Jerusalem in the Future:
The Challenge of Transition

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About the study

Divided cities are quite often microcosms of much larger geopolitical conflicts. They are, as Fred Boal writes, an encapsulation of the broader geopolitical conflict and its different political, economic, spatial, and cultural dimensions. This is particularly true of cities like Jerusalem, Sarajevo, Mostar, Nicosia, Belfast, or Beirut in the past. The major problem this book seeks to address is the future of the divided city of Jerusalem and its prospects of transition from conflict to peace.

Shlomo Hasson examines the territorial, social, economic, and political developments in Jerusalem and explores how they may affect possible solutions to the problem of Jerusalem. Shlomo Hasson and Rami Nasrallah explore the different possible futures that may be played out in the city due to the impact of local, national, and international developments. Rassem Khamaisi proposes the alleviation of the Palestinian plight through the realization of the right to the city. Amiram Gonen explores new ways of strengthening Jerusalem by creating new contacts between Israelis and Palestinians. Noam Shoval examines the morphology of the city and the impact of the security barrier on everyday life.
Ifat Maoz presents survey data on public opinion regarding different solutions to the problem of Jerusalem.

**About the Institute**

The awareness to the importance of policy research has been growing in Israel in recent years. The Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies is the initiative of Dr. Steven H. Floersheimer to establish an institute focusing on long term policy issues. The institute’s objective is to research fundamental trends which future policy makers will face, to analyze their long term ramifications, and to recommend policy and strategy options to policy makers. The fields of research at the Institute are: Relations between Religion Society and State in Israel; Jews and Arabs in Israel; Israel and its Arab Neighbors; Society, Space and Governance in Israel.

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Additional Publications on Jerusalem

- Yaacov Garb, *The Separation Barrier and Jerusalem's Arab Neighborhoods: Integrate or Separate But Don't Postpone*, 2004
- Moshe Amirav (Ed.) *Mr. Prime Minister, Jerusalem*, 2005 (Carmel publishing and the Floersheimer institute)

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Jerusalem: the Challenge of Transition

Shlomo Hasson

Introduction

Divided cities are quite often microcosms of much larger geopolitical conflicts. They are, as Fred Boal writes, an encapsulation of the broader geopolitical conflict and its different political, economic, spatial, and cultural dimensions. This is particularly true of cities like Jerusalem, Sarajevo, Mostar, Nicosia, Belfast, or Beirut in the past. The major problem this book seeks to address is the future of the divided city of Jerusalem and the prospects of transition from conflict to peace.

Hypotheses

Over the years Israelis and Palestinians who considered the issue of Jerusalem within the overall conflict came up with two radical approaches: One approach, which is the dominant one, argues that any solution to the Jerusalem problem has to be postponed until the macro conflict between Israelis and Palestinians is resolved. This consideration has guided most of the peace initiatives until now, including the Oslo Accord and the Road Map initiative. Another approach, sometimes described as thinking the unthinkable, assumes the opposite. It states that resolving the Jerusalem problem is a precondition for any resolution of the macro geopolitical conflict. The failure of the Camp David Summit of 2000, in which Jerusalem proved to be the main stumbling block, lends some support to the argument.
The two approaches express two hypotheses, or even political theories, which are radically different from each other. The first might be termed the *dependency hypothesis*, as it views urban development at the urban level as dependent upon changes at the macro geopolitical level. The second approach, which argues just the opposite, might be termed the *autonomy hypothesis*, as it views developments at the urban level as independent of, and crucial for, conflict resolution.

**Major arguments**

The argument advanced by the contributors to this book is that these two hypotheses are one-sided and tend to oversimplify a much more complex reality. The main features of this argument can be summarized as follows:

*Relative autonomy.* The approach presented in this book steers an intermediary course between the dependency and autonomy hypotheses. It is suggested that the problems of divided cities are partly dependent upon and partly autonomous of the macro conflict. This argument might be titled “the relative autonomy of divided cities”. On the one hand, this argument recognizes both the importance of the macro conflict in shaping everyday life in a divided city, and the importance of the permanent solution for a divided city. On the other hand, it argues that the nature of the macro solution and its stability over time will be largely dependent on developments within the divided cities.

*Dual role.* The divided cities are quite often at the heart of the geopolitical conflict. As such they might become important sites that inflame tensions between ethnic or religious groups, or serve as accommodative arenas that support conflict transformation and peace building. The dual role played by divided cities is due largely to their symbolic and political significance in most divided regions. This is clearly demonstrated by cities like Jerusalem, Sarajevo, Nicosia, or Belfast and, historically, in Berlin.

**Overview**

These two points – relative autonomy and dual role – are examined by six studies that cover different fields associated with the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians over the city. Shlomo Hasson examines the territorial, social, eco-
onomic, and political developments in Jerusalem and explores how they may affect possible solutions to the problem of Jerusalem. Shlomo Hasson and Rami Nasrallah explore the different possible futures that may be played out in the city due to the impact of local, national, and international developments. Raseem Khamaisi proposes the alleviation of the Palestinian plight through the realization of the right to the city. Amiram Gonen explores new ways of strengthening Jerusalem by creating new contacts between Israelis and Palestinians. Noam Shoval examines the morphology of the city and the impact of the security barrier on everyday life. Ifat Maoz presents survey data on public opinion regarding different solutions to the problem of Jerusalem.

Recommendations

All the studies in the book point to the relative autonomy and the dual role played by the city. The implications for policy makers are not hard to see. The implications are, essentially, as follows:

1. Any progress toward conflict resolution should seek to integrate urban and national-regional developments. One cannot explore developments in divided cities in isolation from the broader geopolitical conflict.

2. Any progress toward conflict resolution must adopt a long-term perspective that considers developments in the divided city before, during, and after reaching an agreement.

3. Since developments in a divided city might have a significant influence upon the possibility of reaching an agreement, and even upon the stability of the entire agreement once it has been reached, policy makers should pay careful attention to political, economic, social, and cultural developments within a divided city. A successful transition from conflict to peace in a divided city may have a positive affect on the macro transition.

4. In case no comprehensive or partial agreement is reached, the question is: which measures need to be taken at the urban level in order to minimize the chances of conflict escalation or of a shift from an ethno-national conflict to a larger conflict?
The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in Jerusalem: The Challenge of Transition

Shlomo Hasson

Introduction

Over the forty years since 1967 the city of Jerusalem has witnessed dramatic changes in its demographic, territorial, economic, and political structure. And yet, very little thought has been given to the impact of these changes on possible solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over the city. Symptomatic of this phenomenon is the fact that numerous ideas raised over the last forty years about how to resolve the conflict over Jerusalem clearly assume that nothing has happened on the ground.

My argument is that any solution to the Jerusalem problem has to take into consideration the changes that have occurred in the city since 1967, and should attempt to move from that reality to the desired solution, rather than the other way around. In a nutshell, I argue that given the current developments in Jerusalem, it is in the two parties’ interest to reach an ultimate resolution of two states, each with its capital in Jerusalem. However, given the political developments on both sides, such an ultimate resolution is currently impossible. In other words, the existing situation is undesirable, and the desirable ultimate resolution currently cannot be achieved. This is the kind of trap in which Israelis and Palestinians find themselves caught at the time of this writing (2007). Is there a way out of this trap? Can something be done in order to alleviate the problem and pave the
way toward a better future? It is possible to chart a transition trajectory that leads the two parties away from the current situation toward the ultimate resolution charted above, without necessarily reaching it now?

These issues are indeed at the heart of this chapter. My main purpose is to explore the process of transition in the city, while taking into consideration existing patterns and trends and possible future development. Such an exploration requires a careful examination of the following questions:

1. What are the trends that have occurred in Jerusalem between 1967 and 2007?
2. How have these trends shaped the city of Jerusalem?
3. What are the future trends?
4. What is to be done?

The chapter is divided, accordingly, into four sections. The first section analyzes the current trends taking place in Jerusalem. The second describes the emerging territorial, social, economic, and political patterns. The third portrays a spectrum of possible developments regarding the city’s future. The fourth suggests several ideas as to how to alleviate and resolve the urban problem.

1. Problems and Trends

Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs approach the city of Jerusalem with their own national aspirations, which are deeply rooted in history and religion. Each group relates to the city with claims of its own rights, and has its own narrative as to its relations with the city. For the Jewish people, Jerusalem is the capital city founded by King David in the tenth century B.C.E. It is Zion, the site of the first and second temples, a place often cited in Jewish sources and liturgy. Religious Jews pray to God three times a day for the gathering of the exiles and their return to Zion. As such, Jerusalem is a main symbol of nationhood associated with religion, history, narratives, memories, and the sense of belonging to the Jewish people. Jerusalem has been the capital of the state of Israel since 1949, the seat of parliament, government, and the Supreme Court, and serves as a symbol of Israel’s statehood.
For the Palestinians, Jerusalem is the cornerstone of their historical, religious and cultural attachment to the country. Arab armies entered Palestine and captured Jerusalem in 638 C.E. The Arab conquest began 1,300 years of Muslim presence in what then became known as Filastin. Palestine was holy to Muslims because the Prophet Muhammad had designated Jerusalem as the first qibla (the direction Muslims face when praying) and because he was believed to have ascended on a night journey to heaven from the site upon which the Dome of the Rock was later built on the Temple Mount. Jerusalem became the third holiest city of Islam after Mecca and Medina. The Haram al-Sharif (the noble enclosure) with the al-Aqsa mosque and the Dome of the Rock serves not only as religious but also as a central national symbol in the Palestinian iconography. The specific claims over Jerusalem are part of a larger moral debate between Jews and Palestinians concerning rights to the land in the country as a whole. For the Jewish people, the return to Zion has been justified on three moral grounds: return to the ancestral (biblical) land, refuge from persecutions and pogroms in Europe that culminated in the Holocaust, and an international obligation (the mandate awarded to Britain by the League of Nations in 1920) and obligation in international law (the UN resolution of 1947) to support a Jewish homeland and later a Jewish state in Palestine.

The Jewish claim to the land has been rejected by the Palestinians. What the Jews see as a just act of return to their ancestral land is conceived by the Palestinians as a European style “colonial movement”, which sought to de-legitimize the Palestinians and dispossess them of their birthright (Khalidi, 1983). The Palestinians’ claim to the land is grounded in their long history of settlement in the country and their roots in the land. International support for a Jewish homeland was interpreted as an injustice, and the UN resolution of 1947 to partition the country and give the minority Jewish group 54 percent of the land was perceived as unjust and dishonest. The displacement of Palestinians during the 1948 war (as they were evicted or chose to leave) and the world’s indifference to their plight are interpreted as an evil, which must be redressed by realizing their claim to the right of return.
Geopolitical Complexity

Jerusalem is thus at the heart of an ethno-national conflict, the roots of which lie deep in the history of the two national groups (Hasson, 2004). What makes the resolution of the Jerusalem problem extremely difficult is its geopolitical complexity. This complexity is related to the fact that Jerusalem is both a central and a frontier city. It is an ancient and modern city, which is shared and divided. It is a city of multiple cultures, which is extremely poor. Finally, it is a city where the Palestinians are the minority but a metropolitan area where the Jews are the minority.

Central city. From a religious cultural and national perspective, Jerusalem is a holy city for the three monotheistic religions. In addition, it is the capital of Israel and viewed as the capital of the emerging Palestinian State.

Frontier city. Although a central city, Jerusalem is a frontier city. It is located on the fault-line between two national groups and at the meeting point of two intersecting transnational axes. The north-south axis forms the skeleton of the Palestinian territory and the west-east axis connects West Jerusalem with the Dead Sea, Amman, and Tel Aviv.

Ancient city. The spiritual essence of Jerusalem lies in the Old City, which is the theatre of holy sites and monuments.

Modern city. Most of the population, however, lives outside the Old City in the early- and-late modern city. The negotiations over Jerusalem tend quite often to ignore the quality of life of the people living outside the Old City and to subordinate the political discussion to historical and religious symbols (Hasson, 2002; See Figure 1).

Shared city. The Israelis and Palestinians who live in Jerusalem share the same space and interpenetrate each other.

Divided city. Jerusalem is divided between Jews and Arabs who tend to live in different sections of the city. Beside the ethno-national division, each group is further divided into sub-groups based upon religious commitment, attitude towards modernity, and socio-economic status. (See Figure 2).
Figure 1

The Cities of Jerusalem
Figure 2
Ethno-national division of Jerusalem
A city of multiple cultures. Beside the ethno-national division, Jerusalem is a city of many other social divisions. Within the city, secular and ultra-orthodox Jews collide over the nature of public space, modes of behavior and allocation of public resources. A similar division has been noted among Arabs, expressed in an underlying tension between modern and traditional and somewhat fundamentalist groups. Environmental organizations oppose private and public plans, which in their view might harm the city. Finally, the city is socially divided into middle class and affluent neighborhoods on the one hand, and lower class neighborhoods on the other. In the past, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, this social division was associated with urban social movements that originated in lower class areas. Since the 1990s social protest in Jerusalem has subsided, and has been replaced by environmental activism and ethno-national protest (Hasson, 2001).

Poor city. Jerusalem is a city of elevated dreams and harsh reality. It is the poorest city in Israel where 30 percent of the citizens, mainly Arabs and ultra-orthodox, live under the poverty line (compared with only 20 percent at the national level).

A converse majority-minority relationship. The Jewish population forms the majority in Jerusalem – 64 percent of the population. However, at the metropolitan level, which includes the surrounding Jewish and Arab cities and villages, the Jews form a minority of less than 40 percent.

Strategies of Action: Between Conflict and Accommodation

As a central and frontier city, Jerusalem is as much a place of conflict as it is a place of accommodation. Both kinds of politics exist in Jerusalem. The politics of conflict lead to division and collision, while the politics of accommodation lead to greater cooperation and engagement.

Conflict Strategies: The Israeli Side

Israel’s major goal is to keep Jerusalem united under Israeli sovereignty, and to maintain a Jewish demographic majority in Jerusalem. This form of planning has been defined as partisan, in the sense that it gives priority to the interests and values of one party over the other (Bollens, 2000). To achieve its goals in
Jerusalem, the State of Israel has adopted a series of strategies that aim to strengthen the Jewish presence and disempower the Palestinian population. Four main strategies can be identified in this regard: (a) territorial annexation, (b) zoning regulations, (c) residency and access restrictions, and (d) demographic control. The extension of Israeli services and social welfare benefits (National Insurance and health benefits) to the Palestinian population was the compensatory price for these measures (Hasson, 1996).

**Territorial annexation**

In the aftermath of the 1967 war, Israel expanded the municipal boundaries of West Jerusalem by 70,500 dunams, from 38,000 to 108,500 dunams (8,500 to 27,500 acres), and extended Israel’s law, jurisdiction, and administration to East Jerusalem. In so doing, the State of Israel annexed the 6,500 dunams of East Jerusalem, as well as another 64,000 dunams around East Jerusalem, all of which were hitherto controlled by Jordan, to West Jerusalem. Of the 70,500 dunams incorporated into the city, the Israeli government expropriated 24,000 dunams to build new Jewish neighborhoods. These neighborhoods, which encircle the city and delineate its new boundaries, are home to 170,000 Israeli Jews, that is, one-third of the Jewish population of the city.

**Zoning and Building Regulations**

To curtail Palestinian growth and expansion, large tracts of land in East Jerusalem, as yet undeveloped, have been zoned as “green areas”. In these green areas, construction is prohibited. Nevertheless, two large Jewish neighborhoods in the northern and southern sections of the city have been built on green areas. Currently, the Palestinian population occupies only 13 per cent of the city’s area. Not a single new neighborhood has been built for the Palestinian population. Indeed one Palestinian neighborhood, the Mughrabi quarter inside the Old City, was completely demolished. Restrictions on Palestinian residential building took the form of municipal measures, which withheld permits for new or expanded construction, and demolished illegal building (Marom, 2004).
Ethnic Residency Rights and Denial of Access

Since the first Gulf War (1990), restrictions have been imposed on movement into and out of Jerusalem, and any such movement by Palestinians requires a special permit. Following the Oslo Accords that divided the West Bank into three distinct areas, new border checkpoints were established, separating the city from its Palestinian hinterland. By separating Jerusalem from the West Bank, access to the city was denied for Palestinians living in the greater Jerusalem area as well as those in the West Bank and Gaza. Within Jerusalem, residency rights were restricted to those who were registered in the census of September 1967. Movement into the city, as well as benefits and property rights, were effectively barred from all Palestinians, including those who were born in the city but failed to be present there when the census took place. Facing a wave of terrorism that turned Jerusalem into the premium target, the State of Israel imposed restrictions on Palestinian access to the city, and in 2004 began construction of a security barrier that surrounds the city from north, east, and south. The security barrier separates Palestinians from Palestinians and severely affects their access to educational, health, and other services.

Demographic Encirclement

The politically motivated Israeli authorities have occasionally determined the ceiling for Palestinian demographic growth in Jerusalem, ranging from 24 per cent in the 1970s to 33 per cent at present. Unlike most Palestinian residents of the city, Jewish residents, by virtue of being Israelis, can move in and out of the city without losing their residency rights. A Palestinian resident, on the other hand, is faced with the threat of becoming an absentee if he/she moves temporarily abroad or, indeed, even a few kilometers outside the boundaries of the municipality.

Conflict Strategies: The Palestinian Side

The Palestinians’ major goal is an independent Palestinian State with its capital in East Jerusalem. In general, however, as Salim Tamari (1998) argues, the Palestinian community in Jerusalem has displayed a considerable degree of apathy to its own fate. This has been the outcome of the social atomization of the popu-
lation in East Jerusalem, largely made up of newcomers from the Hebron area. It also reflects Israel’s welfare policy, which provides the residents with the benefits of social insurance, health services, free mobility, and access to the labor market denied to the other residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Nevertheless, the residents of Jerusalem have displayed some resistance to Israeli control, which has taken several forms: civil disobedience, political mobilization, possessing the land, and violent resistance.

*Civil disobedience.* The Palestinians have never recognized Israel’s authority over East Jerusalem. Palestinian residents of Jerusalem entitled to take part in the municipal elections have opted by and large not to do so. In the 2003 municipal elections, turnout among Palestinian voters was 3 percent, compared with nearly 50 percent among Jewish voters.

*Political mobilization.* During the first decade of Israeli rule, Palestinian activists led grassroots mobilization through a network of underground political parties and professional groups based in Jerusalem. The forum that led this mobilization was the National Front and the Association of Professional Unions. Another vehicle for confrontation was the Higher Islamic Committee, also based in Jerusalem, which relied on religious sentiments and the spiritual status of the city to galvanize public opinion.

*Possessing the land.* In the struggle against the Israeli efforts, the Palestinians have developed an endurance policy of possessing the land known as *summud*. The most visible feature of the *summud* strategy is the extensive spread of illegal building activities, especially in the last decade, inside Jerusalem and on its outskirts. This strategy may partially explain why the Palestinian population more than tripled between 1967 and 2006, from about 70,000 to 215,000, climbing from 24 per cent of the total population to 34 per cent. As part of this strategy, holy places and historic sites have been transformed into major national symbols, serving as a statement of resistance and political control. The mosque of al-Aqsa has become a major symbol of resistance and defiance of Israel’s authority (Abu-Amr, 1995).

Violent resistance. In addition to these piecemeal strategies, the militant Palestinian organizations made Jerusalem a major target for terrorist attacks. Between
the years 2000 and 2004 over 70 terrorist attacks were launched against Jewish civilians in the city, in which 2,200 people were injured and about 300 killed.

**Accommodation Strategies**

Beside the conflict-oriented strategies, both parties have developed some conflict accommodation mechanisms. Since 1967 Israel has refrained from any symbolic act in the area of Temple Mount / Haram al-Sharif, and the Muslim Waqf administration has been allowed to run the holy place. Over the years an informal division of labor has developed at this holy place: the Israeli forces are deployed at the outskirts of the complex, in charge of the overall security, whereas the Waqf authority is in charge of internal management and maintenance. Moreover, the Muslim community through the Awqaf Administration has been involved in restoration and innovation of commercial centers, monumental buildings, and selected courtyards, thus maintaining the Muslim presence and ambiance of the Old City.

On the practical level, the Palestinian residents of Jerusalem are entitled to the Israeli social security benefits and health insurance, and have access to Israel’s labor market. They enjoy autonomy in education; the curriculum is set by the Palestinian Authority. From the legal standpoint, the situation of the Palestinians in Jerusalem is rather complex. They are considered by the Israeli authorities to be residents of the city and as such are entitled to participate in municipal elections. However they are not citizens of Israel and therefore cannot vote in the Israeli Knesset elections. As Palestinians they are entitled to take part in the Palestinian general election, electing the Palestinian President and Legislative Council. In reality only a small minority of the Palestinians participate in the municipal elections and only one third participated in the general elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council in 1996 and 2006. Politically, it seems that the Palestinians in Jerusalem live between two political systems, avoiding a clear and overt identification with either of them.
2. Emerging Patterns

The trends described so far have a far-reaching influence on the city’s structure. They shape the territorial and social fabric, the economic patterns, and the political structure of the city.

Territorial and Social Patterns

Over the years Israel has managed to gain territorial control over Jerusalem and its environs. This is clearly manifested in the Israeli neighborhoods built on strategic sites in the northern, southern, and eastern sections of the city. Within the Old City of Jerusalem, Jewish settler groups with the support of the Israeli government have acquired about 80 properties outside the Jewish quarter, especially in the Muslim quarter, thus strengthening Jewish presence in the Old City beyond the Jewish quarter. But in spite of the Israeli political goal of maintaining Jewish majority in the city, the Jewish presence in the city has declined over the years from 76 percent in 1967, to 66 percent in 2006. It seems that territorial changes made by Israel have not secured a stable Jewish majority in Jerusalem. Demographic forecasts anticipate that the Palestinian population will surpass the 40 percent mark in 2020.

In spite of Israel’s claim that Jerusalem is a united city, in reality the city is deeply divided, both territorially and socially. With few exceptions, Israelis and Palestinians live in separate neighborhoods. Most of the Jewish population lives in the western side of the city, while all the Palestinians live in the east. Even the Jewish neighborhoods built after ‘67 in areas located beyond the green line – that is, in East Jerusalem – are well segregated from the adjacent Palestinian neighborhoods.

The few exceptions are Palestinian neighborhoods settled by Israeli Arabs who moved to Jerusalem from northern Israel. Another exception is the move by Arab families, mostly Israeli-Arabs and some from East Jerusalem, to Jewish neighborhoods located at the northern section of East Jerusalem: French Hill (Hagiv’ah HaTsarfatit), Pisgat Ze’ev, and Neve Ya’akov. This is a new phenomenon, associated with the construction of the security barrier that curtails the Palestinians’ option of settling outside the city. As a result, housing prices in
the Palestinian neighborhoods have sharply increased, leading some households to relocate into adjacent Jewish neighborhoods.

The residential segregation is closely linked with commercial and transport separation. There is no link between the central business districts of East and West Jerusalem, and the transportation systems are almost totally isolated from each other. One system serves the Palestinians, and the other the Israelis. The Old City of Jerusalem, seat of monuments and relics of the three religions and cultures, is highly neglected. With the exception of the Jewish Quarter, no attempt has been made by the Israeli authorities to preserve the other quarters or to rehabilitate declining areas.

A bird’s eye view of Jerusalem would reveal a city made up of three distinct sections: the Old City, the inner city, and the outer city, which is subdivided into the outer city to the east, north, and south, and the outer city to the west.

*The Old City* is made up of quarters that are isolated and confessional in character. There is widespread desertion of the middle and professional strata to the suburbs. While the Muslim, Christian, and Armenian quarters are becoming pauperized, the Jewish quarter – by virtue of its expansion and reconstruction – has been transformed into a relatively affluent ghetto. In recent years, however, the well-to-do Jewish families are moving out, and their place is taken by ultra-orthodox Jews.

*The inner city* is made up of Arab neighborhoods, ultra-orthodox Jewish neighborhoods, and secular-Jewish neighborhoods. This area, which is made up of well segregated areas or ghettos, includes the historic Arab and Jewish neighborhoods built outside the Old City during the late Ottoman and British mandate periods, and those neighborhoods built until 1967. The inner city is an atomized city that has a segmented communal character. The Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem continue to display a confessional, “closed” character. Only in the outer areas of Sheikh Jarrah, Shuafat, and Beit Hanina can one see a pattern of bourgeois modernity that emerged in the 1950s.

There is also a substantial degree of communalism, one is tempted to say ghettoization, in the Jewish part of the city – particularly among the ultra-orthodox communities, such as in Mea She’arim and the Bukharan Quarter, where urban consciousness is subordinated to an internal religious normative ethos. In the
rest of the inner city however, both in working class Sephardic communities and in European Ashkenazi quarters, one can witness an urban culture which resonates with issues common to European cities: tenancy and property battles, environmental struggles, the citizen as a consumer, and other campaigns which are integrated into local and national politics.

The outer city, which spreads to the east, north, south, and west, is made up of Jewish fortress-like neighborhoods bordering on over-crowded Arab neighborhoods and rural communities. These neighborhoods and communities are territorially segmented, and exhibit a high degree of localized consciousness. The Jewish neighborhoods, such as Ramot Alon, Neve Ya’akov, Pisgat Ze’ev, Armon Ha-Natsiv, and Gilo, are mainly dormitories and lack strong commercial and social centers. The Arab rural communities, such as Silwan, Tur, and Azariyeh, have become fully urbanized, but without urban consciousness. Shuafat, Beit Hanina, and Ras al Umud are dormitory communities, from which people commute to work elsewhere. None of these communities have substantial shopping centers or communal centers, and they completely lack the internal economy, which typifies traditional urban communities (crafts, or food processing). The only exception to this spatial feature is the prosperous Jewish suburbs to the West, and well-to-do Arab neighborhoods to the north that link Jerusalem with Ramallah.

The structure of the outer city clearly indicates that the traditional inner division of Jerusalem between Israelis and Palestinians now extends to the metropolitan area. Thus, for instance, along the road that leads from Jerusalem eastwards towards the Dead Sea, one may come across Palestinian and Jewish villages and settlements, which are well separated from each other. It is in this area that the security barrier separates between Palestinian neighborhoods located on both sides of the fence, and on some occasions between Palestinian and Jewish neighborhoods.

This urban structure, which is made up of the Old City, and inner and outer city, reflects the different mechanisms that shape the city: ethno-national and cultural trends in the center, geopolitical trends to the east, and economic trends to the west and north. Within the Old City and the inner city of Jerusalem, the geographic pattern of the Israeli and Palestinian neighborhoods make any territorial solution based upon demographic separation extremely problematic. (See
Figure 1). Within the Old City, the presence of the three communities makes any solution based upon separation extremely problematic. Within the inner city, as Figure 1 clearly shows, the Palestinian axis of neighborhoods that runs from north to south is intersected by a Jewish axis of neighborhoods that runs from west to east. The two axes intersect around the French Hill. A similar pattern repeats itself in the metropolitan area east of Jerusalem. Indeed, one of the most heated controversies between Israel and the Palestinian Authority is over the E1 Area that lies east of Jerusalem along the road connecting the city with Ma’ale Adumim. The Palestinians interpret Israel’s building plans in this area as an attempt to cut off the northern section of the West Bank from the southern one. For the Israelis who live in Ma’ale Adumim this section is of the utmost importance, because it links their settlement with Jerusalem.

The geographic divisions at the urban and metropolitan levels clearly attest to the fact that Jerusalem is transforming from a divided city to a divided metropolitan area. This divided area is engulfed by suspicion and fear. In spite of strong claims made by Israeli policymakers regarding the unity of Jerusalem, the two communities mistrust each other and there are few contacts between residents of East and West Jerusalem, whether they live in the Old City, inner city, or metropolitan area. The psycho-geographic detachment implies a practical division of the city. The interesting question is what will happen in the future to the relations between the two communities. From a city divided by a wall, Jerusalem is transforming into a city surrounded by a wall, and the question is how this will shape the relations between the two parties. Will it deepen suspicion and mistrust and lead to further escalation? Or maybe the opposite is true, and by blocking the exit option it will bring the two communities closer to each other as has happened in the past with Arabs who live in Israel?

Economic-Spatial Patterns

There is a deep socioeconomic gap between Israelis and Palestinians in Jerusalem, which is due partly to the historical circumstances prevailing in the city before 1967 and partly to the unequal allocation of resources by the Israeli authorities since 1967. This gap reveals itself in levels of education, income per family, and occupation. Geographically, this gap is manifest in marked differences between East and West Jerusalem in terms of physical infrastructure.
(paved roads, open spaces, sewage facilities) and public services (health services, schools, clubs). The Jewish neighborhoods enjoy a much higher level of services than the Palestinian neighborhoods; it is estimated that the Palestinian Jerusalemites who form about one third of the city’s population receive only 9 to 12 percent of the municipal budget (Margalit, 2006: 111).

The general impact of the social and spatial policy decisions is that Jerusalem has lost its status as a metropolitan center for the Palestinian population of the central West Bank. Up until the mid-1980s, East Jerusalem was the major urban center for the West Bank as a whole, and served as a combination of a market town and a religious center, as well as an educational and cultural magnet for the country as a whole. By restricting access to the city, Israel contributed effectively to the separation of East Jerusalem from its natural geographic environment (Bethlehem to the south and Ramallah to the north), eventually undermining the city’s position as a market and service center for West Bank Palestinians (Tamari, 1998).

The increasing tension between Jews and Arabs, coupled with the cultural rift between secular and ultra-orthodox Jews, has given West Jerusalem a negative image. In Israeli public opinion, Jerusalem has become associated with conflict, national fanaticism, religious fundamentalism, intolerance, and distrust. In spite of the fact that the city boasts the best university in Israel and a large number of students – traditionally a source of human capital – this does not translate into economic growth and urban prosperity. Quite the contrary, many young Israeli Jerusalemites choose to move out of the city, thus triggering further economic decline. A similar trend has been registered among young and affluent Palestinians who choose to move to Ramallah, which has turned into the political and economic center of the West Bank.

**Political Patterns**

Jerusalem exhibits political patterns that are very different from each other: ethnocracy in the Israeli authorities’ treatment of the Palestinians, democratic deficit in the representation of the Jewish secular population in the municipality, grassroots activity, and an apathetic public response to local politics.
Ethnocracy

Ethnocracy is a political model that seeks to strengthen the dominant national group by excluding and reducing the impact of the minority group. Exclusion in Jerusalem takes on a variety of forms: economic limitations on development and growth; unequal provision of services; setting limits to migration in order to maintain a certain “demographic balance”. In this case, preference has been accorded to members of the dominant Jewish group in terms of housing, economic development, demographic growth, and expression of culture and history.

The Arab residents of East Jerusalem have traditionally boycotted the municipal elections and therefore have no representatives in the city council. Theoretically, the members of the city council, whilst all of them are Jews, could represent the interests of the Arab residents, but, with a few minor exceptions, this has not been the case. The Arab residents have been treated at best as tolerable and at worst as a security threat. Under these circumstances, the political model developed in Jerusalem vis-à-vis the Palestinians can be defined as an ethnocracy.

Democratic Deficit

Democratic deficit is the current pattern of representative democracy practiced in West Jerusalem. The secular population, which forms the major segment of the population, is underrepresented in the city council. On the other hand, the ultra-orthodox community, which forms about 20 percent of the city electorate, holds the majority of power positions in the city council, including the position of mayor.

Grassroots Organizations

Ethnocracy and democratic deficit have exacerbated social and political tensions in Jerusalem, leading to protest activity. Jerusalem’s politics witnessed a stormy wave of Jewish protest movements in the 1970s and 1980s associated with poverty-related social movements on the Israeli side. The first and second intifada in Jerusalem, as well as the tax boycott exercised by Arab merchants, may also be interpreted as a form of political protest undertaken by the Palestinians. The main difference between the Jewish and Palestinian organizations is that the latter reject the Israeli system and are more conflict-oriented. The Jew-
ish organizations, on the other hand, although challenging the system, accept its basic political ideology, and their main concern is the distribution of services. Some of them may resort to conflict strategies and some may look for more conciliatory measures, but at the bottom line they all accept the basic principle of a Jewish and democratic state.

**Apathy**

Apathy is another political model exhibited by Jerusalem’s residents. Within the Jewish population it is manifest in an ongoing decline in the rate of participation of secular Jews in local politics. In spite of the fact that the secular population forms a majority among the electorate, its tendency to avoid participation in municipal elections enabled the ultra-orthodox to gain control over the city. In the heyday of Teddy Kollek, the mayor of Jerusalem from 1965 to 1993, his secular list could run City Hall without any partner, which he chose not to do. Today, on the other hand, the city is run by an ultra-orthodox and national-orthodox coalition, and the secular lists form a minor opposition.

In the Arab sector, the situation is even worse. The Palestinians lost control over East Jerusalem in 1967, but their political deterioration had started much earlier. This has been associated with the loss of the political elite, the class of notables, which in the mandate period (between 1920 and 1948) constituted a national elite. The war of 1948, migration, and the loss of the trade networks with the coastal region all contributed to the demise of this class. During the fifties and sixties the remnants of this elite were incorporated into the Jordanian governing class. Others maintained powerful positions in the Awqaf administration, now shared with Hebron families.

With the Israeli rule over the city (1967 to the present) these elites were reduced to the status of merchant families that continue to maintain family property and interests, but no longer constitute the component of a national elite that was completely submerged by the emergence of the PLO. The fusion of the PLO bureaucracy into the West Bank and Gaza locale elites after 1994 did little to revive the demise of these notables. What replaced them was not a new rising stratus of professionals, party apparatchiks, and returnees – as happened in Gaza, Nablus, and Hebron – but the gradual atomization of power. The results of the legislative elections of 1996 and 2006 to the national assembly were illus-
3. Future trends: Possible Developments

What, then, is the potential impact of the territorial, demographic, socio-economic, and political trends identified here on the future of Jerusalem? Where are they leading the city? And how are they going to affect any possible solution to the city’s problem? Jewish presence in the Old City and Israeli domestic politics, as Dumper argues, strengthen Israel’s control over the city, rendering full Israeli withdrawal unattainable. The geographic jigsaw puzzle-like structure - the inner and outer city - will make any territorial solution extremely problematic. The prospects for such a solution have shrunken dramatically with the construction of the security barrier/wall that surrounds the city.

The ethno-national division, fear, and suspicion that engulf the city make any solution based on cooperation and co-management very unlikely. Indeed, the possibility of shared sovereignty or any other form of joint management seems utopian given the hard line assumed by the Hamas-led government that refuses to recognize the Oslo agreements, to halt terror, or to recognize Israel’s right to exist. Generally speaking the current conditions in Jerusalem intensify and deepen the existing ethno-national division, and make the prospects for any solution as gloomy as ever before.

This does not mean, however, that reality is frozen, and Jerusalem remains stagnant. Demography is changing in favor of the Palestinians. They now form over one third of the city’s population, and may reach the forty percent mark within a few years. The fact that the exit option has been blocked due to the construction of the security barrier implies urban cantonization of the Palestinian group. The fact that this cantonized group is economically disadvantaged and discriminated against, and politically unrepresented, may lead toward one of the following directions:

Growing resentment that may lead to escalation and conflict. Due to Jerusalem’s unique position in world politics, such an escalation may exacerbate the Israeli-
Palestinian and Israeli-Arab conflict. It may expose Israel to international pressure, and may intensify Israel’s isolation.

**Gradual integration** of Jerusalem’s Palestinian community into the Israeli political, economic and social systems, following the path already taken by the Arabs who live in Israel. This trajectory may be supported by the Palestinians’ will to survive (that is, to find a job), and to consume public services. Further deterioration in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip may augment the integration process. A large Palestinian canton within Jerusalem, which according to some demographic forecasts may account for 40 percent of the city’s population in a decade or two, will remarkably undermine any Israeli claim for sovereignty and control, not only over East Jerusalem but over the western part of the city as well. If politically astute, the Palestinians may choose to stay under Israeli control, on the grounds that a united city will ultimately become a Palestinian one. Against this backdrop, one might expect gradual Palestinian participation in political life, and one cannot rule out the possibility of a Palestinian list that takes part in municipal politics. If this happens, the Palestinians can turn into a leading power in urban politics, thus affecting the future of the city. Some Israelis may celebrate such a cosmopolitan transformation of the city as a sign of the emerging multicultural city, but for others it will be the emerging nightmare of a bi-national city and the end of the vision of a Jewish and democratic state with its capital in Jerusalem.

**Continued apathy** on both sides may support the existing social, economic, political, and geographic patterns. The middle class and the young generation will continue moving out of the city, and the religious-fundamental groups on both sides will have the upper hand. The center of economic and cultural activity will gravitate towards Tel Aviv and Ramallah. Jerusalem’s economic decline will continue. Cynical politicians on both sides will continue “to pledge allegiance” to Jerusalem calling for its “liberation” on the Palestinian side and “maintenance of its unity” on the Israeli side, but these will be empty declarations with no substantive activity to support them on the ground.

Indeed, the three scenarios charted above are different manifestations of political inactivity and prolongation of the status quo. Those who believe in inactivity tend to argue that one has to build upon what is possible rather than what is desired. Reality, proponents of this view would argue, has a dynamic of its own,
and any attempt to produce a radical change is bound to fail. All that remains, according to the short-term realists, is to adopt a humble approach, one that seeks to redress to some extent the current miseries and inequalities (Benvenisti, 1996). The trouble with this short-term realist approach is that in the long run it would ultimately lead either to intensified conflict, to a bi-national city and subsequently to bi-national states, or to continued economic decline.

None of these options seems to be desirable. Political stagnation, in other words, does not serve the interests of either side.

Given the improbability of diplomatic negotiations at the moment and the undesirability of political stagnation, the question that arises is whether something can be done to reduce the threats associated with the status quo without necessarily resolving the problems through diplomatic negotiations. To grapple with this question, one must assume a middle course that avoids the status quo with its threats and risks, and yet be realistic enough to understand that a final resolution is untenable at the moment. So, what is to be done?

**4. What is to be Done?**

The preferred solution to the Jerusalem problem, according to the international community, and many Palestinians and Israelis, is a final status agreement that leads to two independent States, Israel and Palestine, that live peacefully beside each other, with their capitals in Jerusalem. In this solution there are two recognized municipalities in Jerusalem: one serving the Palestinians, and the other the Israelis.

The parameters of such an urban solution are based on the US president Bill Clinton’s principles of demography and territorial contiguity. The Clinton proposal of December 23 2000 stated very clearly that areas inhabited by Arabs will be Palestinian and those inhabited by Jews will be Israeli. Even the holy area of the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif and its environs are to be divided between the two parties. The only exception to the separation principle appears in the option relating to the excavation site under the Haram al Sharif and behind the Western Wall, where functional arrangement is recommended.

Unfortunately, developments on the ground associated with the territorial and social developments do not support immediate realization of international deci-
sessions, nor do they support smooth realizations of Clinton’s proposals with regard to Jerusalem. It is against this backdrop that one should prepare for two different types of solutions:

A short term solution based on a gradual sequence of activities that may lead from the current situation to the final status charted above.

A long term solution based on a final status agreement reached when the diplomatic arena becomes ripe for it.

Both the long term and the gradual solutions are based on the premise that the two parties are going to stay in Jerusalem whether the other side likes it or not, and that a mechanism has to be set so that the parties’ moral claims and rights to the city are respected.

Short term solution

The short term solution may take several forms:

One municipality with two assemblies following the Brussels model. This short term solution is premised on Palestinian participation in municipal elections, along with preparation for future separation. The elected city council will be in charge of physical development, planning, and the environment, while social, cultural, religious, and educational issues will be the domain of two assemblies, one for each nationality. In the future the assemblies will serve as the cores around which two separate municipalities will be formed, and the general city council may serve as a model for cross-border cooperation on regional issues. The advantage of this short term solution lies in its ability to foster new concepts of a shared and open city. The disadvantages are associated with the mutual suspicion, intensification of ethno-national tensions, and prolongation of the occupation for the Palestinians. If successful, this solution may transform Jerusalem into a bi-national city.

Unilateral disengagement with one municipality that serves the Jewish population and the few Palestinians who remain in the city. The Palestinians may choose to establish another municipality in their area. This interim solution, which is based on partial separation, can be achieved in the short run. On the positive side, it will enable the Palestinian Authority to assert control over part
of Jerusalem without paying any price. Israel, on the one hand, will be able to preserve a Jewish majority within its part of the city. On the other hand, however, this kind of solution will unfortunately lead the Palestinian residents of Jerusalem from one form of occupation to another (even harsher) occupation. They will be denied the social and economic benefits to which they are presently entitled. Moreover, this solution fails to address the major issues associated with the Old City and the holy places, which will remain within the borders of Israel.

Three boroughs under Israeli sovereignty. This solution may be an outcome of an interim agreement, whether formal or informal. The advantages of this solution lie in its ability to bring about partial remedies to the geopolitical, political, and social problems of Jerusalem. Geopolitically, it may encourage a model of an open city, and can be achieved in the short run. In fact the borough system may facilitate technical and economic contacts between the boroughs, thus paving the way towards cross border cooperation in the future. Politically, it partially resolves the democratic deficit, allowing the Palestinians to fully participate in municipal elections and in decision making. Socially, it leads to homogenized boroughs and creates within each borough a strong sense of solidarity and empowerment. The disadvantage is the continuation of the occupation for the Palestinians. Finally, this solution might become a permanent solution with all the social, economic, and demographic ramifications which that entails for the two parties.

None of these options are satisfactory from a long term perspective, in so far as none of them mark the end of conflict. However, given the current conditions, under which the prospects of advancing the diplomatic process are slim and the looming threats immense, these short term solutions may nevertheless help in changing the parties’ frame of reference, thus supporting further progress toward a long-term solution in the future.

Long-Term Solution

In the long run there is a need for a final resolution, which takes the complexities of the city into consideration. Such a solution must be based on the principles of separation, sharing, and cooperation. In charting this solution I have
learned a great deal from the numerous proposals raised over the years regarding Jerusalem. These proposals can be divided into two groups:

*Territorial partition.* This is in essence the Clinton proposal of December 2000.

*Functional division and cooperation between institutions:* joint sovereignty, co-management, division of functions, or transfer of functions to a third party. Those who recommend this approach strongly argue that absolute sovereignty has lost its meaning, and that states share and cooperate on a multitude of issues, from physical infrastructure to ecological surveillance and economic development.

In the current situation it seems that territorial partition, rather than functional division of the city, may better serve the ideologies and interests of the two parties; yet, the functional solution should not be entirely discarded. There are holy sites that may lose their value if partitioned, and there are public infrastructures whose efficient and effective operation requires technical cooperation and joint management. Jerusalem’s problem is far too complex to be resolved by one overall approach, whether it is separation or functional sharing and co-management. Instead of an overall solution, I suggest a set of solutions guided by the principle of separation, but containing a certain measure of functional division and cooperation, *i.e.* shared sovereignty and cooperation. The balance between separation and functional cooperation will vary over time and space (the different parts of Jerusalem as outlined below). Moreover, given the current wave of hostility, violence, and mistrust, I suggest piecemeal progress towards the proposed solutions.

*Separation* is the guiding principle in the solutions proposed here. It relates to both the division of sovereignty and to the separation of municipal government. Division of sovereignty within Jerusalem is unavoidable if Israel wishes to maintain its authority in West Jerusalem and to preserve its regime as a democratic state. The transfer of land to Palestinian control will be gradual, starting with outlying areas and proceeding to the central part of East Jerusalem, including areas such as Sheikh Jarach and Salach a-Din. It will be conditional upon and linked to progress made in other critical areas such as borders, refugees, and ending the conflict. The territorial division will be followed by institutional separation and the establishment of Israeli and Palestinian municipalities within
shared sovereignty is the recommended strategy for sites, areas, and services that may lose their value if divided or separated. Joint sovereignty or international custody within the old city is the only way to ensure the smooth operation of this tiny yet precious area. Any attempt to divide this medieval city, as outlined for example in the Clinton proposal, will have a devastating effect on everyday life in the old city. Gates and international checkpoints posted in the narrow alleys will severely affect the movement of residents and tourists in the city, eventually undermining the city’s value and attractiveness. Urban considerations of historical preservation, cultural protection, and economic efficiency require co-management in this area. The main difficulty with this proposal is the high level of mistrust between the two parties, which makes any cooperation extremely unlikely. It is suggested therefore to treat this proposal as a long-term goal, to be realized only after the successful implementation of other components included in this framework. However, if trust and confidence cannot be built even at this later stage, the option of international management of the old city should be seriously considered. Functional sovereignty in the holy places within the old city and its environs aims to maintain the existing status quo. According to this solution the various denominations will continue to hold their status and perform their functions as per the status quo prevailing in the holy places since 1852.

Cooperation in the economic spheres as well as in the service spheres is necessary for economic and social welfare reasons. I agree that economic and regional cooperation may help in building confidence, but I do not think that cooperation should be a substitute for territorial division of sovereignty. One should be reminded that even in Western Europe, division of sovereignty and delineation of borders preceded economic cooperation. In my view, political interests that aim to achieve geopolitical stabilization should guide economic and regional cooperation, and not the other way around.

Summary

Current developments in Jerusalem are leading the two parties in the direction of the status quo situation with all its negative features: continued occupation,
socioeconomic discrimination and widening social gaps, increased political ten-
sion, changing demography in favor of the Palestinians, democratic deficit, and
ethnocratic regime. All these developments may exacerbate the conflict, en-
hance the city’s economic decline, or lead to a bi-national city, an idea that was
never popular and has no significant support today.

Under the current political conditions the chances for a final status agreement
that would lead to two recognized capitals within the framework of permanent
peace are slim. This seems to lead to a vicious circle: the existing situation is
not desireable but the desireable situation cannot be achieved. The question that
arises at this point is how to avoid the threats associated with perpetuation of
the existing situation without being able to reach a final status agreement. This
is in my view the major challenge of transition facing Jerusalem today.

Grappling with this challenge requires creativity and courage in devising alter-
natives for short-term or interim solutions, without losing sight and hope of a
long-term and permanent solution. Three interim solutions that may signal the
transition from the current situation to the desired future have been advanced
here: one city council with two assemblies following the Brussels model, uni-
lateral separation, and three boroughs. In my view the only humanist alternative
to the status quo option is the three borough option.

It should be reiterated that the boroughs model is conceived of as an interim
solution on the way to the long-term solution of two independent states with
their capitals in Jerusalem. To realize this transformative stage, there is a need
for short- and long-term activity on the part of Israelis and Palestinians. Short-
term activity should be based on joint action taken by Palestinians and Israelis
in order to further develop and realize the concept of the three boroughs as an
interim municipal solution. This may involve an education and awareness camp-
aign to expose the public and the government to the idea. Long term activity
should chart the way from the three boroughs solution to the permanent solution
of two states with two capitals in Jerusalem. This solution should incorporate
the ideas of separation, sharing, and cooperation.
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Introduction

The question of Jerusalem is one of the most sensitive issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. During the peace process launched in September 1993, which resulted in the signing of the DoP (Declaration of Principles), resolution of the issues related to Jerusalem were postponed to a later stage, in May 1999.

But repeated delays occurred in meeting the timetables necessary to reach a permanent status agreement as planned. During the Camp David II summit in 2000 the Jerusalem problem surfaced as the major obstacle on the road to peace. The failure to resolve the problem and to reach an overall agreement led to a violent confrontation. That violence, at least in part a result of tensions surrounding the holy places, has had a negative impact on the city and its future.

* This paper is based on a broader and comprehensive work carried out by a multi-disciplinary, bi-national team of Palestinian and Israeli Jerusalemites. The work was coordinated by the International Peace and Cooperation Center (IPCC) and the Futura Institute, and supported by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. We kindly acknowledge the contribution of members of the two teams. On the Palestinian side we would like to thank Amin Amin, Abdallah Owais, Rassem Khamaisi, Shahad Waari and Omar Yousef. On the Israeli side we would like to thank Daphna Duek, Nimrod Goren, Yifat Maoz, Eetta Prince-Gibson, Marik Stern, and Noam Shoval.
More than ever before, Jerusalem has taken on mythical proportions for both publics. Israeli political leaders have continued to repeat the same rhetoric about a “unified Jerusalem,” while Palestinian political leaders have focused on the demand for national rights for Palestinians in East Jerusalem.

The rhetoric and declarations on both sides are disconnected from the city’s everyday life. Jerusalem must be treated differently, taking into consideration that it is a living city that is precious to the billions of followers of the three monotheistic religions. Jerusalem does not belong solely to the Palestinians. Nor does it belong solely to the Israelis.

With no hope of peace on their horizon, the Palestinians experience a tense situation of being “on hold”, exacerbated by the construction of the separation wall. This has created a misleading calm and quiet in the city, enjoyed by Israelis over the past year. But the quiet is a deceptive illusion, and it should not be believed.

The city is not only suffering in the political sphere. While circumstances are very different for Palestinians and Israelis, the city is collapsing for both of them. The city of Jerusalem cannot tolerate the absence of any positive progress, and cannot survive without intervention by both the parties engaged in the conflict.

The negative migration of the Jewish and Palestinian middle classes and the flight of educated families who have the means to leave the city have accelerated and there was a halt in domestic and international tourism. Now the city is recovering, but slowly and hesitantly.

Even as it struggles to recover, Jerusalem continues to deteriorate functionally, economically, socially, politically, and internationally.

Something must be done. Immediately. As this study definitively proves, Jerusalem will not “wait” passively for future solutions. The city cannot tolerate a vacuum. There is an urgent need to answer the following question: how can the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over Jerusalem be resolved? Indeed, the problem haunts the imagination of policy makers and academics alike. Hundreds of proposals have been presented over the years, but with little success. It seems that one of the major reasons for this failure has to do with the confusion of “what is
desired” with “what is possible”. It is precisely that confusion that this study seeks to address.

So far, the various solutions advanced regarding the problem of Jerusalem have been based on a sincere belief that the desired future is also possible. This conceptual mistake breeds mistaken policies. Conceptually, what is possible is not necessarily identical to what is desired in so much as future developments (scenarios) may significantly differ from the desired solution raised by policy makers. One must thus recognize and prepare for alternative developments, and subsequently devise strategies that can enable a move from these developments to the desired future.

The approach presented here draws a clear distinction between the desired vision, and possible future scenarios. The scenarios are the product of a complex methodology based on a systematic consideration of the perpetuation of, or extrapolation from, the current situation. These scenarios clearly reveal that in the absence of forward movement, the situation can only deteriorate, as the “Scorched Earth” scenario (detailed below) so bleakly demonstrates. Unlike previous proposals regarding the Jerusalem problem, which tended to focus on the issues of sovereignty, holy places, and municipal organization, the scenarios presented here go beyond these critical issues, relating to everyday life in the city. Unlike previous proposals, which treated Jerusalem as a contested political space, the approach presented here relates to the city as a living, breathing place. It looks into the practical and psychological issues that shape and frame peoples’ lives and focuses on the real experience of political/urban/economic and social transformation.

In contrast to previous proposals, which have focused almost exclusively on formal principles and general frameworks, the approach underlying this chapter assumes that given the current situation, in order to achieve a viable resolution to the conflict in Jerusalem, it is necessary to define the desired situation in concrete terms and to examine the obstacles on the path to reaching it.

It is believed that Jerusalem is a dynamic city whose people wish to live peaceful and meaningful lives. Unlike the Israeli and Palestinian negotiators who have focused mainly on political issues, it is attempted here to integrate
geopolitical formulas with social equity, urban planning, and a sense of city and place.

In contrast to “leaving Jerusalem for last,” it is assumed that Jerusalem can, and perhaps must, be “taken-on first,” serving as the catalyst for the resolution of the entire conflict.

With regard to policy, the distinction between possible and desired futures implies a careful study of the barriers and opportunities strewn along the route that leads from the possible futures to the desired one. By identifying these barriers and opportunities, one can devise a set of strategies that can enable movement from the possible futures to the desired one. Informed by these insights, a team of Palestinians and Israelis embarked upon a threefold project:

1. Developing a set of scenarios;
2. Charting a shared vision;
3. Developing a set of strategies to facilitate movement from the possible situations charted by the scenarios to the desired vision.

The essence of this work can be summarized in three sequential sentences:

1. Here in Jerusalem, we encounter all the hardships inherent in the current situation or in any other conflict-ridden future reality;
2. Jerusalem has the potential to become the capital of two independent states, serving as a world city;
3. It is essential that we devise a set of strategies that will take us from the current reality, or any other conflict-ridden reality, to a situation in which the potential of Jerusalem can be realized.

The Scenarios

Scenario building applies systematic thinking and planning procedures to complex, dynamic, and seemingly unpredictable realities, by examining the interrelationships between the factors that influence those realities. A scenario is neither a blueprint nor a prediction. Although it is based on probability and plausibility, the scenarios we have formulated do not forecast what will happen;
rather, they offer well-developed ideas about what might or could happen. Because scenarios show that the future may, at least in part, be shaped by actions and decisions taken by leaders and the public, they help to identify what has to be done to secure a desired outcome and avoid an undesirable one.

Scenarios can thus serve as important guides to strategic policy planning: on the one hand, they can tell us what has to be done in order to avoid potential threats; on the other, they can show how to maximize potential opportunities.

Scenario-building is a sophisticated process that demands that the participants ask many “what if” questions and come up with convincing answers that can withstand the test of logic. While not necessarily agreeing on which scenario might actually happen, or even which is desirable, the participants do have to agree on the nature of the current situation and the factors, whether certain or uncertain, that may affect it. The structure of the process encourages complex, multidimensional thinking. Although rigorous, the process is iterative, participatory, open, and informal, and does not depend on a rigid planning instrument. The process is logical yet also allows for emotions and consideration of values and positions. It simultaneously encourages consensus and stimulates creative thinking. Throughout this process of scenario building the Palestinian and Israeli teams identified four major driving forces:

- Strength of Governments
- Occupation
- Role of Civil Society
- International Intervention

Around these driving forces, the two teams have developed five scenarios which are briefly described below and presented in detail in the following pages:

1. **Besieged City**: The occupation continues, unchanged. Israeli policies in the city deepen the fragmentation of the Palestinians’ urban and social fabric. In the shadow of the construction of the wall, East Jerusalem is cut off from its hinterland and from the rest of the West Bank. The social and spatial segregation between the two national groups deepens, leaving almost no interaction between the Israelis
and the Palestinians. The Palestinians continue to live between the Israeli and Palestinian systems while belonging to neither. There is one municipality and the Palestinians continue to boycott the municipal elections.

2. *Scorched Earth*: The city is ostensibly “united” under Israeli occupation and control, but is exclusively dominated by Jewish presence and dictates, especially in the Old City and the inner neighborhoods of East Jerusalem. The Palestinian Authority is on the verge of total collapse and the Israeli government is also weak, allowing extremists on both sides to control the political scene. Citing demographic and security considerations, the Israeli government unilaterally separates parts of East Jerusalem from the city of Jerusalem. The Palestinians, formerly under “civil” Israeli occupation within the city, now find themselves under an even harsher occupation in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, which has become a security zone under full Israeli control. Everyday life has been almost completely disrupted, and the international community has retreated.

3. *Bi-national City*: Occupation continues, and Palestinians within the city take part in municipal politics. There is one municipality with a dominant Palestinian representation and role, due to the Palestinian’s demographic size, indicating the possible establishment of a bi-national regime between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea.

4. *Hybrid City*: The two governments accept an interim agreement (formal or informal). There are three boroughs under Israeli sovereignty: Palestinian, ultra-orthodox, and non-orthodox Jewish. The Palestinian borough has functional autonomy over issues of everyday life, excluding planning and security. The Old City could possibly be designated as a fourth borough with a special status.

5. *City of Bridges*: The two governments reach a permanent agreement – two states with two capitals. The two capitals are politically separated, with clear political borders. Palestinians live in the Palestinian city, and Israelis live in the Israeli city. However, with regard to
movement, economic and commercial activities, and work, residents are free to engage in joint ventures on both sides, to move throughout the city and to work on either side with whomever they wish, even though they live under different systems.

**Scenario 1: The Besieged City**

1. **Strength of Governments**: The Palestinian Authority loses its ability to function on all levels. The Israeli government is unwilling to engage with the Palestinian Authority and tables the peace process.

2. **Occupation**: The Israeli occupation continues. Palestinians in the city continue to live between the Israeli and Palestinian systems while belonging to neither.

3. **Role of Civil Society**: Civil society collapses as the elite and middle classes in both East and West Jerusalem flee the city.

4. **International Intervention**: The international community continues to support the Palestinian Authority, avoiding significant support for Jerusalem.

**The Scenario Narrative**

*The issue of relevant partnership for peace is still an obstacle for direct negotiations between the two sides. Israel is engaged in unilateral action meant to serve exclusively Israeli interests.*

The Palestinian Authority is unable to maintain security or disarm the militant armed groups. The Israeli government is unable or unwilling to influence public opinion regarding compromise in Jerusalem, and is disinterested in placing the question of Jerusalem on the negotiating table.

Occupation continues. Israeli forces fail to redeploy from the West Bank or even to move back to the lines of September 2000, prior to the second *intifada*. This weakens the Palestinian Authority government even further. As a result, the Palestinian Authority is unable to enforce its leadership on the national level. Local
guerrillas and militias continue to control the neighborhoods and streets of the cities and villages in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Jerusalem is an ongoing source of hostility and conflict escalation. Due to the construction of the wall, the Palestinians in the city are financially and socially overburdened. East Jerusalem is losing its centrality and urban continuity with the West Bank, as East-Jerusalemites are caught between two systems (Palestinian and Israeli) under one dominant Israeli system. This creates severe social, economic, and political pressure which affects every aspect of everyday life for the Palestinians.

In both parts of the city, urban, economic, and political deterioration leads to the emigration of the elite and the middle class. Civil society is active but ineffective. Some Track II, Women’s, and other NGOs do meet regularly; they are able to reduce mutual negative stereotypes between elites but are unable to influence the general public. Due to the deadlock, the international community avoids any significant intervention in the city, viewing its main role as preservation and protection of the Palestinian community in three ways:

1. Strong warnings to Israel against any act that might threaten possible future solutions (e.g., Israeli confiscation of lands in East Jerusalem and expansion to the east by building in the E1 area);
2. Support for Palestinian NGOs and institutions;
3. Encouragement of Palestinian and Israeli civil society-based organizations engaged in Track II diplomacy and positive encounters.

**Scenario 2: Scorched Earth**

1. *Strength of Governments:* The non-functioning Palestinian Authority is on the verge of collapse, with no domestic or international influence and no ability to resist Israeli domination. The Israeli government is strong enough to implement its unilateral disengagement plan in Jerusalem.

2. *Occupation:* Occupation continues and intensifies. Construction of the Wall generates further ethnic cleansing and increasingly expels
Palestinian Jerusalemites to the West Bank, where the Palestinian authority is unable to provide for any of their needs.

3. *Role of Civil Society:* Civil society is weak. Moderates and peace entrepreneurs are regarded as traitors and extremists become the leading force.

4. *International Intervention:* The international community retreats, except for humanitarian aid.

*The Scenario Narrative*

Unable to take decisive action, political leaders on both sides pander to extremists and allow peace spoilers to undermine the last vestiges of stability and moderation. Neither side is able to limit or restrict violent extremism.

As the Palestinian population grows, Israeli policymakers, concerned that Palestinians may constitute a majority in the near future, prefer to maintain the “Jewishness” of the city, at the expense of any pretense of democracy.

Israeli authorities push the Palestinians outside of Jerusalem’s municipal boundaries, first by deliberately making life untenable and intolerable; subsequently, by taking over large blocks of housing in East Jerusalem, including the Old City, and forcibly evicting their residents.

The Palestinians are deported over the wall into the West Bank. However, since the Palestinian Authority has essentially collapsed, it is unable to provide for any of their needs.

Politically and socially disenfranchised, many are on the verge of starvation. Lacking effective leadership, the Palestinians are unable to mount significant political resistance or to enlist any international intervention.

There is limited access to holy sites and the national conflict is increasingly redefined in religious terms. The humanitarian crisis provides fertile breeding ground for increased religious extremism among Palestinians and Israelis. Because of the violence and guerrilla wars on the streets, supply chains to Jerusalem are broken and there are periodic shortages of supplies such as gasoline and foodstuffs. Throughout Jerusalem, public services are provided sporadically, at
best. The anarchy allows criminal elements to act with impunity. Organized and unorganized crime makes life dangerous for all.

Within West Jerusalem, the municipal council is dominated by ultra-orthodox and ultra-nationalist parties. The municipal council, consisting solely of Jews, votes to prevent the few remaining Palestinians from participating in municipal institutions, and the police issue a series of restrictive regulations of Palestinian freedom of movement, access to services, and employment.

Peace spoilers and extremists agitate against peace entrepreneurs. The jingoistic press completely marginalizes all moderates and all moderate positions. Both Jewish and Palestinian peace and human rights activists are assassinated.

The international community no longer believes in the Palestinians’ nor the Israelis’ sincerity or commitment to the peace process. It ceases to even attempt to mediate the situation. Jerusalem, threatened from without and within, is abandoned. Anarchy threatens to spread to countries in the region, especially Jordan and Lebanon, with their large Palestinian populations. Revolts and armed insurrections plague the region.

Scenario 3: Bi-National City

1. Strength of Governments: the two weak governments are unable to reach any political agreement. The Palestinian Authority dissolves, while the Israeli government is unable to maintain the “Jewish character” of Jerusalem.

2. Occupation: the occupation continues but paradoxically undermines itself. The municipality is transformed to one shared by the two national groups.

3. Role of Civil Society: in the absence of any significant political Palestinian government, Palestinian civil society asserts itself and becomes actively involved in municipal governance from the neighborhood to the municipal levels.

4. International Intervention: The international community directs its main support to both civil societies.
The Scenario Narrative

The weakness of both governments leads to the generation of a single municipality, with poor quality of life, decreased Palestinian national identification, and increased Jewish disengagement and internal strife.

The power struggle between the Fatah and the Hamas weakens the Palestinian Authority. Attempts to find a compromise in the form of a unity government are short lived. The political and economic siege on the Palestinian government is not eased. As a result, there is further deterioration in Palestinian quality of life, reaching the point of a humanitarian crisis. Israel maintains control over security issues. The international community and neighboring Arab states realize that in order to provide some relief to the Palestinians, they must assume responsibility for the humanitarian aid, social support, and everyday management in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The international community endorses this form of intervention and provides economic support and social support for civil society.

In Israel, the political shockwaves of the Second Lebanon War undermine the political and military apparatus. Polls clearly indicate that the public does not trust the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister, and a large percentage of the public thinks that the government is corrupt and inefficient. The debilitated Israeli government is too politically weak to act decisively in Jerusalem; it is unable to either pursue final-status agreements or to impose unilateral decisions. As the city of Jerusalem becomes poorer and less attractive to the middle classes, the bulk of Israeli society “disengages” from its own capital.

As occupation continues, the Palestinian population in Jerusalem devotes most of its energy to survival: finding a job, shelter, and food supply. With little support from the attenuated Palestinian Authority, and with little hope for final-status or even a long-term, stable agreement, the Palestinians adopt a new strategy. They demand respect of human rights including the right to the city, which involves proportional allocation of public resources among the Jewish and Palestinian populations and equal participation in decisions concerning these allocations.

There are many meetings between Palestinian communities and Israeli public officials, to discuss the allocation of resources in order to improve the Palestini-
ans’ quality of life in Jerusalem. This is because the Palestinians feel that their leadership has abandoned Jerusalem and that they therefore must take care of themselves and deal with the Israeli government instead. The Palestinian national elite and NGOs, on the other hand, boycott the Israeli government and wish to influence development in Jerusalem through interaction with the international community.

The intense contacts between Jerusalemite Palestinians and Israeli officials stand in sharp contrast to the declining contacts with Palestinians behind the wall. The separation wall acts as a major barrier for political and social contacts between Palestinians and other Palestinians. Many Palestinians, who in the past regarded themselves as sitting on the (metaphoric) fence, belonging to neither side, now choose the survival strategy. First a few, then followed by many, decide to participate in the municipal elections. Subsequently, the Palestinians become massively involved in Jerusalem’s political life, participating in Israeli-appointed neighborhood administrations and voting in Israeli-dominated municipal elections.

Apathy, disenfranchisement, and alienation deepen in the Israeli Jerusalemite population. Civil society groups work on peace education, and Jerusalemites increasingly accommodate the presence and full, egalitarian involvement of Palestinians in the life of Jerusalem. At the same time, because Palestinian civil society is strong and well-coordinated, from the grassroots level to municipal level leadership and elites, the Palestinians are, within a few years, to play a major role in the municipal council.

The Palestinians who form forty percent of the population of Jerusalem become the leading political party in Jerusalem’s City Hall. The municipal structure is preserved under the same Israeli laws and regulations and planning system. There is one municipality over West and East Jerusalem including the Old City, with dominant Palestinian representation under Israeli sovereignty.

The Central government in Israel, and civil society within and beyond Jerusalem, are divided between those who affirm this process and those who strongly oppose it. Right wingers within the Israeli government and within civil society seek ways to reverse the process, by denying Palestinians the right to vote. Nationalists in Palestinian society condemn the participation in municipal elec-
tions, but others support it and argue that this is the democratic way by which Palestinians can have influence over both East and West Jerusalem. At the center of the debate is the future image of Jerusalem. This debate can be resolved in two different ways, which mark the possible outcomes of this scenario:

1. **Outcome 1:** The Palestinians participate in the municipal elections and become the dominant power in City Hall. Along with the ultra-orthodox, they form an integral part of the city coalition, taking control of the planning and budgeting committees. In these positions they control everyday life in West and East Jerusalem and have a far reaching influence on the development of the Old City. The cultural affinity between the ultra-orthodox Jewish and conservative Palestinian society in terms of religiosity, modesty and relations between the sexes, and respect for holy places strengthen the political coalition. The ultra-orthodox-Palestinian coalition reallocates funding in a more just way, so that Palestinian life improves significantly and rapidly. This leads most Palestinians to accept the situation readily. Since the coalition has no political support from the Israeli government or from Israeli society, and daily life continues undisturbed, most Israelis accept this new situation, and the bi-national municipal council is strong enough to overcome the peace spoilers and religious/nationalist extremists on both sides.

   Jerusalem is viewed by the international community as a successful example of a multi-cultural and bi-national city, where Jews, Muslims, and Christians manage to overcome old animosities and develop the city to the mutual benefit of the two dominant constituencies and the three monotheistic religions.

2. **Outcome 2:** The Palestinians’ participation in the municipal elections results in an ongoing conflict between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs. The two parties collide over the division of power and allocation of economic resources. The unbridgeable national programs of the two groups lead to an internal split within the municipality. As tensions mount, the municipality becomes less effective and the city residents express their disappointment by condemning the city council and mayor and by boycotting municipal elections.
Under these circumstances, the Israeli central government, which was never happy with developments in Jerusalem, decides to disband the municipality and to appoint a special minister to administer the city. The Israeli government is condemned by the international community for obstructing the democratic process, but is tacitly supported by Palestinian NGOs and individuals who regard Palestinian participation in municipal elections as an act of treason. This will lead to an apartheid system.

Scenario 4: The Hybrid City

1. **Strength of Governments:** The two governments are strong enough to control peace spoilers but are not yet able to reach a final status agreement. They manage to sign a partial agreement within the framework of the road map.

2. **Occupation:** According to this partial agreement, Palestinians have functional autonomy in Jerusalem in the form of a borough with limited security and planning responsibilities, and full control over their daily lives.

3. **Role of Civil Society:** Moderates and peace entrepreneurs proliferate and are active, but play a marginal role. East and West Jerusalemites each live within two political systems; each has distinct political citizenship (Israeli/Palestinian) and a shared urban affiliation (Jerusalemite).

4. **International Intervention:** The international community attempts to contain the situation by acting as a facilitator and supporter of peace entrepreneur activities.

The Scenario Narrative

While both societies have tired of the conflict, neither government is strong enough to reach a full final-status agreement. The Palestinians reach the conclusion that in the absence of full recognition of their national rights, they can achieve, at least for the time being, municipal recognition and autonomy.
The Israeli government is unwilling to renounce its claims to “a united Jerusalem as the eternal capital of the Jewish people.” At the same time, concepts regarding functional autonomy have gained political popularity and the government is under extensive domestic and international pressure to remove itself from the eastern neighborhoods. It is clear that the Israeli government is not intimidated by violence/terrorist activity, but rather is motivated by the specter of a bi-national state between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. Thus, while it is still unwilling to negotiate a permanent status agreement, the Israeli government is willing to reach an interim agreement (not limited by a defined timetable).

The Palestinian Authority comes to the conclusion that it is impossible to reach a full peace agreement in the short or intermediate term. Preservation of Palestinian national rights and prevention of further deterioration of the conflict are the primary motivations for the Palestinian Authority’s decision.

Based on what it views as a “demographic threat” and a desire to avoid the creation of the bi-national city, Israel agrees to ease the occupation in East Jerusalem. It grants the Palestinians living in the post-1967 boundaries of municipal Jerusalem functional autonomy under a borough system, linked with a Palestinian municipality established in areas proximate to the municipal boundaries.

As a result, the city functionally subdivides into three boroughs: Palestinian, ultra-orthodox, and non-orthodox Jews, all coordinated, monitored, and politically controlled by the central city government. Each borough has some planning and local security authority. National and municipal budgets are allocated proportionately and equally to each borough, and each borough is sovereign to prioritize its budgetary expenditures and means of operation according to the character and preferences of its constituency. In this way the city is reorganized in a decentralized way.

Thus, although Israel continues to impose its sovereignty, it delegates limited security and planning responsibility to the Palestinian borough. Israel annexes settlements around Jerusalem and the highway road system connecting these settlements to the “Jewish City”. This intensified building activity continues to be a source of tension, perceived by the Palestinians as the real obstacle to the peace process and an attempt to restrict the development of a Palestinian capital.
The holy sites become a powerful motivating myth for Palestinians. Their increased sense of injustice and deprivation – exacerbated by prohibitions and restrictions on entering the city – strengthens the religious aspect of the conflict. In response, wary of the role of religion and its potential to escalate the conflict, Israel eases restrictions on access to the holy sites. Confidence that the holy sites are not threatened eases existing religious tensions.

Economic links with Ramallah (for East Jerusalem) and Tel Aviv (for West Jerusalem) are enhanced; as a result, some parts of the wall between Jerusalem and Ramallah have been removed. However, Ramallah and Tel Aviv continue to be attractive to the educated, the economically well-established, and the middle class; negative migration from Jerusalem continues, reaching drastic proportions and threatening the city’s tax base and ability to provide even the most basic services.

Violence decreases considerably on both sides, leading to an improvement in the sense of well-being for both peoples. On both sides, fear dissipates, easing hatred and stereotypes. Yet mistrust and the negative image of the other persist, so there is minimal interaction between the two societies. In addition, both societies feel the need to focus on internal issues, following separate agendas. This allows minimum communication and dialogue between the two communities, which progress in a parallel, almost unrelated, manner.

Because the city is ostensibly quiet, the international community feels little need to intervene on a political or diplomatic level, and concentrates on cross-borough democratic education activities and facilitating the peace process, by bringing both sides to negotiations and guaranteeing that the cycle of violent action-reaction does not resume. In addition, it provides donations and funding, especially to rebuild the Palestinian Authority.

**Scenario 5: The City of Bridges**

1. **Strength of Governments**: the two strong governments are able to resume negotiations over a permanent status agreement, to enlist public support for the peace process, and to control the peace spoilers.
2. **Occupation:** The permanent status agreement brings an end to the Israeli occupation and defines two distinct capitals in Jerusalem for the two states.

3. **Role of Civil Society:** NGOs engage in cross-border cooperation in the fields of economic development, service provision, planning, conservation, and preservation of the Old City.

4. **International Intervention:** The international community facilitates the implementation of the agreement and assists in empowering Jerusalem as a world center.

**The Scenario Narrative**

*Both parties recognize Jerusalem as the key issue and the source of political legitimacy. It is clear to both parties that without a resolution to the issue of Jerusalem, they will not be able to resolve the overall conflict.*

As a result, both the Palestinian and the Israeli governments reach a final status agreement. They are strong enough and politically secure enough to do so. However, in resolving the conflict, Israelis and Palestinians approach the issue from different perspectives: while the Israelis seek to avoid bi-nationalization due to demography, the Palestinians want to fulfill their national aspirations in the city.

This final status agreement marks a change in the relationship between the two national groups: there are two states, each with its own capital in Jerusalem. Domination and occupation are replaced with political separation and functional integration of the city. East and West Jerusalemites each live within two political systems; they have distinct political citizenship (Israeli/Palestinian) and a shared urban affiliation (Jerusalemite). This reflects positively on the daily lives of Palestinians and Israelis and on the city in general.

The Old City is declared a special international area, administered by the two parties with the support of the international community. Peace entrepreneurs are active, promoting inter-community exchange. Professionals articulate a code of ethics for sustainable development, and grassroots organizations write a code of ethics for everyday life in the city. These codes spell out rules of conduct and
behavior in historic and religious sites and the relationships between national 
groups. Preparation of these codes involves a remarkable public debate among 
both Israelis and Palestinians, proving that when they are called upon to deal 
with everyday conduct, members of the two communities essentially strive for 
very similar goals.

The two municipalities coordinate their growth for their mutual benefit and pre-
pare a joint master plan for the city. The plan relates to both sides of the border 
and aims to produce a more efficient system of land uses, avoid duplication of 
infrastructure, and foster positive relations between the two national groups. It 
is clear that the prosperity of both sides is largely dependent on openness, inter-
national centrality, and investment and cooperation across borders.

Jerusalem thus becomes an open, prosperous world capital, serving as a model 
for cross-border Palestinian-Israeli cooperation for the entire region.

**The Shared Vision**

Future-oriented and inherently optimistic, a vision is a coherent, emotionally 
appealing, and convincing statement about a desired outcome – it is an articula-
tion of the way we wish we could live here in Jerusalem.

The process of envisioning enabled the project members to “break out of the 
box.” To create a successful vision, it is necessary to consider the fears and con-
cerns about the future and to recognize the extent to which we have allowed 
these fears to cloud our thinking and obstruct progress towards peace. The 
worst-case scenario provides the negative motivation: it is what we wish to 
avoid. The best-case scenario provides positive motivation: it is what we would 
like to experience, feel, and be.

The vision is premised on the following assumptions:

1. Neither side is going to win by imposing its will on the other.
2. The other side is not going to go away.

The Guiding philosophy stems from a non-humiliation/respect approach. This 
approach accords each group control over its own lives and affairs as long as it 
does not violate the other’s rights. In essence, the vision recognizes Jerusalem
as multicultural and historical city that plays a central role in the national iconography of Israelis and Palestinians. The challenges facing the city are numerous, for example: finding a way to accommodate one group’s view when it conflicts with that of the other group; finding a way to maintain a unified public realm and be sensitive to different cultures; finding a way to establish an ongoing dialogue and to live with differences. The answer to these challenges appears in the following vision, which states that at some point in the future, Jerusalem will be:

- the unique capital of two states: the State of Palestine and the State of Israel.
- an Open City, politically divided yet physically united. A city in which people and goods flow freely between different sectors, and between the different sectors and the surrounding environs.
- a city of peaceful coexistence.
- a viable complex city with a high quality of life.
- a city of diversity and equality.
- a world city and a universal center of peace and conflict resolution, part of the global network of world cities.
- a city that combines the strengths of its cultural and religious heritages with tourism, financial services, and information technology and light industries.

**The Vision Narrative**

*The vision is based on the premise that Jerusalem will become two capitals for two states, each with its own strong government. Each nation will maintain its own national and municipal compounds in the city. We affirm that both the Palestinians and the Israelis have the right to self-determination and separate states; at the same time, we reaffirm our commitment to the economic and physical integration of the city. This vision is predicated, among other factors, on a common understanding that Jerusalem has the potential to serve as a world city and that, uniquely among the cities of the world, its essence is holi-*
ness, respect, openness, and tolerance between members of the three religious communities.

The two sovereignties, with their two capitals, will maintain clear and defined borders within the city, yet Jerusalem will remain open and demilitarized. Goods and people will move safely and freely across the transparent borders that politically separate and functionally integrate the two cities, guaranteeing economic sustainability.

The vision attends to issues of economic growth; religious life and the holy places; culture; public services; education for peace; the media; higher education; and the concept of “home” for each of us, as individuals and as collectives (see Detailed Vision below).

We have paid particular attention to education. In our vision, both societies invest in their educational systems, recognizing that education is the key to creating peaceful societies. Each side takes responsibility for nurturing a culture of peace at home and vis-à-vis the other side. Schools that emphasize freedom, democracy, and social liberties provide the best guarantees that this peace will flourish.

Resolution of the conflict between us is the impetus for the resolution of many domestic difficulties as well. Both sides prosper. Jerusalem is central for both societies and is even able to assist other nations still engaged in conflict.

The Strategies

The strategies are the devices suggested by the Israeli and Palestinian teams in an attempt to bridge the gaps between the possible futures (scenarios) and the desired future (vision). To develop the strategies the group performed the following tasks:

1. Identification of the gaps between the scenarios and the vision, through careful analysis of the barriers and opportunities strewn along the way that could either reduce or enhance the prospects of realizing the vision. This was accomplished by wind tunnelling (testing) the vision through the varied scenarios developed by the team.
2. Devising a set of strategies for each scenario, with the aim of overcoming the gaps between the specific scenario and the desired vision. In so doing, special attention was paid to strategies that reduce barriers and to strategies appropriate for maximizing benefits.

3. Identifying up to three important actors/stakeholders and describing the necessary or desirable contribution which each one of these actors could make with regard to the strategies devised.

4. Charting lines of action for the main three actors in each scenario.

Assuming that four of the scenarios – besieged city, scorched earth, bi-national, and hybrid city – could, in fact, occur, the two teams developed a set of strategies designed to bridge the gap between each specific scenario and the vision.

The gaps between the scenarios and the vision are not difficult to see. With the exception of the City of Bridges, not one of the scenarios is based on a permanent solution that includes two states with two capitals. In each of the scenarios – Besieged City, Scorched Earth, Bi-National, and Hybrid City – East Jerusalem remains under Israeli occupation and the Palestinians in East Jerusalem remain separated from Palestinians in the West Bank. The city thus fails to become the capital of two states; it also fails to serve as an open, world city.

Although these gaps are common to four of the five scenarios, there are, however, basic differences in the nature of the gaps between the scenarios. The Scorched Earth scenario is the furthest from the vision, characterized by further escalation of the conflict. In this scenario, the ethno-national conflict transforms into a conflict of civilizations and religions, as the wall cuts off part of East Jerusalem from the Old City and its environs. The Hybrid City and Bi-National City scenarios chart some improvements in the social and economic conditions of the Palestinians and portray some cooperation between the two communities. As such, they may serve as milestones on the road to the vision, signalling the possibility of conflict transformation. The Besieged City scenario lies somewhere between the Scorched Earth and the Hybrid and Bi-National scenarios. Taken alone, this scenario attests to the perpetuation of the status quo.

Based on an analysis of the gaps, the team outlined four major strategies:
1. Escalation prevention
2. Conflict management
3. Conflict transformation
4. Conflict resolution

*Escalation prevention* seeks to avoid or ease the Scorched Earth scenario. It is based on emergency measures initiated by the international community and supported by civil society on both sides of the city. The strategy of escalation prevention has three major components:

1. Restoration of security and stabilization of the situation, in an attempt to reduce violence and advocate political agreement;
2. Engagement of civil society in a search for a better future for each side and for Jerusalem;
3. Initiation of a peacemaking process that may lead to an interim agreement.

*Conflict management*, associated with the Besieged City scenario, alleviates the discriminatory practices that characterize the current situation and seeks to improve the situation by initiating an eight component strategy:

1. Guaranteeing freedom of association to Palestinians and permitting them to reopen their national and service-based institutions in East Jerusalem;
2. Making policymakers aware of the hardships confronting Palestinian and Israeli residents of Jerusalem by developing the Jerusalem Index (an ongoing poll that monitors quality of life in the city);
3. Promoting economic and urban development in order to enhance economic opportunities and social interaction;
4. Publicizing the scenarios in an educational campaign that illustrates and warns of undesirable outcomes;
5. Articulating a vision for a better future which addresses both policymakers and the public;
6. Reviving the centrality of Jerusalem by bridging the socioeconomic gaps between the East and West cities and initiating joint enterprises, particularly in the fields of tourism and information industries;

7. Networking within civil society to create a joint Israeli-Palestinian framework for analysis and ongoing monitoring of the situation in the city;

8. Forming a network of divided cities in order to share and exchange urban experience.

Conflict transformation, associated with the Hybrid City and Bi-National city scenarios, attempts to confront a situation that, while different from the current situation, remains inherently unstable. In both cases there is still a long way to go toward the vision, but some improvements and changes have already been affected. The challenge in both cases is management of a city that is either divided into boroughs or based on functional cooperation between Palestinians and Israelis in the administration of the city. These situations present new opportunities for further transformation of the conflict.

In the case of the Hybrid City, the proposed strategies are:

1. Melting down the borders between the Palestinian borough in Jerusalem and the Palestinian territories;
2. Empowering the Palestinian community;
3. Enhancing inter-communal cooperation.

In the case of the Bi-National city, conflict transformation may take the form of:

1. Articulating a joint vision for Jerusalem;
2. Educating toward a shared city;
3. Initiating and supporting joint ventures in the economic, educational, and public spheres.
Conflict resolution, associated with the City of Bridges scenario, charts the steps necessary to reach the ultimate resolution, based on two states with two capitals. The activities required are easy to list - but extremely difficult to implement:

1. Concluding a peace agreement between the two parties, including an agreement over territorial division of the city;
2. Creating an economic agreement concerning the nature of Jerusalem as an open city;
3. Engaging international support in the form of economic investment, including investment in the information technology industry in Jerusalem;
4. Initiating dialogue across religions and cultures to promote mutual tolerance and respect;
5. Empowering Jerusalem as a capital, central, and world city; a city that engages international civic society, private sector, and governments.

Summary

Previous approaches to the problem of Jerusalem have been advanced by well-meaning and good-hearted people who believed that it is possible to reach the desired situation in one giant leap. While we would have hoped they are right, we believe that we must prepare ourselves for other developments, including further deterioration, maintenance of the status quo, and some improvements due to conflict transformation.

Our message is clear: it will be extremely difficult to move from the current situation to the desired vision. A realistic approach should strive for the highest goal of conflict resolution, but should not neglect other strategies of escalation prevention, conflict management, and conflict transformation.

Reviewing the four strategies, it becomes apparent that civil society, the business community, and the international community can play a significant role in improving the situation in Jerusalem and in guiding the two parties towards the desired vision.
In The Shadow of the Separation Wall: Impeding the Right to the City and Shaping the Palestinian Spatial Environment in Jerusalem/al-Quds

Rassem Khamaisi

Introduction

The process of building the separation wall continues around Jerusalem, according to the decision of the State of Israel. Some argue that the motivations behind the erection of the wall are security and demographics, and that it will ultimately be used as a geopolitical border both of the Municipality of Jerusalem and of the State of Israel; in other words, that the wall will serve as a national border, a municipal border, and an ethno-national border as well. The route of the wall was unilaterally determined by Israel despite the opposition of the Palestinians. Most of it crosses through inhabited areas of Palestinian neighborhoods and separates Palestinians from Palestinians before separating Palestinians from Israelis. The erection of the separation wall is considered one of the largest projects that the Israeli government has initiated in the Jerusalem area since the annexation of East Jerusalem/al-Quds after the 1967 war. The building of the wall in the Jerusalem area is controversial, revolving not only around the motivations behind it and the need to erect it, rather also around its route, the efficacy of its security role, and its implications upon the city and its space. The dispute also regards conceptualization, focusing on the question how the wall is to be called. There are various terms for the wall, like “security fence”, “wall”, “obstacle”, and “separation wall”. The differences between the
names are a result of the dispute regarding the essence of the wall, and express the differences in views regarding the rationale, objectives, and goals of the wall, and its performance and geopolitical status, as well as the narratives of the sides involved and affected by it: Palestinians, Israelis, and the international community.

To date, quite a lot has been written on the implications of the separation wall erected along the entire length of the West Bank (Khamaisi, 2006), and in the Jerusalem area (Michael & Ramon, 2004; Garb, 2004; Kimchi, 2006; Bark, 2004; Brooks et al., 2005), for the fabric of life of the Palestinian population. However, many subjects and aspects have not yet been examined, regarding the effect on the fabric of life in the city of Jerusalem and its space specifically, as well as on the relations between Palestinians and Israelis generally. The separation fence is not a routine physical component in the area. It is a component which creates a new geographic space, and affects the configuration of the landscape and of sociopolitical and socioeconomic links, beyond it being a component which creates the geopolitical space and consciousness of both of the populations – Palestinian and Israeli. The erection of the separation wall does not constitute fulfillment of the demand that “we be here, and they be there.” The wall does not separate. It is possible that in the short term, given the present distribution of power and control, the fence will provide a partial security solution; but it cannot ensure geopolitical and security stability inside of the city of Jerusalem, or between it and its natural urban environs. The argument in this article is that as long as the rights of the Palestinians in the city of Jerusalem are not honored, and geopolitical arrangements are not established to make possible the development of the city for the welfare of its residents and the entire area, the security situation will remain dangerous and unstable as it is now.

This article examines the denial of the Palestinians’ right to the city as a result of the erection of the separation wall, and attempts to draw a general outline of the implications of that denial. First, the principles of the right to the city, developed by thinkers and established in the literature by the French philosopher Lefebvre (Lefebvre, 1996; Salmon 2001; Purcell 2002), will be presented. I shall state at the outset that I am aware of the fact that the point of departure of “the right to the city” is based upon municipal “citizenship”, whereas the situation in Jerusalem is linked to a political national struggle. It is to be expected
that after the erection of the separation wall and its determination as the geopolitical border, leaving a large number of Palestinians inside of Jerusalem, they will be completely denied their right to the city. The right to the city is completely unexercised, as neither side, Israeli or Palestinian, wants to “tie the knot” with the other in the shadow of the security wall; and that is a tested recipe for damaging the city and the fabric of life within it. The power of the centralization of the Israeli nation state, and that of the evolving Palestinian one, will continue to determine the character of the urban space of Jerusalem, and will prevent local residents from shaping the space and their lives independent of central government. Furthermore, both nation states will reject at the outset the idea of granting a special status to Jerusalem as proposed in the partition plan for Palestine in 1947 (UN resolution no. 181), or an arrangement similar to “Jerusalem DC”, which would grant the right and power to shape the urban space to the citizens and residents of Jerusalem/al-Quds, even within the boundaries of the wall. The second part of the article is devoted to the principles of the current policy forced on the city by the central government. That policy is intended to ensure Israeli control and hegemony over Jerusalem, and shapes the urban fabric and the relations within the city. The wall’s implications for the creation of contrasts between Palestinians and Israelis will be described below. The article concludes with a discussion intended to establish the arguments raised within, by presenting scenarios about the types of relations between Palestinians and Israelis in the era of the wall. The article offers a different approach for dealing with the challenge of honoring the Palestinians’ right to the city. Honoring that right might increase stability, contribute to the development of the city and the fabric of life in it, and liberate the city from the siege conditions which the separation wall has created.

*The Right to a City: Between Nationality and Citizenship*

The point of departure of Lefebvre’s idea (Lefebvre, 1991; 1996) is linked to the right of urban citizens and inhabitants to active and effective realization of their urban citizenship. The ensuring and safeguarding of a sustainable right to the city is made possible by transferring the power and the control from the nation state and large financial interests to the urban inhabitants. The idea of “the right to the city” expresses a new and different political view of citizenship and residence. Lefebvre does not define political identity according to terms and con-
cepts regarding civil status as per the national constitution, rather bases it on the
natural definition of inhabitant status. The idea is that all who live in the city are
granted the legitimate right to the city. According to that definition, Lefebvre
determines two basic principles of the right to the city: the first principle is the
right to participation, and the second is the right to appropriation (Purcell,
2003). The right to participation means that the inhabitants of the city fulfill a
central and decisive role in every decision contributing to the creation and shap-
ing of the urban space, including decisions made under the auspices of the state
or large financial interests on all levels. The right to appropriation includes the
inhabitants’ full and absolute right to free physical access to the urban space and
to movement within it, as well as the right to possess and occupy the urban space
and to use it in an unlimited fashion. Harvey (2003) further expanded the defini-
tion of those entitled to the right to the city to include all inhabitants, including
children, immigrants, women, and various sociocultural and socioeconomic
groups. Ya’akobi (2006) defines the right to the city as freedom, realization of
the right to identity and to an individual and a collective way of life, and the
right to participation in decision-making and in creating the urban space. Thus,
the right to the city exists not only due to national, ethnic, or native identity,
rather as a result of day-to-day life de facto in the urban space and among its
consumers. The idea of the right to the city thus presents a challenge to defini-
tions of citizenship according to the liberal democratic or ethnic democratic sys-
tems of government (Smooha, 1998), and contradicts the Westphalian idea by
which political allegiance is determined hierarchically, through the individual’s
joining the nation state (Hettne, 2000). The idea of “the right to the city” can be
included in the framework of the radical approach of reconstructing formal citi-
zenship, manifest in three changes as defined by Purcell (2003): first, the re-
definition of citizenship by weakening the national dimension and reinforcing
the urban-local, or global-cosmopolitan dimension. The second change is the
geographical redistribution of citizenship. This change raises doubt regarding
the strong link between the geographical sovereignty of the nation state and the
political loyalty to the nation state, and leads to a redistribution of the powers
and authority between national and local-urban government. The third change is
the redirection of citizenship away from the national group, considered to be the
hegemonic political society, and from the citizens, who are considered to be a
homogenous entity. Thus redirection of citizenship will lead to the creation of
identification with and loyalty to multicultural political societies. In an age of
globalization, trends which change the traditional relationship between the nation state and citizenship are underway, and a new agenda is raising the importance of locality/municipality, including the right to the city as a space generating a sense of belonging and civil loyalty.

Are such processes possible in Jerusalem, through development of “Jerusalemite” identity and a “Jerusalemite” right? The claim is that in the shadow of the erection of the separation wall, the character of the political regime and the Jewish nation state which guide urban policy and shape the space in Jerusalem, and, on the other side, the Palestinian aspiration to establish the nation state of Palestine with al-Quds as its capital, are two trends which generate national political consciousness that does not allow the development of the right to the city in Jerusalem. That is the claim that will be examined in this article.

Despite the policy of delegation of powers and encouragement of privatization in the State of Israel, the right to the city in Israel is lacking, primarily in Jerusalem. Jabarin noted that the right to the city in the State of Israel is for the most part denied to urban inhabitants, both Jewish and Arab, albeit not equally (Jabarin, 2006: 10). The lack of the right to the city stems from the centralized nature of the political regime in Israel and its control and distribution of power resources (Nachmias, 2005). That centralization is palpably manifest in land management, ownership, and planning (Khamaisi, 2003). The planning system is hierarchical, concentrated, and compulsory. It controls 93 percent of the area of the state via the Israel Lands Administration (Minhal M’karka’ei Yisrael). All the decisions and municipal bylaws are subject to statutes and to the approval of the Interior Ministry, which is responsible for local government. The Interior Minister is authorized to remove mayors, determine municipalities’ zones of jurisdiction, and to approve their plans, including determination of the scope of their income and the distribution of land resources in them on a centralized statutory planning basis. All these are indicators of the weakening of the right to the city in Israel. In the case of Jerusalem, the situation is even worse. There are governmental committees, e.g. “The Ministerial Committee on Jerusalem” (Merchav & Giladi, 2003: 269-272), and even a Minister for Jerusalem Affairs, contradicting the municipality’s attempt to establish agencies and neighborhood committees that would intensify the inhabitants’ partnership and involvement in the management of the city. The question is whether the denial of the right to
the city in Jerusalem will become more severe as a result of the erection of the wall, especially regarding the Palestinian population. Might coalitions of city inhabitants, Israelis and Palestinians, arise as a result of the erection of the wall? Will they lead a civil struggle for their right to the city, led by civil society, as a part of the vicissitudes of the conflict, turning a national struggle over Jerusalem into a civil struggle for the right to the city?

**Existing Policy Denies Palestinians the Right to the City**

The point of departure of the idea of the right to the city is the shrinking role of government, identification with it, and the intensification and reinforcement of the local-urban role. Such a process can develop in cities with political stability and economic prosperity. In cities experiencing political struggle, ethno-political segregation, and socioeconomic gaps, the right to the city will decrease. The governmental policy in Israel, characterized by direct and active intervention in shaping the urban space and in creating the urban fabric of life – intervention which directly limits the right to the city – will be briefly surveyed below.

**The Determination of the City Limits by the Government of Israel**

The national struggle for control in Jerusalem began in the 1930’s. That struggle reached its peak with the partition of the city in 1948 between West Jerusalem, under Israeli control, and East Jerusalem, under Jordanian control. That partition was at odds with the plan for partitioning Palestine into two states, one Jewish and one Arab, with a special status of corpus separatum for Jerusalem. In 1949, the border between East and West Jerusalem was determined as the armistice line, known as the green line. In 1967 Israel conquered East Jerusalem and all the territory of the West Bank from the Jordanians. Israel decided to annex and apply Israeli law to East Jerusalem and the villages adjacent to Jerusalem, such as Shuafat, Isawiyeh, Jabel Mukaber, and Tsur Baher. Israel unilaterally decided upon the borders of those parts of the West Bank to be annexed, including Jerusalem. In 1980 the Knesset enacted **Basic Law: Jerusalem the Capital of Israel**, which determines that “Unified Jerusalem in its entirety is the capital of Israel.” The UN passed a series of resolutions opposing the annexation of the territories of East Jerusalem and of the Palestinian villages
included in the annexed border, comprising approximately 70,000 dunams, whereas the area of jurisdiction of Eastern/Jordanian Jerusalem was comprised of only 6,000 dunams. According to the basic law, the municipal border of the “Unified Jerusalem” Municipality is also the border of Israeli sovereignty. In 2000 the Knesset amended the basic law. The amendment determined that “no authority, regarding areas within the limits of Jerusalem, which is granted to the State of Israel or to the Municipality of Jerusalem, shall be transferred to a foreign political or governing body, or to any other similar foreign body, whether permanently or for a determined period” (Lapidot, 2003: 220). Thus the Jerusalem city limits were determined according to a government decision, and the municipality and its inhabitants had no effect on or involvement in determining them. Thus, too, part of the route of the separation wall, determined by the government, lies along the border of the city as approved by Basic Law: Jerusalem the Capital of Israel, whereas in other places territory was left behind the wall, and in yet other places it annexed additional territories which had not previously been within the Jerusalem city limits or under the sovereignty of the State of Israel. The policy of determining the borders of the city of Jerusalem, which overlap into the Palestinian territories, as the borders of Israeli sovereignty, was based on ethno-demographic and geopolitical territorial considerations. It was determined by the central government, and the urban inhabitants and citizens had no involvement or partnership in it.

The State of Israel annexed Palestinian territory conquered in 1967, determined the Eastern border of Jerusalem, and applied Israeli sovereignty and law to it, but employed a different policy toward the status of the Palestinian population in the city. Since 1967 the State of Israel has given the Palestinian population in East Jerusalem the status of “Permanent Resident in Israel”. As permanent residents they carry Israeli identity cards, but have not received Israeli citizenship, and have continued to hold Jordanian citizenship, yet Israeli residency. Being “permanent residents”, the Palestinians in East Jerusalem are entitled to choose their representatives in the municipality, but being devoid of Israeli citizenship they do not carry an Israeli passport, and are not permitted to participate in Knesset elections. East Jerusalem’s Palestinian inhabitants are also allowed to choose Israeli citizenship, but only a small minority has done so, the decisive majority preferring to continue to hold Jordanian citizenship. Since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, the Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusa-
lem have participated in Palestinian presidential and legislatorial elections. Today, the Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem are torn between three identities; Israeli residency, Jordanian citizenship, and Palestinian political consciousness and participation. Despite the fact that the right to participate in municipal elections was granted to the Palestinians in Jerusalem, they have refrained from doing so. The Palestinians in Jerusalem do not recognize the occupation or forced annexation, and do not want to grant legitimacy to the Israeli occupation through participation in the municipal elections. They thus waive that right, and as a result waive the claim for civil equality in the city, preferring to demand an end to the Israeli occupation. De facto, that complex status, and the political conduct which derives from it, deny the Palestinians of the right to urban participation, and to appropriation, creation, and shaping of the urban space. The Municipality of Jerusalem initiated a policy of establishing neighborhood agencies in the city in order to intensify the participation of the inhabitants in the management of the neighborhood and in fulfilling its needs. In realizing that policy, three agencies were established in the Palestinian neighborhoods in the city: a-Tur, Beit Hanina and Beit Tsafafa (Ramon, 2003: 262-267). As these agencies have not received recognition from the Palestinian population, their ability to represent it and to participate in decision making and shaping of the municipal landscape is limited. Nor did the erection of the wall change the permanent resident status of the native Palestinian population, and thus these agencies’ ability to lead to participation in the shaping and creation of the urban space remains limited.

The Separation Wall and the Demographic Motivation

One of the terms for the separation wall is “the demographic wall”, meaning that the wall is intended to reduce the number of Palestinian residents in the city of Jerusalem by removing the Palestinian neighborhoods, inhabited by approximately 55,000 Palestinians, from the city, and separating Palestinians from Palestinians, such as in the area of a-Ram, Dahiat al Brid, and Abu Dis (Khamaisi & Nasrallah, 2005). Thus, an ethno-demographic policy and majority-minority relations constitute a central component in the determination of the spatial and functional policy of the Israeli government and the Municipality of Jerusalem, and serve as the motivation for the process of erecting the separation wall between Palestinians and Israelis, particularly in Jerusalem (Sopher & Pol-
lack, 2003; Kimchi, 2006). Since 1967, the governments of Israel have determined a policy of ensuring a “demographic balance”, the purpose of which is ensuring a Palestinian minority in Jerusalem no larger than a third of the city’s inhabitants. The formula of 30% Palestinians versus 70% Israelis has guided the spatial planning policy, the housing policy, the political arrangements and the outlining of the city limits (Khamaisi, 2006; Khamaisi & Nasrallah, 2006; Margalit, 2006). The very concept of a “demographic balance” is misleading, as it implies a neutral policy intended to preserve the balance between the two populations in the city. In fact, as mentioned, it is intended to preserve the demographic supremacy of the Jewish population of the city (B’tselem, 1995), and thus contradicts the principles of the idea behind the right to the city, by not entitling all of the inhabitants of the city to participation in and appropriation of the city.

The adoption of the principle of “preserving the demographic balance in the city” constitutes one of the central aims of the new planning scheme for Jerusalem known as “Jerusalem 2000”, with intended implementation by 2020, which includes, for the first time, West and East Jerusalem (Jerusalem Local Planning Scheme 2000; Report no. 2, Current Status Survey and Analysis of Trends, June 2002, p. 26 [Tochnit Mit’ar Mekomit Yerushalayim 2000; Doch mispar 2, Seker Matsav Kayam ve’Nituach Megamot]). This demographic objective and principle is derived from the grand objective of the scheme, which is “establishing the status and continued development of the city as the capital of the State of Israel, as a center for the Jewish people, and as a city holy to the three monotheistic religions.” The “Jerusalem 2000” scheme states that demographic balance “according to the government decision” is the objective which was presented by the municipality and adopted in government meetings (950,000 residents), intending to preserve the ratio of 70% Jews versus 30% Arabs (Jerusalem Planning Scheme 2000: Report 4, chapter 7: 202). The planners, after presenting the demographic analysis according to the existing trends and forecasts regarding the city, determine that “it is very reasonable to assume that if the demographic trends of recent years continue without substantial change, the situation in 2020 will be approximately 60% of the general population living in the Jewish areas and approximately 40% living in the Arab areas (ibid: 202). See table 1 below.
Table no. 1


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>197,700 (74.2%)</td>
<td>458,600 (67.4%)</td>
<td>570,000 (60%)</td>
<td>111,400 (24.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabs</td>
<td>68,600 (25.8%)</td>
<td>221,800 (32.6%)</td>
<td>380,000 (40%)</td>
<td>158,200 (71.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>266,300 (100%)</td>
<td>680,400 (100%)</td>
<td>950,000 (100%)</td>
<td>269,600 (39.6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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In order to cope with that forecast, the planners of the planning scheme propose to enlarge the Jewish population, concluding:

The discussion above leads to the following conclusion: the demographic trends predicted in the various scenarios for 2020 are fundamentally affected by the layout of political, economic, social, and cultural forces, as they have been expressed in practice over the recent years. In order to prevent the occurrence of those scenarios, or worse ones, far reaching changes are needed in the way of dealing with the central variables affecting the immigration/emigration balances and the gaps in birth rates, which ultimately create the demographic balance. Those variables include many subjects regarding personal security, employment, housing, education, the quality of the environment, cultural and social life, municipal services, etc. Due to the sensitive and special situation of Jerusalem, the ability to affect the variables is in the hands of the Government of Israel (ibid: 2004; emphasis in original).
The planners of the scheme were aware of the connection between the borders of the city and the preservation of the demographic balance:

The Municipal Borders – the forecast relates to the city limits as they are. Future changes in the city limits can affect the demographic balance by enjoining other municipalities or other undeveloped territory to the territory of the city, or if territory is removed from the city’s municipal territory (ibid: 201).

Examination of the route of the wall shows that it will include undeveloped territory, remove neighborhoods inhabited by Palestinians, enjoin urban Jewish settlements such as Ma’aleh Edumim in the east and Giv’at Ze’ev in the northwest to Jerusalem, and create Palestinian enclaves, like the Bir Nabalah enclave and the Anata enclave. This route for the wall was approved by the government against the opinion of the inhabitants of the city, especially the Palestinians, and thus their basic right to participate in creating their urban space was denied them.

The Policy of Central Spatial Management and Planning as a Demographic Policy Solution

The demographic and spatial policy is reflected in the spatial planning policy, land designation, and allocation of land for housing (Bimkom, 2006). Marom, who discussed the planning “trap” in East Jerusalem, and demonstrated planning policy, land settlement, building permits, and house demolition, stated:

The attempt to preserve the ‘demographic balance’ amidst the faster natural growth of the Palestinian population violates accepted planning considerations and distorts them. The ‘demographic balance’ leads, de facto, to restrictions on building for the Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem (Marom, 2004: 19; emphasis in original).

The local planning scheme for the Palestinian neighborhoods, as a program, is derived from the principle of preserving the “demographic balance”. Thus, the scope of territory allocated for development of housing, public buildings, and economic use is limited, and no larger than 7.1 percent of the area of municipal jurisdiction, which is 12.7 percent of the area of East Jerusalem, despite the fact that the population there constitutes approximately 33 percent of the inhabitants of the city (Khamaisi, 2006: 79). In addition, despite the fact that Jerusalem is a
city, and that the Palestinian population is supposed to be urban in its patterns of behavior (its housing patterns, building rights, and planning trend in the approved planning schemes), the Jerusalem 2000 plan actually preserves the village format. The objectives of that format are territorial and demographic, not functional. It appears from analysis of the housing plan for the Arab population that the plan proposes one central tool for solving housing needs: densification of the existing neighborhoods. The data in report no. 4 of the Jerusalem 2000 planning scheme shows that for the Jewish population, the scheme allows allocation of 47,000 housing units (real capacity, Report no. 4: 137) and 9,500 dunam for development, whereas for the Arab population the plan allocates 26,000 housing units (real capacity for densification of neighborhoods according to table no. 1, Report no. 4: 139) and approximately 2,300 dunam for development. The inequality is also manifest in a comparison of the allocation of building rights in Jewish neighborhoods and adjacent Arab neighborhoods. The policy of densification, intended to limit the area designated for Palestinian development, which is also the declared municipal and government policy toward the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, contradicts the scheme planners’ claim regarding preservation of the present character of the city. In addition, there is no real possibility of densification in most of the areas in which Palestinian inhabitants live, due to the limitations on building rights and building height, and the scarcity of public land (for public buildings and streets), needless to mention the block on private ownership of land and the complicated arrangement regarding proof of ownership. All the schemes, including the Jerusalem 2000 scheme, have been forced top-down, with little participation on the part of the inhabitants, and without being adjusted to existing sociocultural and sociopolitical circumstances.

Ethno-national Isolation in the Urban Space: Between Achieving Equality and Ending the Occupation

The legal status of permanent residence, maintenance of the demographic balance, reduction of territory by expropriating land, and limitations through statutory spatial planning, as well as the vague geopolitical future, the alienation, the estrangement, and the state of conflict between the two populations in Jerusalem, have contributed to the realization of a policy of separation between their residential spaces in the city. The Palestinian Arabs live separately, and assem-
ble in neighborhoods separate from the Israeli Jews, who live in their own separate neighborhoods. The few attempts of individual extremist Jews to penetrate into and live in Palestinian residential areas do not change the fact that there is a clear separation in Jerusalem, between neighborhoods that are homogenous in terms of ethno-national and cultural identity (Hasson, 1996). This separation is manifest in the urban landscape, and is clearly noticeable both in housing architecture and in the quality of infrastructure and development. The Arab neighborhoods are based mainly upon self-construction. They developed organically, with no prior planning, despite the fact that there are approved schemes for some of them. They lack public building and initiative on the part of contractors. The Palestinian neighborhoods, excepting the Old City and the development around the holy basin, developed from nuclei of villages. They still preserve their village style format, although there are also urbanization processes occurring in them. The social, functional, and spatial behavioral patterns of the Palestinian population are based on traditionalism and conservatism. In light of the limitations which Israel has placed on Palestinian national political organization, the Palestinian leadership in Jerusalem has not become entrenched, and national institutions which create national consciousness have not been established. All these, as well as intense Israeli activity to decrease the political national links between the Palestinians in Jerusalem and the national Palestinian movement, including the Palestinian Authority, have pushed the Palestinian population to turn inward toward local, national, social, and religious leadership within separate “village” neighborhoods. The lack of political stability in the Palestinian Authority, the economic crisis, and the lack of economic opportunities for the middle and lower class to which most of the Palestinian population in Jerusalem belongs, the spatial separation between the Palestinian neighborhoods, their segmentation and surrounding by Israeli neighborhoods and settlements, as well as the policy of supervision and control employed by the Israeli establishment, present the Jerusalemite Palestinian population with challenges and dilemmas regarding participation in the shaping and appropriation of public space in the city. Refraining from participation is the result of internal and external motivations and barriers. Although the Palestinian population lives in and consumes this space, it is not a partner in its creation and management. Any participation in the creation of space under the existing geopolitical conditions of Israeli control and occupation is seen, by Palestinians in and out of Jerusalem, as quasi-recognition and legitimization of
the Israeli occupation and hegemony. On the other hand, non-participation harms their ability to acquire resources and to appropriate public space, and to exercise their right to the city. The centralized Israeli municipal and national government policy constitutes an additional barrier preventing Jerusalemite Palestinians’ exercise of the right to the city.

This dilemma causes the Palestinian population to swing between attainment of equality, realization of justice in distribution of resources between city inhabitants, and claims for fairness in distribution of space. (This includes active participation in the creation, design, and management of the space as inhabitants of the city on the one hand, and, on the other hand, their national demand to end the occupation and to be granted Palestinian citizenship and residency by repartitioning the city into the Israeli west, and the Palestinian east, where they will be independent in controlling power resources and in managing the public space and resources). Additional factors have contributed to that alternation, including geopolitical arrangements and solutions which have been proposed from 1967 until today, the stance of the Palestinian authority and the representatives of the national Palestinian movement, and the lack of international recognition of Israeli control over East Jerusalem (Khamaisi & Nasrallah, 2006). Local attempts and initiatives for participation in the Jerusalem municipal elections and preparing of local planning schemes like in Tsur Baher and Isawiye, as well as the activity of neighborhood agencies, are still only limited attempts, and do not present an alternative for managing the dilemma in which the Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem find themselves.

The erection of the separation wall will intensify the dilemma of the Palestinian population, the Israeli government and the Jerusalem Municipality, and the entire Jewish Jerusalemite population. The separation wall will make the Palestinian Jerusalemites’ mobility to the rest of the Palestinian territories and to the political and administrative center of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip more difficult and limited. Simultaneously, the State of Israel will apparently limit the movement into the Israeli areas in West Jerusalem and the rest of Israel. Notwithstanding, the Jerusalemite Palestinians’ political status will not change in the foreseeable future, and will continue to be a status of permanent residency. This status differentiates them from the Palestinian Arabs who are citizens and residents of Israel, as well as from the Palestinians in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip who are residents and citizens of the Palestinian Authority, and in the future, possibly, of the State of Palestine. The question under discussion regards the scenarios of the Jerusalemite Palestinians’ behavior as a result of the erection of the wall and the intensification of their isolation as a group with a different status, in a sensitive geopolitical, cultural, and spiritual place. Prior to any such discussion, we shall summarize the implications of the wall for the Palestinian population particularly, and for the city in general.

The Separation Wall and its Implications for a Viable Right to the City

Studies dealing with identification and demonstration of the separation wall’s implications for the fabric of life of the city’s population have emphasized the metropolitan implications on the Palestinian area in and around Jerusalem. These studies have reported, on the one hand, the political implications of the wall, and on the other hand on the wall’s implications for maintaining the security in Israel. It is the opinion of this author that the significance of the wall has not yet been identified in depth, beyond the various reports (Kimchi, 2006; Michael & Ramon, 2004; Brooks, Khamaisi, Nasrallah & Abu Ghazaleh, 2005). The wall is a physical element, partly comprised of an eight meter high wall, and partly a fence spread over an area between 50-80 meters wide. Its length in the Jerusalem area, according to plan, is approximately 150 km. The total amount of land expropriated for the building of the wall is 2,680 dunams, and the total of land, which is inaccessible to its owners due to the wall is 19,200 dunams (OCHA, 2003: 3). The direct implications of the separation wall are as follows: expropriation of land inflicting direct harm on its owners, the damage to and the marring of the landscape, detachment of the city of Jerusalem from its metropolitan and surrounding area, and driving the city back to its peripheral situation as a border city, as it was between the years 1948-1967. This detachment economically weakens the nucleus of the city. Studies have shown that there is a direct link between the periphery and the core in the metropolitan structure. A strong metropolitan core depends upon a strong and nourishing periphery, and vice versa. Detaching the city from its periphery, or supervising access to and from it, will deal a direct blow to the core of the city and its developmental directions. Thus, Jerusalem’s natural and historical developmental directions on a north-south axis, between Ramallah and Bethlehem, are forced
westward, with an orientation toward the heart of Israel, Tel Aviv. The erection of the wall weakens and even detaches natural cultural, functional, economic, and political ties between the Palestinian community in Jerusalem and the community belonging to it in the adjacent Palestinian villages, towns, and cities, and harms them economically, socially, and psychologically.

The wall passes through neighborhoods inhabited by Palestinians, separates families’ space of identification, limits their development, and decreases the value of the assets in them (Garb, 2004). On the other hand, it directs the ties between Jerusalem and the Palestinian territories through checkpoints with strict supervision and selection procedures. Without a geopolitical arrangement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, including the determination of the status of the settlements, the Israeli settlers will continue to use the passages to Jerusalem. Thus, a system of apartheid might develop in the area of the West Bank and at the passages to Jerusalem. An additional possible implication is that of temporary traders setting up shop adjacent to the passages outside the wall, and outbreak of violence against the backdrop of national and economic struggle. Thus, a change will occur in land uses in the areas around the passages and terminals, and provocations and security problems will occur. Where the wall passes through an inhabited area without a political arrangement, in an area experiencing economic disparities and a national struggle, it will lead to smuggling, infiltration, violence, and other activity on the part of those opposing it. In other words, the area of the wall will not be a tranquil area; it will be a security hotspot.

Supervision of Palestinian mobility into the emerging political economic center, north of Jerusalem in the Ramallah area, places Palestinians in a dilemma whether to emigrate to Ramallah or live outside the wall, in an attempt to reduce the suffering of the daily passage, or to detach themselves from work in Ramallah and to look for inferior work opportunities in Jerusalem and in Israel. For the middle class, the upper class, and the educated, opportunities arise in the Ramallah area, and also in other Arab and Muslim states. Those opportunities are greater than the ones existing or likely to develop for them in Jerusalem or Israel. Thus, the wall will lead to emigration of the educated from Jerusalem to the other side of the wall. On the other hand, middle and lower class families outside the wall, who have residency rights in Jerusalem, might abandon their
homes outside the wall, wishing to live in Jerusalem. Some of them will return to the Old City, where living conditions are very bad. These contrary trends harm Jerusalem, specifically the Palestinian population. The recent developments in Sheikh Sa’ad and the burden upon its inhabitants as a result of the erection of the wall adjacent to them, for example, caused more than 500 residents to abandon their homes in that neighborhood and to move to Jerusalem proper. In this regard as well Sheikh Sa’ad – a small neighborhood – is an example of a far wider phenomenon, felt primarily in Jerusalem neighborhoods which the government has decided to leave outside of the separation wall (Kafr Aqav, Ras Hamis, the Shuafat refugee camp, and the Shalom neighborhood in Anata), as well as in the main Palestinian cities adjacent to Jerusalem, which had always been outside the municipal border (for example, Abu Dis and a-Ram). Garb (2004) has already pointed out the widening phenomenon by which many Jerusalemite Palestinians who lived in the peripheral neighborhoods of the city have begun to “immigrate” back into it as a result of the construction of the separation wall and the detachment which it has imposed between the city and their residential neighborhoods. There are those who estimate at tens of thousands the total number of Palestinians with Israeli identity cards likely to ultimately settle permanently on the western side of the wall. Mass return to the city on the part of Jerusalemite Palestinians will cause increasing crowding in the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, and a sharp rise in poverty and unemployment, which are already high. Entering the evacuated peripheral neighborhoods are Palestinians who are not Jerusalemite and do not hold permits to enter Israel. Thus, poverty in East Jerusalem and the Jerusalemite Palestinian metropolis is increasing, the economic situation is declining (with all that entails for the character of the city), the level of crime is on the rise, all increasingly undermining stability.

A wall which separates Palestinians in Jerusalem from their brethren in the Palestinian Authority, detaches their connections, and imposes active supervision over their mobility, presents a challenge for the Israeli government and the Jerusalem municipality in managing their policy toward the Palestinians: should the inherent discrimination on the part of the establishment be continued, or should steps toward conciliation, integration, and attainment of equality be accelerated? Garb (2004), who demonstrated the wall’s negative repercussions for the Palestinians, including a substantial drop in the value of real estate and the return of
Palestinians to Jerusalem after the construction of the wall, also defined the challenge of immediate decision which the Israeli government is facing: to work toward full and equal integration, or toward separation from the entire Palestinian population in Jerusalem.

The unilateral policy of the State of Israel which determined the erection of the separation wall and its route entails further implications, both for the Palestinians living in the city and its environs, and for the Israeli population in Jerusalem and in all of Israel. This article does not intend to expand beyond what has already been said about the implications of the wall, rather to present the changes and trends which will occur in the Palestinian population in Jerusalem after its erection, while dealing with the question whether the exercise of right to the city will increase, or be denied as it is today.

**Scenarios of Transformation: Between Isolation and Convergence, and Spatial Partnership**

The challenge which Garb (2004) places before the Israeli government and the Jerusalem Municipality is also the Palestinian population’s challenge: should they continue to demand the end of the Israeli occupation and the exercise of their right to the city (as opposed to the occupation), or come to terms with Israel’s decision to keep Jerusalem, including its Eastern part, as the capital of the State of Israel, in order to realize Israel’s grand objective of the “Jerusalem 2000” planning scheme? Will the situation of Israeli control over Jerusalem allow for exercise of the right to the city on the part of the Palestinians? Realization of the goals, the policy, and the operative activity determined in the Jerusalem 2000 planning scheme, which are, *de facto*, the continuation of the existing policy discussed above, will put Palestinian inhabitants of Jerusalem in an inferior position from the outset, in terms of their political status and economic opportunities, and deny them the right to the city, by the very essence of its demographic objective, the decision making structure, and the Israeli controlled process of resource distribution.

At the same time, the Palestinian population in Jerusalem is expected to grow as a result of a high natural birth rate, and of Palestinians’ return to the city from three different sources: a) the Jerusalemite population living in the diaspora, including Amman in the Kingdom of Jordan; b) inhabitants of Jerusalem who
emigrated in the past, and lived in cities and villages outside the municipal boundaries of the city which became bulges like the Bir Nabala bulge; c) Jerusalemite Palestinian population living in the neighborhoods outside of the wall, yet within the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem. Their fear of government decisions which would allow the revocation of their permanent resident status, or “crawling revocation” of their identity cards, encourages them to find housing within the wall. The factors pushing from and pulling in the direction of positive immigration stem, therefore, from the considerations of the policy of maintaining or revoking permanent residency, as well as of political stability. The trends of demographic growth among the Palestinians in Jerusalem will intensify the demographic myth in the Israeli public. Israel’s goal of preserving the “demographic balance” according to a formula of 70:30 will push the Israeli government to employ an active policy against immigration and return of Palestinians, and to enact statutes and bylaws which will approve and formalize the policy of preserving Israeli demographic superiority. In this context, the issue of whether the State of Israel will waive its sovereignty and its annexation of territories and neighborhoods populated by Palestinians which are within the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem, but were left outside of the wall, will be on the agenda. Those Israelis who support the demographic option will call for, and act toward, an Israeli decision to cede these residents. On the other hand, demands will rise for the return to and entry into the city by Palestinians with Israeli identity cards, raising the demand for housing and services, an outcome hardly desirable for the government and the Municipality of Jerusalem. The great demand for housing, and the limited supply, will lead to a number of trends in the city: a) the prices of housing will soar (construction, purchase, and lease). Poorer families and young couples will not succeed in solving their housing problems, intensifying the housing shortage; b) the state of distress will reflect upon the level of neighborhood development. The Palestinian neighborhoods in Jerusalem will deteriorate further, and the disparities between them and the Jewish neighborhoods will increase; c) the Old City, its environs, and the village nuclei, which have a traditional preservation value, will attract weak families, thus harming their character and turning them into a space which evokes fear and deters visitors and tourists; d) Palestinian middle class families will begin to seek housing in the Jewish neighborhoods proximate to them such as French Hill, East Talpiot, Neveh Ya’akov, and Pisgat Ze’ev, a trend which has already begun to bud. The trend of spillout and penetration on the part of Palestinian
families, into neighborhoods which were built as settlements in East Jerusalem, will accelerate, encourage emigration on the part of the Jewish population, and intensify the tension between the two populations, especially those of low socioeconomic status. Those who can afford it will seek alternative solutions far from the areas of fear which will develop, and only the weak, who cannot afford to move to new places, will remain. The results will be Jewish emigration from Jerusalem to alternative and available housing in other Israeli cities and towns, a tipping of the demographic balance, physical and social deterioration of neighborhoods due to penetration of weak populations into them, and tainting of the social relationships among some of the Palestinian families, due to their departure from the traditional and conservative settlement framework.

The limitations which the Government of Israel and the Municipality of Jerusalem have placed on building in the Palestinian neighborhoods will become more severe. The housing market will be limited due to lack of public initiative and support to solve the housing problems of the Palestinian population and supply the demand. The value of land will be high due to a lack of developable land, a direct result of the restrictive and systematic planning policy, and due to the desire of landowners to keep their land for their grandchildren and great-grandchildren, as part of their commitment to the next generations, especially in the current state of national threat. The land trade will not function under free market conditions. Intrafamilial disputes over land will also get worse, due to multiple owners and changes in traditional behavior patterns. The shortage of land will of course limit the supply, and the price of land will rise, undermining even the ability of the few to purchase land for self-construction or construction by contractor.

The shortage of housing land will be accompanied by a shortage of land for public needs. The planning and development policy for the Palestinian neighborhoods is based upon local demand. There is no supply of land for public urban supra-neighborhood uses. Under the current social circumstances, the policy of the Jerusalem municipality and the Israeli government, of fragmentation and of perpetuation of the local focus and tribal reality, meets cultural willingness among the urbanizing Palestinian population, a fact which is expected to lead to a number of implications: a) a shortage of public space and of employment on the urban level, for which the Palestinian population will use land
in Jewish neighborhoods; b) the traditional conservative behavior patterns and the local identification with the neighborhood, the extended family, or the tribe, and the identification with local social-economic or religious leadership, will deepen and will not produce Palestinian civil society in Jerusalem; c) the demand by the entire Palestinian population for the exercise of the right to the city will decline, as the geographical division between groups according to neighborhoods, with no transportation system, common employment base, functional center, or educational and cultural center to increase the contact between them, will deepen the alienation and estrangement, and decrease the civil consolidation.

The rise of individualism, and the desire of individuals to survive, will dull the effect of social-national feedback, and might accelerate the demand for Israeli citizenship instead of permanent residency. Concerns over the delay in political arrangements, and the blocking of connections with the Palestinian political and financial center due to the wall, will encourage people to consider the Israeli option, in order to ensure opportunities for themselves. Demands for Israeli citizenship are at odds with the Israeli government’s policy of preserving the demographic balance, and reveal conflict between the interests of the central government and the community. In such a situation, the Municipality of Jerusalem stands as the guard at the gate of the state’s interest, against the interest of the community.

The Israeli opposition to the Jerusalemite Palestinians’ demands for citizenship status, or to have Israel concede the space of their neighborhoods for a Palestinian political entity, will turn them into a new interest group within their people. This group will include a Palestinian subgroup with Jordanian citizenship, Israeli permanent residency, and Palestinian consciousness and identity. Erection of the wall will make the system of interests and dilemmas of this group more acute. An Israeli concession over the Palestinian neighborhoods within the municipal boundary of Jerusalem, yet beyond the wall, has political implications, and contradicts Basic Law: Jerusalem the Capital of Israel. The erection of the wall thus raises the issue of the citizenship and geopolitical future of Jerusalem residents who remain beyond the separation wall. Remaining outside of Jerusalem leads to expiration of the right of residency. These acts of “crawling” transfer by limiting Palestinian development in Jerusalem, revocation of resi-
dency due to political identification, prevention of the return of refugees, and social demographic policy which encourages forced urbanization, leading to a decrease of the Palestinian population in the city, all allow the Government of Israel to preserve the demographic balance, and to continue to deny the inhabitants’ right to the city, despite the fact that it is the largest city concentrating a large Palestinian minority, constituting about one fifth of the total Palestinian population in Israel. The problems of the Palestinian inhabitants of Jerusalem will be added to the problems of the Arab population in Israel.

**Summary and Conclusion**

The unilateral erection of the separation wall on the part of Israel, with no geopolitical arrangement with the Palestinians or other interested parties in the Arab world and international community, escalates the confrontation over the city and harms the fabric of life within it. The very fact of the continuing national struggle in the city denies the inhabitants their right to the city. Each ethno-national group identifies with the national struggle of the state to which it belongs. The residents sacrifice their right to the city, succumbing to a national policy, which will directly determine the fabric of life in the city. The national struggle and the majority group’s control over the positions of power, the resources, and access to them do not contribute to civil parity, and frustrate the possibility of distributive justice in the city between citizens and between national groups. The national policy aspiring to ensure control over the city denies the minority the right of participation in decision making regarding the creation of the urban space, its shaping, and its appropriation, and perpetuates the Israeli control over affairs in the city and the fabric of life within it. The erection of the separation wall makes the Palestinians’ inability to exercise their right to the city more acute. In the foreseeable future, the central government’s policy of determining the arrangements in the city of Jerusalem will continue.

The State of Israel declares that the erection of the wall stemmed from security motivations, which it will serve until the attainment of a geopolitical arrangement between the Palestinians and the Israelis. However, there is no doubt that the wall’s route testifies to ethno-demographic and geopolitical considerations. In the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, temporary borders have now been created. The separation wall appears not only to temporarily buffer, but,
also, like other security arrangements such as the green line drawn in the cease-
fire agreements, to determine an international border between Israel and Palest-
tine. Such is the nature of temporary borders: they become permanent and 
change the political orientation and the status of the population, as well as the 
fabric of life within it. The Palestinian Arabs in Israel have acquired a political 
consciousness which is different than that of those who were annexed to Jordan 
and Egypt between 1948 and 1967. Over a period of 19 years, in villages which 
were split along the ceasefire line – the “green line” – like Barta’a (Kabha, 
2005) or Beit Tsafafa, two groups of different status, political orientation, and 
identification evolved. The conquering of East Jerusalem, its annexation, and 
the granting of permanent resident status to Palestinians in Jerusalem, turned 
them too into a group differentiated and set apart from the rest of the Palestinian 
population. One knows not when a geopolitical arrangement will be reached in 
Jerusalem, and in the meantime, adoption of the idea of the right to the city by 
the Palestinians and the Israelis might spark a turning point in the conflict, and 
lead to a search for common interests, and for their reinforcement, for the wel-
fare of all the inhabitants of that city, which is important to everyone.

Israel continues to control more than two thirds of the territory of the West Bank 
as well. It grants freedom of movement to Israeli settlers in the area (without 
supervision by the Palestinian Authority whose roles were defined by the Oslo 
accords in areas “A” and “B”), and is creating a system of apartheid in the West 
Bank. The concern is that if the Palestinians are not allowed to exercise the right 
to the city in Jerusalem, a system of apartheid will penetrate it as well. The chal-
lenge facing the Government of Israel today is to decide whether or not to reach 
the geopolitical arrangement which will allow the Palestinians to exercise their 
right to the city, either separately from, or together with, Israel. This decision 
should not be postponed until such time as it will exact a greater price, when 
violence, which threatens security, development, and the future of Jerusalem, 
will frustrate it; the sooner – the better.
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Transformation of the Urban Morphology of Jerusalem: Present Trends and Future Scenarios

Noam Shoval

Introduction

Jerusalem of the first millennium BC, like almost every pre-industrial city, was always divided along the lines of social class. Clear evidence of this can be found in the archaeological excavations and from various textual descriptions of the city from the period. The rise of Christianity and later of Islam, and their growing interest in Jerusalem, meant the increasing diversity of the human fabric of the city, and therefore even within its walls the city was divided along religious lines (that was the case during the long periods when the city was under Islamic rule – 638-1099, and from 1187 until the modern era – as under the Christian Byzantine rule, no Jews were allowed to live in the city, and later during Crusader rule, non-Christians (Jews and Muslims) were also prohibited from living in the city).

When the modern city emerged from the city walls in the second half of the 19th century, these lines of division were retained; however, the larger space outside the city walls now also enabled lines of separation within the different ethnic and religious groups themselves, for example on the basis of class. The two major factors that determine the spatial patterns of land use in every city – market mechanisms and city planning – were linked in Jerusalem by the city’s hilly topography. Jerusalem’s initial development was in the basin of the Old City, fol-
lowed by a process of growth along the ridges that branch out from the Old City northwards, westwards, and southwards. The result was a city with a well-defined and built-up center, and annexes extending from it in the form of fingers, while extensive areas remained empty in the valleys between the built-up spurs (Shachar, 1973: 76).

1860–1948: Late Ottoman and British Mandate Periods: Segregation in a Politically Unified City

During the Late Ottoman and British Mandate periods the city was under unified political rule. However, it was only under British rule that the city regained its status as the country’s capital for the first time since the Crusader period. Segregation between the quarters of the Old City continued to characterize development outside the Old City as well. The main Arab development was north of the Old City, both for topographical reasons and as a continuation of the orientation of the Muslim quarter within the Old City. Jewish development was initially westward along the main road to the port city of Jaffa. In other words, the cultural and social divisions between the ethnic groups in the Old City were reflected in the development of the new city, despite the political unification.

By World War I, the city had reached the Romema outskirts to the west and the Bukharian quarter and Sheikh Jarrah in the north, while development to the south and east (mostly for topographical reasons), was much more modest (Amiran, 1973: 28). Rapid population growth during the British Mandate resulted in development to the south as well, for example the garden suburb of Talpiot (1922) and later the neighborhood of Arnona (1931) (Amiran, 1973: 38). During the British Mandate period, the business center moved from the Old City and its environs along the axis of Jaffa Road to the northwest and relocated in the “triangle” between Jaffa Road, Ben-Yehuda Street, and King George Street (Amiran, 1973: 39).

1948–1967: The Divided City

One of the outcomes of the war of 1948 was the division of Jerusalem between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, which had occupied former territory of the British Mandate for Palestine. Jerusalem was transformed
instantly from a big central city, capital of the British Mandate, into two frontier cities that had to develop “dual landscapes” in order to recreate the municipal functions that had to be developed simultaneously on both sides (Kliot and Mansfeld, 1999).

The decline in Jerusalem’s status after its division was more severe in the western part of the city. It became a frontier city located at the end of a narrow corridor, while the eastern part of the city remained connected to the urban system of the central mountain ridge. During this period, the eastern section of Jerusalem extended mainly northwards towards Ramallah for topographical reasons – the moderate relief in the area of the watershed – in the form of a “ribbon development” (Amiran, 1973: 44). Another important morphological outcome of the division was the emergence of a separate business center for the eastern city, which found itself isolated from the main business center in the Israeli sector of the city. This new center developed along the length of the main street that runs from the wall of the Old City northwards. But the choice of the street clearly reflected the political realities of the frontier in the city. The new center did not evolve along Nablus Road, which faces Damascus Gate – the main gate of the north wall on which all the main streets in the northern part of the Old City converge – and which until 1947 had been the main street in this district. Instead it developed along Salah a-Din Street, as Nablus Road was considered too close to the border (Amiran, 1973: 47).

**1967–2002: Unification of the City and Its Surrounding Region**

Soon after the capture of East Jerusalem in 1967, the municipal area of the unified city drastically increased. There were several reasons for this, such as security and urban issues, but the principal consideration was political. The expansion of the municipal area and massive construction of Jewish neighborhoods was the expression of Israel’s desire to put an end to the division of the city from the physical, administrative, and demographic points of view, and was also a clear statement that the city would not be the subject of any future negotiations (Kimhi, 2003). Immediately after June 1967, the Israeli government began to plan and later build Jewish neighborhoods that separated the West Bank from the municipal borders, breaking the contiguity between East Jerusalem and the West Bank. *See map 1.*
Map 1

Jewish Neighborhoods in Jerusalem After 1967
These neighborhoods were built between Arab settlements in the eastern sector, thus impeding the development of the latter and allowing Jewish residents to be absorbed in the eastern sector of the city (Nitzan-Shiftan, 2005). In the late 1960s several Jewish neighborhoods were established, in an effort to create territorial contiguity by connecting the northern Jewish neighborhoods of pre-1967 north Jerusalem to Hadassah Hospital and the campus of the Hebrew University on Mount Scopus, which had remained in Israeli hands as an enclave surrounded by Jordanian territory between 1948 and 1967. As part of this effort the following neighborhoods were built: Sanhedria Chadasha, Ma’alot Dafna, Ramot Eshkol, Givat Hamivtar and Ramot Shapira (French Hill) in the northeastern part of the city. In the early 1970s Neve Ya’akov and Ramot Alon were established in the northern parts of the city, while Gilo and Talpiot Mizrach were built in the southern part of the city. In the mid-1980s Pisgat Ze’ev was built in the northern part of the city in order to create Jewish territorial contiguity with Neve Ya’akov. In the latter half of the 1990s, two additional large-scale Jewish neighborhoods were established in Jerusalem – Har Homa and Ramat Shlomo. It is important to note that the term “neighborhoods” is deceptive in several of these cases. Some of these “neighborhoods” can be considered cities, since they have almost 50,000 residents, such as Ramot, Gilo and Pisgat Ze’ev. However, the demographic-political aim of maintaining a large Jewish majority in the unified city led to the incorporation of these large neighborhoods into the municipality of Jerusalem rather than granting them independent status. In addition, from the mid-1970s, rapid Jewish suburbanization began in all directions – south, east, and north, outside the municipal borders of Jerusalem in areas that, prior to 1967, had been under Jordanian rule. The construction of three large urban settlements was initiated in these areas: Ma’ale Adumim in the east (1979), Givat Ze’ev in the north (1981) and Efrat in the south (1982). These urban settlements were complemented by less dense forms of settlement. To the west, in the area of the narrow corridor that links Jerusalem with the coastal plain, the same suburbanization processes occurred, most notably with the construction of Mevasseret Yerushalayim.

As a result of the unification of the urban region under one political entity, and the elimination of the physical border within Jerusalem, economic, social and functional interrelationships began to develop between the city and its hinterland (Hyman et al., 1985: 36). The Israeli concept was to integrate the entire region, as there was little violence and the demographic issue was not yet on the
agenda. As a result, the city and the metropolitan region were completely open during the first 20 years following the unification of 1967. Palestinian transportation passed freely from Hebron and Bethlehem in the south to Ramallah and Nablus in the north without any obstacles like checkpoints or roadblocks. The uprising that began in December 1987 (first *intifada*), and paradoxically the Oslo agreements of 1993, introduced the idea of a political arrangement for the first time in a generation, and led to competition between the sides to create facts on the ground before discussions on final status agreements got underway. As a result, Israel began to establish permanent checkpoints on the municipal borders in order to delineate Israeli sovereignty and to limit the growing Palestinian influence in East Jerusalem. The increasing use of checkpoints to limit the access of Palestinians to Jerusalem was a result of the increase in the number of suicide attacks in the mid-1990s. The war (or the low-intensity conflict) that began in September 2000 further increased the checkpoints and led to the notion of erecting a barrier to protect the city. Freedom of movement in the Jerusalem region was limited to Palestinian residents of Jerusalem who held the “blue” permanent resident status identity card.

In the mid-1990s Ramallah became the Palestinian political center, and as a result some businesses left Jerusalem. The events that followed September 2000 brought about the termination of official Palestinian activity in Jerusalem: the closure of Orient House, along with other Palestinian institutions in the city. It should be noted that the structure that was built in Abu-Dis to house the Palestinian parliament was deliberately left outside the path of the security fence; the section of the wall that was built in this area was one of the first to be completed in the city – and this was not by mere chance.

**Current Trends**

The main trend from 2002 to the present is the unilateral division of the metropolitan region by Israel, resulting from the construction of the “security fence”. *See map 2.* This transformation in the urban geography of Jerusalem is probably the greatest morphological change since the unification of the city in 1967. The construction of the fence in general, and in Jerusalem in particular, reflects the notion that at this stage and for the foreseeable future, the Israeli establishment is firm in its belief that there will be no agreement regarding the division of Jerusalem.
Several urban morphological processes that are not directly related to the construction of the fence will be discussed briefly before we return to address the issue of the fence at length.

**Consolidation of the “Metropolitan X”**

Urban development in the Jerusalem region today is along two principal axes: a north-south Arab axis and east-west Jewish axis. See map 3. The Old City and its environs—together known as the “Holy Basin”—lie in the area where the two axes intersect. The security fence that will be described and analyzed below basically amputates the Arab south-north development axis.

Interesting dynamics are developing in relation to the Jewish east-west axis. Development to the east is towards Ma’ale Adumim and nearby communities; the other direction of development—to the west—includes the plan to annex and develop areas just outside the municipal borders (This was epitomized in
The Safdie plan that was rejected in 2007 by the National Planning Committee). The municipality’s motivation to develop areas that are already included in the municipal borders or that will soon be annexed is clear: some of the local tax money, or in other words, the residents that are leaving the city, will be retained. In addition, the municipality will benefit from improvement taxes and other revenues that will help fill its dwindling coffers. In contrast, Ma’ale Adumim, developing rapidly to the east, is one of the most successful towns in Israel from the standpoint of advanced education and cultural services, in addition to real estate prices that are lower than those in Jerusalem, as well as fast, easy access to the city.

Wedged between these opposing development axes lies the declining city center of Jerusalem, which is declining as a result of several processes, but clearly due to the ongoing suburbanization of residents and retail services. Considerable resources are being invested in efforts, yet to succeed, to regenerate the city cen-
ter. At present there are (in my view unrealistic) hopes that the light rail or the construction of flagship museums, such as the Tolerance Museum that is now already under construction on the site of the ancient Muslim cemetery in Mamilla (adjacent to Nahalat Shiva) will serve as a miracle cure, financially and image-wise, for the dying city center. In contrast to the strong suburbanization trends in the Jewish sector, in the Palestinian sector the fence is causing a reverse process, with residents moving their commercial enterprises and homes into the city so as to not remain on the wrong side of the fence.

**Construction of Transportation Arteries and Ring Roads**

Over the last few years, several main traffic arteries have been built in Jerusalem and its environs. See map 4. Due to the hilly geography of Jerusalem, such projects are costly and require complicated engineering (the use of tunnels and bridges). Dumper claims – probably correctly – that the “new roads not only integrate the outlying Israeli Jewish settlements into the core areas of Jerusalem, but also serve to divide the Palestinian areas, breaking up the physical contiguity of those areas with each other and with the West Bank” (Dumper, 1997: 99). Even if the transportation networks were not designed intentionally to serve as a means for spatial domination, it is extremely difficult to counter the realities on the ground. In this regard, it is interesting to note that the eastern ring road, parts of which are already under construction, has already been transformed on the drawing board from a traffic solution for the city into a geopolitical solution. It incorporates the Adumim settlement bloc into the Israeli side of the security fence, in an effort to allow freedom of movement between Bethlehem and Ramallah and continuous transportation (but not territorial contiguity). Construction of the fence also eliminated Route 45, which was planned to be the national lateral artery connecting the city with the coastal plain (Ben-Gurion Airport and Tel Aviv) and the Jordan Valley. The Mt. Scopus tunnel created a faster link with Ma’ale Adumim, accommodating the large Jewish population that has moved there, and this undoubtedly also continues to encourage ongoing suburbanization eastwards. Road No. 4 (Begin Blvd.) crosses the city from north to south, extending from Malcha to Atarot and forming a direct link with Highway 443 towards Modi’in and Highway No. 1. In addition to its transportation role, this road separates the villages of Jib, Bir Naballah and Beit Hanina...
Map 4
Transportation Arteries and Ring Roads
(old section) from the Palestinian territory along Highway 60, encircling these communities to form an enclave bound to the north by Highway 443, as a continuation of Road No. 4, so that the only remaining link between these villages and Bitounia and Ramallah is a single road that passes through a tunnel underneath Highway 443. Road 9 will also be inaugurated shortly, connecting the main access route from Tel Aviv, Highway No. 1, with the north of Jerusalem and the French Hill junction. A new transport element on the cityscape worth mentioning is the light rail, which despite the fact that some of its routes have a north-south orientation, was planned in the main to serve the city’s Jewish sector. This is no innovation, as separate public (bus) transportation systems have always served the eastern and western parts of the city.

**Israel’s “Security Fence”**

In August 2002 the political-defense cabinet approved the construction of 22 kilometers of the security fence in the northern and southern outskirts of Jerusalem. At the end of July 2003 the work in these areas was completed (Michael and Ramon, 2004). The final configuration of the “Jerusalem Envelope” in some places was left open mainly for political reasons, such as in the area of Ma’ale Adumim and the adjacent communities. However, the government decision of February 2005, backed by “understandings” with the American administration as expressed in President Bush’s letter of April 2004, enabled the incorporation of the Adumim settlement bloc and determined the current route of the fence. Work in the Jerusalem region recommenced; however, in several places it has been delayed due to petitions by residents to the High Court of Justice, mainly Arab residents who will be adversely affected by the fence for various reasons (details of the various petitions can be found in the internet site of the Supreme Court of Israel: http://elyon1.court.gov.il/heb/verdict/search/verdict_by_misc.html).

The “Jerusalem Envelope” begins in the northwest in Khirbet Abu-Lahem and ends in the southwest near the village of Battir. See map 2. It is 143 km long, of which only 18 km consists of the notorious 8 meters high concrete wall. Fifteen crossing points are planned along the wall (several of them now ready for operation), among them several that were constructed specifically for tourists and
pilgrims, such as the “Lazarus” crossing point in Azariyeh and the “Rachel” crossing point near Bethlehem.

The location of the “Jerusalem Envelope” command post, called “Mezudat Adumim” and situated below the Hebrew University’s Mt. Scopus campus, was deliberately chosen as a wedge between Anata and a-Zaim and to prevent the creation of urban Palestinian contiguity between Ramallah and Bethlehem. Israel’s general concept in plotting the route of the Jerusalem fence was to take the initiative in creating a border that would be as convenient for Israel as possible.

The general idea was to build the fence along the municipal boundaries outlined as early as 1967; however, aside from this general directive there were many other specific configuration considerations, such as pressure to place the home of a Knesset member from one of the Arab factions in the Dahiat El Brid neighborhood inside the fence and pressure exerted by European countries to include churches and monasteries on the Israeli side. Israel also desired to leave the Palestinian parliament and other key Palestinian institutions outside the fence. There is no doubt that an important objective behind the fence was to deliberately break transportation links and the functional contiguity of the Palestinian city with the West Bank, for example by severing the link between Azariyeh and Jerusalem on the old road from the Dead Sea, which was quite simply cut off by the wall adjacent to the Palestinian parliament. In an effort to reinforce the physical separation, pedestrian and vehicle crossings were not built at this point, rather only several kilometers farther north at the Mt. of Olives crossing. Ownership of land or sites of Jewish importance resulted in further changes in the route of the fence, for example the Jewish cemetery on the Mt. of Olives, or the “Kidmat Zion” neighborhood planned for construction opposite the Palestinian parliament building in Abu Dis (see figure 1), as well as the desire to include settlement blocs in the north (Givat Ze’ev), east (Ma’ale Adumim), and south (Gush Etzion). A further consideration was keeping Arab residents beyond the wall wherever possible, as in Kfar Aqab and the Shuafat refugee camp, in contrast with the inclusion of open areas that will serve as a reserve for future urban development. It would be fair to assume that there were other considerations as well; however, due to the fact that the issue of the fence as a whole was not a subject of public debate, and in the absence of any transparency in its planning, one can only hazard a guess as to the factors underlying its ultimate route.
The fence, which is currently under construction, divides the city differently from a previous division (1948-1967). This time the inner city and the entire enlarged municipal area of the city remain a single political and geographic unit. Most of the Jewish hinterland, at least in terms of the number of residents, is incorporated into the city by the barrier: in the north, Givat Ze’ev and adjacent communities such as New and Old Giv’on and Har Shmuel; in the south, Efrat and the other villages, and kibbutzim and communities that comprise Gush Etzion; in the east, the city of Ma’ale Adumim and some smaller villages and communities. However, metropolitan Palestinian Jerusalem will be destroyed (Klein, 2005). Nasrallah’s harsh comments reflect the sense of frustration and helplessness on the Palestinian side resulting from the building of the fence, seen as yet another nail in the coffin of Palestinian autonomy in East Jerusalem, which, in addition, makes any normal Palestinian life in that part of the city almost impossible:

**Figure 1**

The Location of the Planned “Kidmat Zion” Neighborhood
The process of settlement construction in and around the city’s borders, followed by their actual annexation through the construction of the wall and inclusion of vacant (unbuilt) land as reserves for those settlements’ expansion, was at the expense of the Palestinian neighborhoods and villages. This was accompanied by the connection of the settlements to each other via a network of highways, tunnels and bridges, which has shortened distances and expanded Jerusalem’s limits in all directions. The process has been coupled with the dismemberment of the Palestinian neighborhoods and their spatial and functional cohesion through Israeli spatial domination, and the use of exploitation as a means for amputating and weakening the integration of the Palestinian space. The disintegration reached a degree whereby it is possible to argue that Jerusalem’s urban entity is no longer existent (Nasrallah, 2005, 211).

A very important issue to be addressed is the “real” role and purpose of the fence. In the Israeli public and media the fence is portrayed simply as a security measure. It is frequently regarded as an effective measure despite the fact that it is not yet fully operational. This approach was developed by the Israeli government, probably in an effort to escape international political pressures. Furthermore, the government claims that the fence is only temporary (on this subject, see the Ministry of Defense internet site: http://www.securityfence.mod.gov.il/Pages/ENG/purpose.htm). However, analyzing the fence’s role solely as a security measure misses its main purpose as a future political, economic (at least for customs and taxation), and demographic border. The economic disparities between the two societies and Israel’s wish to stop the “Silent Return” of Palestinians into Israel suggest that the fence will remain in place for a long time, unrelated to the security situation.

The other reasons for the creation of a clearly defined border, in addition to the enormous construction costs estimated at $3 billion for the project as a whole, lead us to the conclusion that it is definitely not a temporary line. It is possible that as a result of negotiations or realities on the ground the current route will be modified, but the idea of creating a physical division does not seem to be a temporary line of thinking. This division is probably not the best option for the future of Jerusalem, as various researchers claim, but will probably prevail for at least the next few years. It is important to note that this division is less acute for the Israeli side, as since 1987 most Jewish residents of Jerusalem have avoided
visiting the Old City and the eastern city and few work in those areas. However, for the Palestinians in the city the situation is completely the reverse: many of the Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem regularly enter the western side of the city for purposes of work, medical treatment, and other reasons, thanks to their blue ID cards.

Analyses of the impact of the fence on the morphology of Arab sectors of the city (see, for example, Khamaisi and Nasrallah, 2003; Brooks et al., 2005; Garb, 2005; Garb and Savitch, 2005; Klein, 2005; Nasrallah, 2005) show that the fence will have a devastating impact on Palestinian society in East Jerusalem and its suburbs, particularly regarding accessibility to medical services, education, and social and cultural life. It is interesting that, to date, no large-scale empirical study has been conducted to analyze the barrier’s impact on the Jewish sectors and residents.

**Figure 2**
Hotel Intercontinental Bethlehem

Examples of Some Evolving “Grassroots” Cross-fence Cooperation

Two current areas of cooperation that have sprung up, crossing over between the two sides of the fence between Israelis and Palestinians (*i.e.*, not between East and West Jerusalem), will be discussed in this article in order to demon-
strate the need and potential for economic interaction, and the fact that both sides will lose out without a way for the region to function in cooperation despite the erection of the barrier.

The first example is the case of the coordination of the Palestinian and Israeli tourist industries to enable the flow of pilgrims and tourists between Jerusalem and Bethlehem. See map 2. Before the recent period of violence (September 2000), there was free passage between Jerusalem and Bethlehem for Israelis and inbound tourists, but Palestinians had to obtain a special permit to enter Israel and Jerusalem. Indeed, on the eve of the millennium, when Bethlehem underwent a major transformation as part of the “Bethlehem 2000” project, many tourists and Israelis visited the city. In addition, more than 2,000 hotel rooms were built, including the Intercontinental Hotel near Rachel’s Tomb. See figure 2. After the onset of violence, tourists and Israelis were no longer allowed to pass the checkpoint into Bethlehem, and in any event, due to the violence in the area, there was little demand to visit Bethlehem and the region. Incoming tourism to the region dropped significantly. The agreements between the Palestinian factions that were reached with the aid of Egypt as a result of Operation “Defensive Shield” (March-April 2002), and later the disengagement from the Gaza Strip, helped improve the overall situation in the region, and as a result tourism began to increase significantly. However, it was clear that if tourists would be unable to visit Bethlehem, a Christian pilgrimage to the Holy Land would be unattractive. Starting in 2004, Christian tourists have been allowed to enter Bethlehem, but Jewish tourists have not, due to concerns about terrorist attacks or kidnapping. Thus, Christian groups enter Bethlehem while their Israeli tour guide remains at the checkpoint. If the bus belongs to an Arab East Jerusalem company, and particularly if the bus driver is an Arab, the bus passes through the checkpoint as is. If the driver is Israeli, the tourists are transferred to a bus coming from the Bethlehem side, in some instances even a bus with Israeli license plates from Jerusalem. The transfer takes place at the Roadblock 300 crossing or near the crossing at the exit of the Gush Etzion tunnel road. The check by the soldiers at the roadblock, both of the tourists and of the bus if it passes through the roadblock and returns, is not thorough. Interviews conducted recently with a number of tour guides show that there are several methods of coordinating a group’s passage into Bethlehem: in some cases the tour operator arranges the details, in others there is an arrangement between the tour guide
and his colleagues in Bethlehem; the most common arrangement is with store owners or the big souvenir dealers in Bethlehem, who regularly call the Israeli tour guides asking if they are interested in a vehicle to tour the town that week. In other instances tour groups are “ambushed” at the churches in Jerusalem, such as Gethsemane, where representatives of the Bethlehem souvenir shops frequently wait to see if the tour guides wishes to arrange a visit to Bethlehem that day or on another day during the week. When such visits are arranged, the tour guide naturally receives a percentage of the tourists’ purchases at the store from its owner as a commission. The main drawback to this arrangement is that it is impossible to verify whether the tour guide receives his fair share, although the store owners do have an interest in ensuring that the guides are satisfied and will wish to continue the arrangement and visit their store again (rather than patronizing other stores). It should be clarified that the souvenir stores themselves pay for the buses to Bethlehem and for the local tour guides. The stores are generally vast, and capable of accommodating hundreds of tourists at a time. The cooperation surrounding the visits to Bethlehem demonstrates that religious and cultural differences form no obstacle to business cooperation in the market for visiting tourists’ purchases.

Another interesting case is one that has taken place recently in Mishor Adumim, a large industrial area located east of the city of Ma’ale Adumim, inside (i.e. on the Israeli side) the approved route of the security fence. See map 2. Retail activity has recently begun to develop in this industrial area. Moreover, Mishor Adumim is a large employment zone which, for Palestinians from the West Bank without permits to work in Israel, provides an opportunity to find jobs, some as permanent employees in Israeli (Jewish) companies. This is an interesting case of integration between Jews and “West Bank” Arabs sharing a newly constructed shopping center. The center was built by a new supermarket chain (Rami Levy Hashikma Marketing). It opened a huge supermarket, a large pharmacy (New Pharm) and a clothing store. This could be termed a kind of “twilight zone” of spontaneous Jewish-Arab cooperation, since the fence will soon prevent Palestinians from shopping there and Israeli merchants will lose important customers.
Future Scenarios

The completion of the construction and the operation of the security fence will generate far-reaching morphological changes in the region: for example, the Palestinian road network will have to adjust and change because of its partial truncation by the fence. On the other hand, there are roads currently under construction for Palestinian use that may create new links, for example the eastern ring road that in several years will hopefully connect the two parts of the West Bank, from Hebron and Bethlehem to Ramallah and Nablus. The fence will exacerbate the separation of East Jerusalem and its population from the Palestinian-inhabited network and from the Palestinian economy and society.

It will come as no surprise if the fence’s present route changes in the future as a result of international pressure, negotiations with the Palestinian leadership, or unilateral action by Israel, as it comes to realize that the current route, which leaves more than 200,000 Palestinians within Jerusalem, is not in its own interest. Nevertheless, the present direction is towards physical separation, even if the route of the fence is modified. An important factor which I will focus on later in this article is “tourism” (this term includes all kinds of motivations for visit, including pilgrimage). Tourism has the ability to become a key factor in the economic development of the region for two important reasons: first, it is perhaps the region’s only “natural resource”, and second, the attractions (both material and spiritual) are abundant. Unfortunately, this resource has not yet realized its full potential for various reasons, such as lack of political stability, lack of suitable infrastructure (including too few airline seats at reasonable prices), lack of good, integrated planning and management, and, finally, a lack of proper marketing. Moreover, tourism could serve as a unifying factor in the different parts of the region.

There is a broad consensus among planners and urban researchers involved in studying the case of Jerusalem, that a logical step would be the creation of two municipalities as a basis for future management of the city (Auga et al., 2005). Hasson even argues that this is in Israel’s best interest, since in a generation Jerusalem, while perhaps remaining under Israeli sovereignty, will have an Arab majority (Hasson, 2003: 220). This means that the current situation will pose a challenge to the Jewish majority in the city within a decade or two. Another idea that is commonly accepted today is the need to have certain mechanisms for the
joint management and control of the Holy Basin, due to the proximity of holy places of the different religions in a very small area, and sometimes even overlapping between sites (for example in the case of the Room of the Last Supper and King David’s Tomb). A further reason is the fact that this area is the tourism core of the city, and there is therefore a need to enable free movement of visitors. Despite the fact that there is an advantage to keeping the city open even if it is divided politically, it is clear that in the short and intermediate terms (maybe even in the long term as well) this will not happen, for the reasons that were discussed in the earlier part of this article. Even if the Palestinians get a firm foothold in Jerusalem as the result of future political negotiations, it is reasonable to assume that the route of the fence will change, but that it will not be dismantled. This means that two entities could be established in the region, which are differentiated politically, but also functionally, with limited cooperation in different areas. This analysis contradicts the opinions of many of the writers whose work appeared in a recently published volume dedicated to this subject (Auga et al., 2005), who see the city as an open city in any political solution. This concept is also clearly reflected by Khamaisi, who suggests political division, yet economic cooperation, with Jerusalem remaining an open city:

We assume Jerusalem will be a functional open city with free movement of goods and people, and the capital of two states: Palestine and Israel, and a city with Palestinian and Israeli hinterlands. The official political and administrative border between the parts of the city will be the pre-1967 border (Khamaisi, 2003: 139).

Hasson (2003) appears to have a more realistic approach. He writes that two types of solutions have been advanced, to date, with regard to the Jerusalem problem: territorial separation and functional integration. In his opinion, due to the current geopolitical crisis in the Middle East, integration and cooperation across boundaries are being replaced by pleas for separation and disengagement. Territorial partitioning is therefore the only currently viable option. An attempt to limit functional arrangements to places or services that cannot be divided will result in a loss of their value. However, notwithstanding his opinion that the division is inevitable, Hasson argues that there is a need for a metropolitan government, because the alternative is perpetuation of the present situation. This would mean a lack of frameworks for coordination and cooperation on the supra-municipal level. The absence of such frameworks will exact a cost from both sides, especially in the field of tourism (Hasson, 2005: 201). Political separ-
ration enhanced by the “fence” will increase the morphological division, but the tourism industry, which is one of the main “natural resources” of the city and the region, requires close economic cooperation and functional integration in order to flourish.

A reminder of the problems that may be created in the event that there is no free flow between the different parts of city is the situation that existed in the previous division of the city. Between 1948 and 1967, movement between the two sectors of the city was severely restricted due to the difficulties involved in crossing the border. According to the agreement between Israel and Jordan, movement was in one direction only, from Jordan to Israel, with the exception of a few religious leaders and UN personnel. Those wishing to cross the border were forced to stay in Jordan for at least 56 hours prior to crossing over, and they also had to hold two passports, one to be stamped by the Israeli authorities and the other for the Jordanian authorities (Shoval & Cohen-Hattab, 2001). Due to the difficulties in crossing from one section of the city to the other, West Jerusalem gained little from the tourism which developed in the eastern sector in this period (Cohen 1987: 162).

In the absence of free passage between the two sides of the city, only the side in control of most of the holy sites will be profiting, as was the case during the period of Jordanian rule. In my opinion Israel actually has an interest in “losing” to the Palestinians, allowing them to develop economically and providing an incentive to preserve calm on the security front, although clearly, if the city is open, many more tourists will visit the area and both sides will benefit. Gonen (2005) expresses his concern that Jewish Jerusalem will lose part of the expanding tourism pie to the Palestinians due to their control over a large share of the tourist sites (this is incorrect on the basis of the separation map or in the event that the Holy Basin is managed jointly with free passage), and due to the lower salaries paid by Palestinian employers. In my opinion, not only is this no cause for concern, but efforts should actually be made to help the Palestinians in this field.
Tourism and Future Regional Cooperation in the Jerusalem Metropolitan Area

Tourism and pilgrimage have been central features of Jerusalem’s economy and geography for the past 3000 years. As a result of the city’s religious and cultural importance to a large part of the world’s population, the potential for tourism to Jerusalem appears to be unlimited. However, the unstable political situation in the region over the last several decades, coupled with the lack of suitable transportation and hotel facilities, are the main barriers to the rapid growth of tourism to the city (Shoval, 2000).

Jerusalem is a unique case among sacred places, in that it attracts pilgrims from a diverse and wide range of religions and national and cultural traditions. The fact that Jerusalem is sacred to the believers of the three monotheistic religions and their very many denominations creates spatial and organizational competition and fierce ongoing conflicts over particular rituals, sites, and itineraries (Shachar and Shoval, 1999). While Rome, Mecca, and Varanasi are mono-religious centers, Jerusalem is a multi-religious center of unique character, spiritual meaning, and universal appeal. Tourism always had a great impact on the city: for example, in the late 1990s one out of every six workers in the city was employed in the tourism industry or a related field (Shoval, 2000). The big hotels in the western part of the city dominate the skyline and underscore the fact that the main business of the city is tourism.

The Difference between Tourist Arrivals and Tourist Bed-nights

A common misconception is the exaggerated importance attached to the number of tourist arrivals at a destination; however, from the standpoint of the destination, as opposed to the air carrier, the number of bed-nights spent at the destination is of greater importance. Thus, three million tourists staying four nights on average, create 12 million tourist-nights at a destination, while five million tourists staying two nights on the average create just 10 million tourist-nights. From the city’s perspective, the first configuration is therefore preferable. This is one of the major problems facing historical cities and other urban destinations as a result of growing demand. Several factors contribute to a decrease in the average stay: when demand is higher than supply, in this case due to rising hotel prices and a shortage of rooms, some of the demand filters down to more re-
mote destinations or to shorter stays in the city. At the national level this is of less significance, but the local destination loses potential revenue. Another cause of this situation is the burgeoning cruise industry, a trend that has not neglected the Mediterranean. In the second half of the 1990s, Israel hosted about 250,000 cruise passengers each year, who disembarked at Ashdod and Haifa ports as part of their eastern Mediterranean tour, for a day trip that included Jerusalem and Bethlehem. This kind of “tourism” patronizes local attractions and the transportation system, but contributes almost no revenue to the destinations. This is precisely the problem facing Venice, which today has only three million tourists who spend the night in the city while an additional nine million day-visitors only spend the day there (Russo, 2002).

During the millennium year, in addition to Pope John Paul II, some two million overseas tourists visited Jerusalem (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2001), resulting in considerable congestion in the area of the Holy Basin. Churches remained open until late at night to allow the crowds of tourists to visit, occupancy in the hotels and Christian hostels was at a peak, and prices were high. The overriding impression was that without a better developed infrastructure and better tourist transportation facilities (Israeli and Mansfield, 2003), the city had reached full capacity regarding the number of tourists that could be handled. All this, at a time when movement in and around the city was almost completely unrestricted. The challenge will become even greater if the future brings a division of the metropolitan area.

**Principles of Tourism Development in the Divided Metropolitan Area**

In my opinion, in an effort to facilitate further tourism development in Jerusalem, four steps must be taken simultaneously, to be coordinated by all the relevant parties – Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and key Christian entities:

1. *Enabling free and efficient passage of tourists between the different parts of the area.* In a situation of security checks on people entering the Israeli side of the city, channeling the flow of visitors from one side of the fence to the other poses a huge challenge. Tourism is an industry in which geographical freedom of movement is a key to success. Any restriction of movement affects the pockets of all those involved. The rigid division of the area already impedes freedom of
movement. The need to coordinate free passage (see next section) is essential, but can also serve to enhance cooperation in the area and create joint frameworks for spatial management and planning at the metropolitan level.

2. *Shared transportation and tourism management and planning in the Holy Basin and the entire metropolitan area.* The complex nature of the area and the very different needs of the visiting tourists necessitate the establishment of organizations that will coordinate and promote tourism in the region. Without it, this industry, and consequently the two sectors or cities, will suffer immensely and will not develop as expected, since tourism and heritage are the main potential of Jerusalem tourism. It should be added that in Jerusalem such coordination is crucial, due to the fact that the different religions and denominations in the city use different calendars that change over time: for example, the Muslim calendar is a lunar calendar and as no days are added to adjust it to the solar calendar, there is a constant slow “reverse” movement of the festivals over the course of the year. The Jewish calendar is also lunar with an adjustment mechanism, so that there may be differences of a few weeks in either direction in the dates of the festivals vis-à-vis the solar calendar. The Armenian and the Christian Orthodox churches celebrate Christmas and Easter on dates that differ from those celebrated by the Catholic and Protestant churches. Attention must therefore be paid to the possible coincidence of religious festivals in Jerusalem, resulting in the congregation of large numbers of pilgrims from different religions and groups in the region. This situation is particularly complex in the Old City due to its size: for example, in some years Passover, with its large-scale Jewish pilgrimage, may coincide with the Catholic Easter (or the Orthodox and Armenian Holy Fire ceremony) as well as any Muslim festival, which easily attracts a quarter of a million Muslim faithful to the Temple Mount mosques.

However, as mentioned earlier, shared management, coordination, and planning are not just needed in order to enable smooth visits by the tourists, but also to ensure the growth of the share of tourism –
of people that spend nights in the city – and not just of the number of tourist arrivals. This could be the first step in the creation of a joint metropolitan Israeli-Palestinian administration, and the successful implementation of such a framework could lead to an extension of its mandate to other fields as well.

3. **Balance of development between the Israeli and Palestinian sectors.** Most of the tourist infrastructure, in terms of hotel rooms and restaurants, is located and operated by Israeli entrepreneurs. This situation must be redressed, and in our view that would be in Israel’s interest as well. The Israeli side will not lose its existing clientele if the number of bed-nights increases, but in any event it would be wise to assist the Palestinians in developing their economy. This could help stabilize the region and ensure the creation of a calm atmosphere, which in turn would enhance the flow of tourists to the region. It is in Israel’s interest to assist the Palestinians in developing the tourist industry, even if Israel “loses” potential revenues, as Gonen (1995) fears. A strong economy like Israel’s could survive such a loss and benefit in other economic branches from the geopolitical stability that could be gained.

4. **The need for massive construction of hotel rooms in the region in order to benefit from a possible growth in demand.** Thousands of hotel rooms must be built in the city and the region; this is the bottleneck for any real increase of tourism in the city area. Simply increasing tourist arrivals from 2.5 million to 5 million tourists, for example, fails to secure any real gain in tourism, since it is possible to reach the 5 million mark but to remain with 10 million tourist bed-nights. This will happen if the average stay falls from four nights to two as result of a limited supply of accommodations. In order to increase the tourist bed-nights in this case, an additional 10,000 hotel rooms at least are needed. An important point regarding this possible flow is that it will probably be comprised of the Christian and Muslim sectors, as the potential of the Jewish sector is rather limited in size. According to Dumper (2002), Palestinian sovereignty in Jerusalem would bring large numbers of Muslims in con-
junction with the Hajj, as was the case in pre-1967 East Jerusalem, when large crowds of Muslims passed through the city in conjunction with their journey to Mecca.

Although Israel’s Ministry of Tourism and the Jerusalem Municipality created plans for land allocation for hotel construction on such a scale (Shoval, 2006), in recent years some of the land has been re-zoned for residential construction due to the tourism crisis (Holyland Project, the Haas [Armon Hanatsiv] Promenade, etc.). In addition, taking into account real estate prices in the inner city and the fact that such tourism activity creates transportation problems, it would be wiser to direct future large-scale hotel construction to areas on the outskirts of the city. The hotels in mainly Palestinian areas will serve the Christian and Muslim sectors, while the Jewish sector will probably continue to use the big stock of rooms in the Jewish areas of the city. Another reason for directing additional hotel development to the Palestinian sector is the fact that due to Israeli efforts since 1967, most of the construction took place in the Jewish parts of the city. Today 8,000 of the hotel rooms in the city are in the Jewish areas, while the eastern parts of the city offer only 2,000 rooms of low quality that are the remnants of the pre-1967 period, when most of the tourist activity took place on the Jordanian side. There are an additional 2,000 beds in Christian hospices in the Old City and its vicinity (Shoval & Cohen-Hattab, 2001).

The Bethlehem 2000 project proved that under normal political conditions the Palestinian Authority, with the financial assistance of the international community, is able to plan and coordinate a big development project that includes massive regeneration of historical areas, meeting tourist transportation challenges by successfully implementing the plan for tourist coaches and the construction of 2,000 new hotel rooms in the city. Similar efforts should therefore be made again in Bethlehem in an effort to restore the pre-2000 situation and to add several thousand hotel rooms, probably in the less dense areas of Beth Sachour. See map 5. The magnitude of the proposed construction in Jericho and Bethlehem should be similar to
the hotel compounds built in Sinai under the directive of the Egyptian Ministry of Tourism, which created some 35,000 new hotel rooms in less than 10 years in the strip between Sharm el-Sheikh and Taba (Shoval & Cohen-Hattab, forthcoming).

Map 5
Possible Locations in the Jerusalem Area for Massive Hotel Construction

In addition to some development in the inner cities of East and West Jerusalem, we wish to propose general locations for the potential of about 5,000 hotel rooms in each, in order to accommodate the growing demand:

(1) The area east of the Mount Scopus Campus of the Hebrew University. See map 5. This location is ideal since it is proximate to the Old City and located just below the Mount of Olives and Mount Scopus. In addition, it is a highly sensitive area – it is sometimes erroneously referred to as E1 (which actually lies further to the east) –
and may be one of the most problematic in the Jerusalem region, since it is the point where the eastern ring road that will link Bethlehem and Ramallah passes, as well as being the seam between Jerusalem’s municipal area and the Ma’ale Adumim area. In other words, it is the exact location of the meeting point between the two main orientations of the region – north-south and east-west. Tourism could therefore be the ideal solution, since it seems to be a neutral element, and both sides would enjoy the economic fruits of tourism, and thus it would not appear to be another unilateral act. An example of tourism’s ability to serve as a unifying force can be seen in the three hotels that were built along Route No. 1, near the old seam line.

(2) Development in the Beit Sachour and Bethlehem area, mainly for Christian pilgrims.

(3) Jericho, which is positioned very conveniently for day trips to the Dead Sea and Masada, Jerusalem, etc. See Map 5. Jericho is also close to Amman. This would be an advantage when Ben-Gurion Airport is too congested at peak periods during the year. Moreover, if some of the mass movement to Mecca and Medina would bring visitors to Jerusalem as well, this would be their point of entry. Development in the Jericho area could therefore be geared toward the Christian and the Muslim sectors.

(4) A fourth area for development could be the northern part of the metropolitan area towards Ramallah, but due to higher densities of residential areas, smaller tourist accommodations could be developed for smaller groups or individual tourists in search of authentic experiences among the local Palestinian population.

It should be noted that these proposed locations are at a considerable distance from Jerusalem’s principal tourist sites. Moreover, studies have shown that the proximity of hotels to important tourist sites is an important contribution to their success (Shoval, 2006). This, however, applies in the main to individual tourists, whereas we are principally addressing the issue of the construction of hotels for or-
ganized groups, which is much less location-sensitive, as such groups have a tour bus and tour guide at their disposal. Thanks to the tour bus, tour groups are able to move effortlessly through the city, while the presence of a tour guide and bus driver, both of whom are familiar with the city’s highways and byways, means that, unlike the individual tourist, they have no difficulty orientating themselves in the city.

Conclusion

The fence currently under construction divides the metropolitan region. As a result, the vision of a politically divided city that also has an open economy and transportation system is no longer realistic in the short term, and it seems that the current situation will remain in effect for at least the foreseeable future. This has several severe morphological implications; nevertheless, despite the separation, it is important to maintain economic cooperation in the region. Tourism, which traditionally is a major industry in Jerusalem, characteristically necessitates the free flow of visitors in the area. It is in the interest of all sides (including Christian denominations) to develop a tourism industry that will benefit all parties, acting as a unifying force in the area and an incentive for creating a calm and stable atmosphere, which will enable the increasing tourist potential to be realized to a greater extent.
References


Maps and Figure Captions

Map 1: Jewish neighborhood construction across the 1949 armistice line, 1967-2000
Map 2: The “Security Fence” in the Jerusalem Area
Map 3: The Metropolitan “X”
Map 4: Transportation Arteries and Ring Roads
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Figure 1: The Location of the Planned “Kidmat Zion” Neighborhood
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Towards an Interconnected Jerusalem Metropolis

Amiram Gonen

The Vision of an Interconnected Metropolis

This article has been written in the hope that despite the many difficulties and disappointments that have plagued Jerusalem in recent years and in the more distant past, the possibility nevertheless exists that the scenario presented here, or something similar to it, will be acceptable to both parties laying claims to the city, and will thereby enable tranquility to prevail within. As a result of this tranquility, life will be able to resume a semblance of normality. If the arrangements arrived at by all the parties are implemented, Jerusalem may yet see a process of vibrant development that will benefit all the residents of the metropolis, Jews and Arabs, Israelis and Palestinians. Admittedly, the negotiations that lead to these arrangements are going to be difficult and complex, because the competition among those vying for control of the city is fierce and has deep historical roots. Each of the rival camps includes individuals unwilling to compromise on any of the collective rights sanctified in a belief system incapable of accommodating rival claims. Each camp includes individuals who, with some degree of justification, see the risks and not only the opportunities inherent in accommodation, and warn of hidden traps, or the danger that promises made in a written agreement will not be kept. However, without maintaining hope and making a resolute effort, nothing will be achieved.
The aim of this article is to propose a conceptual framework which can assist considerably in ensuring that neither Jewish nor Arab Jerusalem is harmed by the developments expected over the coming years as leaders and specialists attempt to find a way out of the present imbroglio, and to present a solution which offers real hope for the Jerusalem metropolis. The key element of this conceptual framework is as follows: irrespective of any solution contemplated by policymakers, the principal subject that should be considered, when drafting the details of whatever form of political and territorial settlement is adopted, is the creation of channels of communication between Jewish Jerusalem and Arab Jerusalem. These channels should be maintained in such a way that, to the extent possible, they will enable the Jerusalem metropolis to function as a single interconnected region. Efforts should therefore be directed at ensuring that both parts of the Jerusalem metropolis – the Jewish and Arab, the Israeli and Palestinian – are functionally connected. This functional connection should apply to every facet of life that involves economic prosperity and the environment, as is the case in other metropolitan areas divided into several zones of jurisdiction. By trying to interconnect Jewish Jerusalem and Arab Jerusalem in any political and territorial configuration, one can furnish an underlying structure that can offer a real chance to achieve the desired prosperity and well-being. For this purpose, it is necessary in the Jerusalem metropolis to establish and operate connective nodes between its different parts, even if they are under different sovereignty.

After the War of Independence there were two cities in divided Jerusalem, disconnected on almost every conceivable level. As a result, both Israeli Jerusalem and Jordanian Jerusalem were relegated to the sidelines of economic development while their big sisters, Tel Aviv in the west and Amman in the east, progressed. Many Jerusalemites, Jews and Arabs alike, who witnessed the events of the 1950s and 1960s, have no wish to be entangled in that situation again and see the city bled of its inhabitants and its businesses, as they leave it for other urban centers. Now that they have gotten the taste of a city visited by multitudes of tourists and pilgrims between one intifada and the next, now that they have seen what life can be like under conditions of peace in a city capable of captivating people and attracting businesses worldwide with its appeal, full interconnection between the city’s two national components should be made possible, thus creating the potential for development and prosperity. Many Jerusalemites wish to make the Jerusalem metropolis a major player in the global network of
metropolitan centers. Jewish Jerusalem and Arab Jerusalem can join this network only if they proceed hand in hand.

The Interconnected and the Divided City

Jerusalem has alternated repeatedly between being an interconnected and a divided city. At the end of the Ottoman period and during the British Mandate, Jerusalem was joined together as a single city; separate areas of development among Jews and Arabs were discernible, yet even these had some degree of overlapping and intermingling. The Jews built neighborhoods in the northwestern and western sector of the city, on both sides of Jaffa Street. Christian Arabs built neighborhoods mainly in the southwest. Muslim Arabs built neighborhoods mainly in the northern and eastern sectors. Dozens of new Jewish neighborhoods were built. Facilitating their construction was the access to resources in the Arab sector, both manpower and raw materials, particularly stone. Jewish and Arab commerce overlapped, and business ties were formed between merchants from both sides. Jewish buyers relied on Arab businesses, while Arab residents of the city utilized the services provided by Jewish businesses.

At the same time, the Old City was shared by Jews and Arabs, although each group was centered in its own quarter: Jewish, Muslim, Christian, and Armenian. This entire system of ethnic neighborhoods and quarters functioned as a single municipal entity, with joint business centers in the Old City and along Jaffa Street. One city hall managed the entire municipal area of Jerusalem. The city had transportation, electricity, water, drainage, and sewage infrastructures deployed throughout this municipal area.

As the enmity between the two ethnic groups increased, especially after the disturbances, or the Great Arab Revolt as it was called, during the years 1936-1939, a gradual process of separation between the Jewish and Arab systems began. Jews who lived in Arab neighborhoods or in their immediate vicinity went to live in Jewish neighborhoods, in order to enjoy a greater degree of security. Despite this development, extensive commercial and business ties were maintained between Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem. Both ethnic groups in the city used Jaffa Street and the adjoining streets west of the Old City walls for trade and services, until the outbreak of hostilities following the UN General Assembly’s resolution on the partition of the country on November 29, 1947. During
the subsequent months of hostilities, which developed into outright war, the city was divided into two parts, Israeli and Jordanian.

The War of Independence was followed by a period of 19 years during which Jerusalem was divided into two completely separate cities, one in the State of Israel and the other in the Kingdom of Jordan. The ceasefire line (the Green Line) between Israel and Jordan marked the division of Jerusalem into an Israeli-ruled city and a Jordanian-ruled city. During those years, the economies of the two cities were separated from each other, as were their infrastructures. There was scarcely any movement of people and goods, or of ideas, between the two sides. A few UN personnel occasionally moved between the two cities, but the border was usually sealed. Both sides suffered from their exclusive dependence on their respective urban hinterlands: Israeli Jerusalem on Tel Aviv and Jordanian Jerusalem on Amman. Both sides found themselves unable to exploit the advantages of being a big city. Jerusalem may have been the world center of faith, but it was left out in the cold with regard to commerce. Neither side was able to take advantage of the geographical proximity of a neighboring pool of resources. It was not possible to cross the street and interact with the other side in order to benefit from supply and demand, as is usually the case in an integrated urban or regional system. Instead of being mistress of its own destiny and open to any type of economic and functional relationship, Jerusalem became the maidservant of grand ladies located 60 or 70 kilometers away – Tel Aviv in the west and Amman in the east. Both Jerusalem populations paid a heavy price for the complete separation between them during those 19 years. Residents abandoned the city and were followed by businesses as well. Businesses that remained failed to prosper. Arab Jerusalem suffered in particular, because the capital city of the Kingdom of Jordan was far away in Amman. Jewish Jerusalem by contrast enjoyed the advantages of its status as Israel’s capital and also absorbed some of the immigrants of the Fifties and the Sixties.

After the Six-Day War, the city was reunited as a single system, with the annexation of neighborhoods in Arab Jerusalem into the Israeli municipality of Jerusalem and the administration of the West Bank by Israel. The city began to function again as a single municipal system in some respects. The new neighborhoods of Jerusalem, built to consolidate Israel’s territorial hold on the capital, were able to utilize the skilled and relatively inexpensive Arab labor
available within the Jerusalem metropolis. During the period of the British Mandate and the post-1967 period, when the city and its metropolitan area were open and unfettered by political borders, Jewish Jerusalem was to a large extent built by Arab laborers. This may have embittered advocates of Palestinian nationalism, fearful of an Israeli takeover of the territories which they define as Palestinian. All in all, however, the construction of Jewish neighborhoods constituted a very important source of income for the Palestinian-Arab population in the Jerusalem metropolis. New houses and new neighborhoods were built in the Palestinian sector in the Jerusalem metropolis with money earned in the Jewish building trade. Small villages thus grew into large villages, while big, spacious houses replaced small, cramped ones. Higher incomes led to an improved standard of living among the Palestinian population, not only in terms of housing, which was its most visible manifestation.

It was not in the building industry alone that a system of complementary relationships existed between the Jewish sector and the Arab sector in the Jerusalem metropolis. Commerce and industry were also areas where entrepreneurs were eager to break through jurisdictional borders and security control posts in order to increase their market potential. However, as violence increased, considerable informal but very tangible divisions were created, although extensive economic and other ties between the sides were nonetheless maintained. Nowadays, as a barrier is being erected across the Jerusalem metropolis, Jerusalem is again paying the price of disconnection between its parts, to the detriment of all.

In the coming years, as the boundaries of a Palestinian state are defined, the division of the Jerusalem metropolis could again become an issue, leading to a separation between the two national populations. Such a division would cause both Jewish Jerusalem and Arab Jerusalem to revert to the position of a peripheral city – a city at the end of the road. It would seem that many Arab and Jewish Jerusalemites are not willing to pay the economic price of living this way in return for isolated sovereignty. The time for such an approach has long since passed. Of course, the aspiration to sovereignty is understandable; yet both sides should realize that today it is possible to achieve partial political sovereignty without sacrificing too many economic and environmental advantages. Europe is teaching the world a lesson by opening borders and removing barriers in order to create a single large and prosperous market. All Europe wishes to do is to
modify absolute sovereignty as expressed by closure and exclusivity. Within Europe, in cities located close to borders, attempts are being made not only to open these borders to the flow of people and goods, but also to create regional or interurban frameworks for areas divided politically, but not economically, and certainly not socially. The crucial question, then, that now needs to be addressed is whether the city of Jerusalem will enter its new era as a disconnected metropolis or as an interconnected one. I wish to present the case for an interconnected Jerusalem below.

**The Case for an Interconnected Jerusalem Metropolis**

Though the mood these days among many Palestinians and some Israelis favors a political division of the Jerusalem metropolis, with Palestinians wishing to secure their sovereignty and their capital city in part of the metropolis, and Israelis wishing to avoid the “demographic” and therefore the political consequences of holding onto some of the Arab parts of the metropolis, there are still some good reasons for interconnection.

**Tourism and Pilgrimage Call for an Interconnected City**

Tourism is an industry in which geographical openness is a key to success. Tourists move from site to site when they visit a particular city or a particular area. Every site competes for part of the tourist traffic. Any restriction on movement affects the income of everyone engaged in the tourist industry. Much of the tourism in Jerusalem is based on the holy places. The entire Jerusalem metropolis in fact is bristling with holy places for the followers of the three monotheistic faiths. An economic and social division of this region that severely restricts freedom of movement would cause friction. Conversely, free movement between the different parts of the metropolis and all of its holy places could also create a basis for cooperation between representatives of the three religions.

Cities worldwide have jumped on the bandwagon of tourism during recent decades, and are doing their utmost to attract tourists from abroad, whose numbers are increasing as the level of income rises, transportation becomes more sophisticated and inexpensive, and tourism becomes an integral part of the modern
consumer culture. The initial development of modern Jerusalem was related to the growing influx of pilgrims and tourists since the middle of the 19th century. Even Jaffa benefited from the burgeoning tourism to Jerusalem and grew from a poor fishing village into an active port city as a result. Bethlehem benefited from the upsurge in tourism as well, in its own way. After developing as a result of the tourist industry, Jaffa and Jerusalem became important centers for the consolidation of Jewish settlement.

Unrestricted access to the holy places was the most important component of relations between the Christian European powers and the Muslim Ottoman Empire. The arrangement made by the Ottoman sultans in 1757 and 1852, under pressure from the Christian powers, was intended to regulate access to the holy places in Jerusalem. It was this arrangement that allowed Jews to pray in the narrow passage in front of the Western Wall, but prohibited them from introducing any additional facilities there. This arrangement marked the beginning of the arrangements for free access to the holy places in Jerusalem. The British resolutely maintained these arrangements, but found themselves powerless in the riots of 1929, which were triggered by Jewish pressure to rescind the prohibitions prescribed under the arrangements. After the Six-Day War, Israel very well understood the sensitivities with respect to the holy places and therefore, as soon as it had expanded the municipal area of Israeli Jerusalem to include the eastern neighborhoods of Jerusalem as well as the Old City, the Knesset enacted the Law for the Protection of the Holy Places on June 27, 1967. Central to this legislation was the issue of free access to the holy places. But it should be understood that unrestricted access does not mean only that the gates of the holy places themselves are open to worshippers and visitors; it means that the entire urban space of the city in which these holy places are located is open as well.

Part of the initial building in Jerusalem was intended to provide for the needs of those visiting the city. Hotels were a point of contact between the local population and visitors. Businesses and workshops were opened in the city in order to provide goods and services to tourists and pilgrims. After the War of Independence, Jewish Jerusalem was deprived of this economic base, as most if not all of the holy places were in the Jordanian-controlled part of the city. Christian pilgrims reached their holy places via Amman. Arab Jerusalem enjoyed an almost complete monopoly of this tourist activity. The hotels in Israeli Jerusalem were
happy if they hosted a small group of tourists willing to spend a night in Jerusalem after a day in the city, before returning to the more glittering attractions of Tel Aviv. In the eastern, Jordanian-controlled part of the city, new hotels opened in order to accommodate not only the Christian pilgrims who flocked there, but Muslim pilgrims as well. Jerusalem – al-Quds – came just after Mecca, in Islam, as a site for pilgrimage, and Jerusalem’s tourist enterprises during the period of Jordanian rule were also based on this very important component of Muslim tourism.

The Six-Day War and the circumstances that evolved in its wake may have stemmed the tide of Muslim tourism, but did not necessarily put a total stop to it. If a new situation evolves in the Jerusalem area and Muslim visitors again become commonplace, or maybe even more numerous than before, such an influx will undoubtedly make itself felt in the economy of Jewish Jerusalem if there is contiguity in the city. Within a space of two kilometers, Muslim pilgrims will become tourists curious to view the Jewish neighborhoods and inspect their centers of commerce. Some of them may even wish to visit the museums and other cultural institutions that usually attract tourists visiting a city.

The overall area of the Jerusalem metropolis includes other historical and cultural sites, which together constitute an exciting pool of attractions for the residents of the city and its visitors. This pool of attractions should be accessible in its entirety, without restrictions and barriers that detract from experiencing the city. This is particularly important for those visiting the city as pilgrims and tourists from abroad. Many of these people come to experience all the facets of Jerusalem, and not only to visit Jewish Jerusalem or Arab Jerusalem. We should therefore make an effort to create conditions that will provide unrestricted access to Jerusalem in its entirety. This will enhance the experience of visiting the city and, as a result, will greatly increase its attractiveness. And the more compelling the city becomes as an attraction, the greater the influx of tourists and pilgrims will be.

Here again we can see the economic advantage inherent in Jerusalem’s standing as a destination for pilgrims and tourists, which could expand enormously given the right conditions. Jerusalem is by far the greatest of all the tourist attractions in Israel, and serves as a catalyst for much of the tourism to other parts of the...
country. In a state of peace, and in a situation in which Jerusalem is interconnected, its status as such an attraction could lead to a vast increase in the number of tourists visiting the city, and, of course, other Israeli and Palestinian areas as well. With partition and closed borders, it is difficult to see how tourism to the Jerusalem metropolis can develop on a large scale. Not only the Jerusalem metropolis, but also the entire Israeli and Palestinian economies, would be the losers in such a situation.

**Jewish Jerusalem’s Need to Interconnect with the Arab Parts of the Metropolis**

Another reason for connecting Jewish Jerusalem with Arab Jerusalem is that Jerusalem lacks a large peripheral area of settlement. While Tel Aviv came into being against the background of peripheral rural Jewish settlements that had grown into cities and supported its development as a regional center – a classic and essential function of any city that wishes to prosper – Jewish Jerusalem developed without peripheral Jewish localities. The small nuclei of Atarot and Neve Ya’akov in the north, and Motza, Kiryat Anavim, and Ma’ale haHamisha in the west, contributed little in this respect. These were mere specks on the map compared with Holon, Bat Yam, Rishon le-Zion, Rehovot, Nes Ziona, Petah Tikva, Ramat Gan, Givataim, Ramat Hasharon, Herzliyya, Ra’anana, Kefar Sava, Ramataim and Magdab (the latter two subsequently becoming Hod Hasharon), as well as numerous other localities and neighborhoods that began to surround the city of Tel Aviv during the period of the British Mandate. Jewish Jerusalem had no such satellite localities. The city’s Jewish population earned its living from internal commerce, from pilgrims, and from a generous inflow of capital in the form of the chaluka (charity collected from Diaspora Jews) or from other national resources. However, to some extent, Jewish Jerusalem did share the periphery of Arab towns and villages in the vicinity of the city with Arab Jerusalem. These towns and villages supplied the city with agricultural produce, both to its Jewish and Arab inhabitants, and also consumed goods and services, part of which Jews were able to supply. From time to time, business strikes and other disturbances disrupted this economic relationship between Jews and Arabs in the Jerusalem area. At the same time, both national camps tried to end or minimize the relationship. But since it was a major asset of the city, it soon resumed.
This symbiosis was seen after the Six-Day War, before the outbreak of the *intifada* distanced Jews from Arabs and blocked the channels through which goods and services had flowed. Jerusalem’s Jewish and Arab merchants suffered. Arab merchants were more deeply affected by the *intifada* than their Jewish counterparts, as much of their income came from Jewish customers. Moreover, parts of Arab Jerusalem have subsequently been cut off from other Arab parts of the metropolis by a wall/fence, thus leading to a further deterioration of the economic situation. Even if Israel continues to rule the city and many adjacent areas with an Arab population and economy, it will still be necessary to find ways to maintain the maximum degree of openness between the Arab commercial centers of the city itself and their base of customers and workers in the Palestinian periphery.

**An Interconnected Metropolis as a Gateway to the Countries of the Region**

A connected Jerusalem could give the Israeli economy access to the economies of the adjacent Arab countries. When a Palestinian state is established, of all the Palestinian cities Jerusalem will undoubtedly be the center of the economic activities catering to these countries. In this regard, Arab Jerusalem as an economic center includes Ramallah, which during recent decades has functioned as Arab Jerusalem’s business center. The years of the *intifada*, which hampered movement between Jerusalem and other parts of the West Bank, were a major contributing factor in this respect.

Although trade with Arab countries is hardly likely to be the major factor in the Israeli economy, which is today mainly connected to the economies of Europe and North America, such contact could be of major importance for the local economy of Jewish Jerusalem, even if not always directly. It can be assumed that it will be mostly Palestinian businesses that have economic contact with Arab countries; however, these businesses will rely, *inter alia*, on the abundant Israeli supply of goods and services lacking in the Palestinian economy. Businesses in Jewish Jerusalem will be able to join the commercial chain that will be created between supply in Israel and demand in the Arab countries. Open gateways in Jerusalem will facilitate the operation of this commercial chain.
Internal Interconnectivity as a Key to Ending the Primacy of Tel Aviv

The connection with the markets to the east could help the economy of Jewish Jerusalem to contend with the enormous competition from the economy of Israel's core region, centered primarily around Tel Aviv. Although Israel has ruled Jerusalem since 1967, and despite the vast resources that have been channelled into the city and its environs in order to build new neighborhoods and new settlements there, and even though industry in Jerusalem has been granted various concessions by the Israeli government, it has been very difficult to compete with Tel Aviv and its metropolis. The wave of immigration from the former Soviet Union was of no help in this respect either, for these immigrants never chose to settle in Jerusalem to the extent they did in the coastal region. Jerusalem's relatively backseat position in Israel's regional economic structure, in which the center of the country is the economic focal point of its wealth, can only be remedied if the gateway to the east is opened, thus giving the Jerusalem metropolis the role of a hub in a much wider economic region. One way to do this is by connecting Jewish and Arab Jerusalem in an open metropolis.

Obviously, the Israeli economy can build economic relations with the Middle East via Tel Aviv. Tel Aviv is built to serve as a clearing house for all forms of business and for any geographical destination, including the entire Middle East if necessary. Tel Aviv has the ability and necessary facilities to play this role and to profit from it as well. The days of Jaffa at the end of the Ottoman period may yet return. In those days, Jaffa constructed new commercial systems at a time when Jerusalemites were squabbling among themselves about how to prevent innovation and stop modern entrepreneurship in the name of the Jewish religion. Jerusalem was not only closed to rapid economic and urban development but actually rejected it, though it was then, as it is now, the biggest city in the country. The insularity of the Jewish public in Jerusalem at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century induced ambitious Jerusalemites, armed with an entrepreneurial spirit, to leave the city in order to share in the benefits of prosperity enjoyed by both Jews and Arabs in Jaffa. Subsequently, Tel Aviv came along, taking over from Jaffa and soon crowning itself as the queen of Israeli cities. Jerusalem lagged behind as an ultra-orthodox backwater, wallowing in insularity and fanaticism, living in its glorious past and relying on
the protection of a higher power that would do its work for it. And if God did not do the job, the chalukah funds would do it instead.

The loss of primacy to Tel Aviv sealed Jerusalem’s fate for decades. Even when it was accorded the status of capital of the country under British rule, it did not revert to its former position as the country’s economic focal point. Jerusalem continued to send its sons to the greener pastures of Tel Aviv, where they could make a better living and enjoy a modern life. If there is any hope of overcoming this second-city syndrome – a dilemma facing not only Jerusalem but also Haifa and other cities around the world such as Chicago versus New York, Melbourne versus Sidney, and a-Salt versus Amman – it is by opening it up to the Arab world via Arab Jerusalem, its natural intermediary if not partner. Arab Jerusalem could be Jewish Jerusalem’s ally in the economic rivalry with Tel Aviv.

Common Interests Require an Interconnected Metropolis

The economic implications of an interconnected city are quite clear. Underlying the economic aspect are considerations of market size and divergence of business ties. A connected Jerusalem could offer additional advantages. Jewish and Arab Jerusalem share a common problem, namely the clash between liberalism and modernity and the old insularity and conservatism; between tolerance and enlightenment and piety and religiosity, where the “other” is apt to be outside the consensus and even a bitter foe, with whom a communality of interests cannot be created. As soon as this issue is broached, the question arises as to which parties are the natural allies. The answer is not clear cut. If a particular lifestyle is to prevail, these allies may actually end up in different national camps. I know the following statement may sound naïve, tenuous or, heaven forbid, “leftist,” but perhaps consideration should be given to the possibility of an alliance between the modern Jewish camp and the modern Arab camp, to decide the issue of the future character of the city and prevent it from regressing into nationalist and religious fanaticism and conservatism on both sides. In recent years, a dialogue has been going on between groups and individuals on both sides, who wish, possibly unwittingly, to create some kind of framework to examine how the path of progress can be given a chance in the city on the basis of the modern Western model, in the face of the numerous obstacles still posed by both national entities vying for control of the city and the country.
It may even come to pass that the camps which I call conservative and fanatical, and who are to be found in both Jewish Jerusalem and Arab Jerusalem, will indeed be the ones capable of forming an alliance to ensure that the city truly is holy, in every sense of the word. While this scenario should be seen as one of those available for consideration when contemplating the future of Jerusalem, I believe that in view of the basic worldview of these camps, built around cultural rivalry and negation of the “other”, the chances of its realization are small.

**Risks of Interconnectivity**

Of course, underlying the creation of an interconnected metropolis, with a great measure of free movement between its politically distinct areas, are various elements of risk. Clearly, the issue of security is highly sensitive, and it seems that we will still have to live with it for a long time. Specialists in the subject will have to deal with it. In the final analysis, however, it would appear worthwhile to take the security risk for the sake of the long-term objective of realizing the city’s high degree of urban and metropolitan potential.

Another underlying risk requiring attention by city managers on both sides is respect for the followers of other faiths. Bound up with this issue is a history of highly regrettable incidents in which hotheaded provocateurs have impugned the dignity of members of other religions, and at times, the dignity of high-level representatives of these faiths. Moreover, religions and ethnic groups are rivals over certain of the holy places. It would be advisable to establish a framework for preventing harm in such situations.

**Connective nodes in the Old City and its Environs**

Some of the connective nodes between Jewish Jerusalem and Arab Jerusalem are well known, while others can be regarded as new. Here, I propose a number of connective junctions with the joint aim of connecting economic systems at the interurban, metropolitan, and international levels. Interconnection on the overall Middle Eastern level is also part of this joint objective. The Old City, along with its gates and the commercial streets fanning out from its walls, constitutes a main area for interconnection between the Israeli and the Palestinian economic systems.
Map 1
Connective Nodes in the Jerusalem Metropolis

Prepared by Tamar Soffer, Department of Geography, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
The Old City as a Connective Node

The Old City is the historical connective node between Jews and Arabs, and between them and other nationalities that visit Jerusalem. The Old City contains within its confines the holy places of the three monotheistic religions, and thereby constitutes the main focus of pilgrimage for followers of these three faiths. Each religion has a claim on the sanctity of the Old City. Since the holy places in it symbolize the Old City’s centrality in the city as a whole, without an Old City that is open to devotees of all three religions, and managed as a city open to unrestricted movement from all directions for all those with a claim on its sanctity, all sides will feel affronted. Accordingly, arrangements must be found to allow for unrestricted movement and provide for forms of management and sovereignty which ensure that the Old City is completely open. In any event, Jewish Jerusalem should not be disconnected from the Old City in its totality.

Apart from the holy places, the Old City is a center for commerce and tourism. It is one of the most important economic engines of the city. The Old City serves as crucible for intensive economic activity among those who find their way there. Currently, the Old City serves as a center for day-to-day commerce for the Palestinians in particular. However, if the present situation of violence were to change, the Jewish population too could have access to the commercial and service enterprises located within the Old City. In the future, when the security situation in the city becomes more tranquil and millions of tourists and pilgrims again visit Jerusalem, a vast amount of economic activity will flow into the Old City, turning it into a giant emporium of markets and commercial passageways. Those unable to participate in this activity will suffer economic loss.

The Commercial Streets Leading North from the Old City

The areas adjacent to the Old City would also benefit from the economic activity centered there. The commercial streets north of the Old City, near Nablus Gate and at the top of Salah a-Din Street, are closely connected to the Old City commercial system. The northern wall of the Old City does not block the commercial activity conducted within the Old City from that which is conducted north of Nablus Gate. The commercial streets north of the Old City today form the principal trade and business center of the Palestinian economy in Jerusalem.
It is therefore in Jewish Jerusalem’s interest to be connected to this center in the future. Such a connection could serve the area on both sides of Road 1, which lies west of these commercial streets. Although this road currently serves through traffic, with proper planning it could become a main thoroughfare for commerce, services, and businesses on both its sides, serving both Arab and Jewish Jerusalem. The large hotels that were constructed next to this road in recent years could effectively take the lead in the development of an urban strip of intensive economic activity, connecting the economy of Arab Jerusalem with the economy of Jewish Jerusalem under whatever political reality that may emerge.

If an urban strip of development indeed materializes on both sides of Road 1, the adjacent neighborhoods may well follow suit. For instance, on the Jewish side of Road 1, the Morasha/Musrara neighborhood is likely to undergo major land use changes. Until now, the neighborhood has served mainly as a low-income residential area. New immigrants were housed in it during the years 1948-1967, in place of the well-to-do Arab population who lived there before the 1948 War of Independence. Following the reunification of the city under Israeli rule in 1967 and the removal of border posts, the neighborhood has been slowly upgraded. Well-to-do Jews have settled in. Following the projected development along Road 1, various services and businesses can be expected to locate themselves in this neighborhood, which with time could become one of the most important centers of economic activity based on the Old City, like the center that emerged within the Notre Dame Monastery compound adjacent to the Old City wall. Instead of waiting for businesses to move spontaneously to the Morasha/Musrara, this development could be promoted by specific planning. It would be interesting to see how this neighborhood could be upgraded and developed without the drastic demolition that characterized the redevelopment of the Mamilla neighborhood west of the Old City.

**The Commercial Streets West of the Old City**

Until Israel’s 1948 War of Independence, the commercial streets west of the Jaffa Gate were an integral part of the economic system centered in the Old City. Jaffa Street, immediately to the west of the Jaffa Gate, was the scene of diverse business activity, as was the entire length of Mamilla Street, which
branched off from Jaffa Street near the Jaffa Gate. Mamilla Street housed one of the most important commercial centers in the city until it was destroyed in the disturbances prior to the War of Independence. Jaffa Street, and Mamilla Street and its commercial center, were connected to the Old City geographically and functionally. Following the partition of the city, Mamilla Street became a frontier zone of low-income housing and workshops. The aftermath of the Six-Day War provided the Mamilla area with renewed potential due to its proximity to Jaffa Gate, although city planners failed to exploit this potential properly. Part of the district was given over to high-income housing, with apartments often left vacant by their overseas owners. What had once been a vibrant commercial center become a sleepy residential area with a huge parking lot. Had the city fathers let natural processes evolve, the old Mamilla Street, now nonexistent because of massive demolition, might once again have become a thriving commercial district, full of colorful shops, cozy cafes and popular restaurants. This has happened in recent decades in Emek Refa‘im Street in the German Colony. If Mamilla Street had been shaped by natural processes instead of massive interference, it could perhaps have outdone Emek Refa‘im Street, due to its proximity to the Old City with its millions of tourists and pilgrims. Renewed consideration should be given to the manner in which the Mamilla area and its building projects have developed. The challenge is to try to introduce a spirit of urbanity appropriate to its strategic location, even if that necessitates tearing down expensive, recently built housing for which there is no geographic justification, so that businesses and institutions can move there and enhance the connection with the economy of the Old City. This will increase the interconnection between the economies of Arab and Jewish Jerusalem, as long as some measure of openness is introduced into the Jerusalem metropolis. The idea of demolishing and rebuilding what is known as the Mamilla Project should not give cause for concern. Demolition and rebuilding are an accepted practice in many cities, even in the case of relatively new projects; furthermore, the issue here is finding a suitable and proper use for a strategic tract of land in the city.

**Southern Connective Nodes**

South of Jerusalem is the city of Bethlehem, a major attraction for Christian pilgrims and tourists. In the future, when an arrangement between Israel and the Palestinians is implemented, tourist and pilgrim traffic is likely to constitute a
larger part of the Jerusalem metropolitan economy. Also south of Jerusalem is an area of extensive economic activity, in the Palestinian and Israeli settlements in the Hebron hills, all of which are closely connected with the city’s economy. It is therefore very important to enhance and create connective nodes in the southern part of the Jerusalem metropolis.

A Connective Node on the Jerusalem-Bethlehem Border

The area bordering Bethlehem is a location where Jewish Jerusalem can connect with the tourist and Christian pilgrim economy, centered at the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem. Many years ago there were those who saw the area adjacent to the Talpiyot and Mar Elias monastery as a suitable zone for the development of commercial activity, catering to the flow of tourists between Jerusalem and Bethlehem. But except for a few businesses, little was done to transform the area between the two cities into a center of activity based on tourist and pilgrim traffic. Attention was soon diverted to the plan to build the Giv’at haMatos caravan camp to house immigrants from the CIS and Ethiopia. Most residents of the site have now left, and Jerusalem planning circles are talking of building a prestigious residential neighborhood there, with views of Jerusalem to the north and Bethlehem to the south. Given the vast potential inherent in this interurban zone for interconnecting the economy of Jewish Jerusalem with that of Palestinian Bethlehem, an urban development plan for this zone should be prepared with no delay. This plan should include the possibility of transforming the area into a connective node linking the two national economic systems operating in the Jerusalem metropolis.

A Connective Node East of Bet Jallah

The construction of the tunnel bypassing Bethlehem and Bet Jallah as a result of the intifada created a new transportation environment south of Jerusalem. This situation will prevail even in good times, once Israel and the Palestinians reach some kind of agreement. The new transportation environment has created the potential for a new connective node adjacent to the village of el-Khader, where traffic converges between Jerusalem, the Arab localities in the Bethlehem and Hebron regions, and the Jewish settlements of the Etzion Bloc, the Hebron hills, and the Adulam region. The area surrounding this junction has considerable po-
potential for activity that would result from the connection of the Israeli economy with the Palestinian economy, particularly if the Etzion Bloc settlements remain under Israeli sovereignty.

**Connective Nodes East of Jerusalem**

The eastern margins of the Jerusalem metropolis, towards the Jewish town of Ma’ale Adumim, are located at a crossroads that is politically sensitive. Two ethnic structural lines intersect in this area. The structural line running from west to east is the Israeli one, enjoining Jewish West Jerusalem with the Jewish town of Ma’ale Adumim and its adjacent Jewish settlements. The structural line running from north to south is the Palestinian one, connecting the northern West Bank with its southern part, and also linking up with Arab Jerusalem. These two structural lines intersect, as do transportation lines.

In a situation of entrenched hostility, this intersection of ethnic structural lines in the Jerusalem metropolis represents a geopolitical predicament, since the Jewish structural line could forestall the territorial contiguity of the future Palestinian state, a source of complaint by the Palestinians, as well as by others. On the other hand, the Palestinian structural line poses a threat to the territorial contiguity between Jewish Jerusalem and the Ma’ale Adumim area, and would call into question Israel’s ability to continue maintaining control of Ma’ale Adumim and its adjacent Jewish settlements. This issue is likely to be a crucial factor in negotiations on the future borders between Israel and the Palestinians in the Jerusalem area. But in the spirit of this article, which envisages a high degree of connectivity between the two national economies, it might be fruitful to look at this intersection of the two ethnic structural lines differently. Instead of serving as a source of friction, this intersection between the two national border lines might be seen as a zone of intensive interconnection. In this area, two specific locations have the potential for acting as connection points east of the Jerusalem metropolis: the a-Za’im node and the Mishor Adumim node.

**The a-Za’im Connection Node**

The main existing and future transportation routes intersect at the a-Za’im junction, east of the Mount Scopus-Mount of Olives ridge. Properly planned traffic
movement at this junction, and appropriate controls over sovereignty and economic needs, could lead to a situation in which each side would be able to move freely in the desired direction. Consideration should also be given to introducing commercial activity at this strategic junction, which under certain conditions could become a zone of interconnecting business activity that would include the Jordanian side and more distant countries.

**The Mishor Adumim Connection Node**

Located in the Mishor Adumim area is an industrial zone which in the future could become a center of activity for industry, storage, and wholesale trade. The Mishor Adumim node could thereby connect not only Israelis and Palestinians, but also link the Jerusalem metropolis with Jordan, and from there with other countries in the Middle East. This node is on the main road to Amman, a road which under certain conditions could be the principal channel for economic activity connecting Amman with Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. In the course of time, this channel could effectively become the “main street” of an Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian economic zone. Under the road network planned for Israel, Route 45 would be the transportation base of an economic freeway, and could make a great contribution in the future, once territorial disputes have been resolved.

**Connective Nodes in North Jerusalem**

Most activity in the Palestinian economy is likely to develop from the areas north of Jerusalem. In recent decades, the city of Ramallah has indeed become the principal economic center of the Palestinian population. Located north of Ramallah are the majority of Palestinian towns with developmental potential. All these factors indicate that Jewish Jerusalem should find ways of connecting with the Palestinian economy at the national level, and possibly even at the overall regional level. The area north of Jerusalem is also highly important in terms of contact with the main centers of the Israeli economy on the coastal plain. The existing and future transportation systems could facilitate convenient connections with the business and marketing centers in the Tel Aviv metropolis. Jewish Jerusalem has every reason to be involved in this arrangement, if it does not wish to let Ramallah and Tel Aviv be the only ones to benefit from the eco-
economic development expected during an era of peace between the Palestinians and Israel. Both national populations in the Jerusalem metropolis, Arab and Jewish, actually have a common interest in this respect.

**The Atarot/Qalandiya Area**

The Atarot/Qalandiya airport and the Atarot industrial zone have the potential to connect with both national economies in the Jerusalem area. The Atarot industrial zone was established with the intention of bringing Palestinian labor and Israeli businesses together. The recent *intifada* curtailed this development. Over time, however, as hostile activity ceases, a new pattern could emerge, whereby Palestinian businesses would base themselves in the industrial zone and its environs. The adjacent Atarot/Qalandiya airport area can also serve as a basis for industrial and commercial development in the north of Jerusalem, especially if flights there are resumed and the airport is able to serve both national economies. The location of an airport so close to Jerusalem would enable it to provide the city with the transportation infrastructure essential for transforming it into an important center in the global economy, where convenience of access from long distances is of appreciable significance when it comes to business executives and more affluent tourists.

**A New “City” Between Ramallah and Jerusalem**

The potential for establishing a joint Israeli-Palestinian business center in north Jerusalem can be realized in the form of a new “city”, which in a rational scenario would enable both peoples populating the metropolitan area to construct a gateway connecting their two economies, and thereafter connecting these two economies and those of the Middle East and the global economy. In view of the bold entrepreneurial nature of this innovative proposal, the next section of this article is devoted to a brief presentation of the proposal.

**Proposal for a New “City” in the North of Jerusalem**

In order to enhance their position in the business world of the future, Arab and Jewish Jerusalem can interconnect by establishing a new business center north
of the city of Jerusalem and southwest of Ramallah, which would accommodate potential economic activity for two main reasons.

One reason is the development of a metropolitan region with a population of over a million, centered on Jerusalem and extending from Ramallah and its satellite communities in the north to Ma’ale Adumim and its satellites in the east, to Bethlehem and its satellites in the south, and to the Jerusalem hill settlements in the west. Such a large metropolis could support a flourishing business center, if only because of the size of its population, which can be expected to grow further once peace is achieved.

The other reason is the possibility that Jerusalem will develop as an economic center at the national and supranational levels. Israel has Tel Aviv as its principal national center, where most of the country’s business activity is controlled. Within the Jerusalem metropolis, the Palestinians have only Ramallah as a potential location for the development of business activity at the national level. Nablus and Hebron cannot compete with Arab Jerusalem in the same manner that Tel Aviv competes with Jewish Jerusalem. The Palestinians will therefore obviously focus their efforts on developing the national center of their economy in the Jerusalem metropolis, where they are also planning to establish their political center. The connection between such an economic and a political center will lead to the rapid development of Arab Jerusalem. This analysis of the future map of Palestinian development suggests that Jewish Jerusalem should make every effort to participate in this development, and do all it can to become an important economic center in the emerging economic geography of the Middle East. It can achieve this by constructing a modern business center to attract Israeli, Palestinian, and international organizations that believe that Jerusalem will become an important focus of development in an era of peace and tranquility. This is also Jewish Jerusalem’s opportunity to claim a share of the national and global economy, which until now has been largely left to Tel Aviv.

The idea of a new “city” for Jerusalem is based on the realization that there is little chance to transform the old centers of both Arab and Jewish Jerusalem into vibrant business centers that are closely linked to the national and global economy. Numerous problems and risks are likely to hinder the construction of a modern business center in the old centers of Jerusalem that could meet the demand for state-of-the-art infrastructures in the international business world. The
old center of Jewish Jerusalem around Jaffa Street has been slow in taking up the challenge of modern business construction. The desire to preserve the area’s architectural heritage is irreconcilable with development of this type, in which high-rise office buildings are the main venue of urban development. This existing center is too close to the Old City, and any such construction might do damage to the cherished historical landscape. The same holds true for the existing center of Arab Jerusalem along Salah a-Din Street. Nevertheless, these two existing centers, in their present urban format, can continue to serve Jerusalem’s retail and tourist trade in the future. Such a trend has indeed developed in recent decades. If this really does prove to be the “natural” designation of the existing centers of Jewish Jerusalem, another location needs to be sought for the development of modern business in the proper urban format.

In recent decades, in the Jewish-inhabited western part of Jerusalem, national and international corporations have chosen to locate in peripheral areas of the city: in Giv’at Shaul, Har Chotzvim, and Malcha. The construction of new office buildings in recent years has been concentrated mainly in the former Giv’at Shaul industrial zone, the term “industrial zone” long ago becoming a misnomer. The location of Giv’at Shaul, west of the city center on the main road to Tel Aviv, provides an obvious advantage for business activity that relies on Tel Aviv and on the national economic and transportation systems. However, the area of the Giv’at Shaul is limited in space, being closed off by the Har Ha’Menuchot cemetery to the northwest, the Har Nof neighborhood to the west, and the Jerusalem Forest to the south. As a result, its future development as a major business center of the Jerusalem metropolis is limited.

In Arab Jerusalem no such significant geographical trend has been taking place within the limits of the inner city. Due to present political circumstances, most new Palestinian office and commercial building has been taking place in Ramallah, a burgeoning city only a few kilometers to the north of Jerusalem. The net result of these two trends, one to the west and the other to the north, has been the distancing of the new business agglomerations from each other, appreciably reducing the potential for fruitful interconnection between the Arab and Jewish economies. The Giv’at Shaul area is distant from Ramallah. It may therefore be appropriate to suggest an alternative course of development for business activity in Jerusalem, in the wake of a political arrangement between
Israel and the Palestinians. One of the geopolitical scenarios for such an arrangement is the creation of territorial contiguity between Giv’at Ze’ev and Jerusalem. This leads us to examine the seemingly outlandish idea of establishing a new business center – a new “city” – in the area north of Nabi Samuel and south east of Givat Ze’ev. This area could serve most of the globally oriented business activity that might be directed to the Jerusalem metropolis, in order to benefit from the economic development resulting from a peace agreement. The new “city” in this ambitious concept would be divided between Israel and Palestine. The Israeli new “city” and the Palestinian new “city” would be designed for interconnection and cooperation. The necessary business and infrastructure services would likely be common to both parts of this new “city”. Each part would be connected to the existing commercial centers in the Jerusalem metropolis, the Israeli to Jewish Jerusalem and the Palestinian to Arab Jerusalem and Ramallah. The new “city” would thereby be able to function as a zone ensuring connectivity between the two metropolitan economies – the Israeli and the Palestinian.

The new “city” on each side would be built in accordance with new standards, adapted to the requirements of international business activity. The business and infrastructure services necessary for this type of activity would also be provided. On the Israeli side, the new “city” would enable Jewish Jerusalem to gain a foothold in the global economy and reap the economic benefits of a peace agreement, and to ensure that Tel Aviv does not steal the show in this respect. Jerusalem would be able to offer a business center capable of competing with Tel Aviv, due to its connection with businesses operating in the Palestinian “city.” By sharing common business and infrastructure services as stated, the new center would offer a considerable advantage to those preferring it over the business centers in Tel Aviv or Amman.

The proposed location in the northwest of the Jerusalem metropolis would be convenient, from the social point of view, for both parts of the new “city”. This location would enable both the Israeli and the Palestinian parts to connect to the heart of Israel on the coastal plain. The planned rail line that is intended to pass through a location near Mevasseret Zion would help in this respect. If the concept does in fact materialize, it will be necessary to construct a spur leading to the new “city” from the planned Tel Aviv-Jerusalem rail line. Once finally com-
pleted, Route 45 would also contribute to connecting the new “city” to Amman, the largest business center to the east, and to Tel Aviv, the largest business center to the west. The new “city” of Jewish and Arab Jerusalem would thereby come to be located within easy reach of two large metropolises that already occupy a place on the global economic map. By clearly appearing on this map, Jerusalem would be in a position to reap the economic benefits of a peace agreement, while forming a close connection between the two economies active in the city.

Conclusion

The suggestion to consider the building of a new twin “city” for the Jerusalem metropolis is the epitome of the vision which considers this bitterly contested region as an interconnected economic system, irrespective of the geopolitical outcome. This article has presented the case for such interconnectedness, outlining its benefits for both Arab and Jewish Jerusalem. The article has dwelt mainly upon the transportation and commercial nodes necessary to ensure a high degree of connectivity between Jewish and Arab Jerusalem. This kind of connectivity could be enhanced by social and institutional instruments. That aspect of connectivity within the Jerusalem metropolis is left for elaboration in subsequent work.
Psychological Factors in the Transition to Post-Conflict Cooperation and Reconciliation: The Case of Jerusalem

Ifat Maoz

Objectives and Outline

This article explores the psychological factors involved in the transition from the present state of protracted conflict in Arab-Israel relations, to the desired state of stable peace and cooperation in a post-conflict situation, focusing on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the issue of Jerusalem as a divided city. It is based on literature in the domain of conflict, conflict resolution, and reconciliation, as well as on research findings specific to the Israeli-Palestinian case and to the issue of Jerusalem. The article is divided into three parts:

1. *Literature review: psychological factors and their role in the transition to post-conflict cooperation and reconciliation.* This part will discuss psychological factors such as (a) the perception of the other side as threatening, (b) the feeling of hatred toward the other side, and (c) the feeling of sympathy toward the other side, which influence the readiness of the public to make the transition to post-conflict reconciliation and cooperation.

2. *The psychology of transition to post-conflict cooperation and reconciliation in Jerusalem as a divided city: a study.* This part includes a study based on a national survey conducted in May 2005 on a representative sample of the Jewish-Israeli population (N=500). The study ex-
amines the extent to which the three major psychological factors described above, of perceived threat, hatred, and sympathy vis-à-vis the other side, determine support for compromise solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that can lead to reconciliation and cooperation in Jerusalem.

3. **Strategic recommendations.** Based on the literature review in Part 1 and the findings in Part 2, strategic recommendations are made.

**Part 1: Literature Review: Psychological Factors and their Role in the Transition to Post-Conflict Cooperation and Reconciliation**

**Introduction: Public Opinion, Compromise, and Reconciliation**

Scholarly writing has noted that the reconciliation process requires implementation of formal policies that forge relations between former rivals, create cooperative links, and stabilize peaceful relationships (Bar-Tal, 2000). These structural steps toward reconciliation include finding solutions based on compromises between the two sides (Maoz, 2004), as well as developing joint institutions and organizations, free and open trade, joint economic ventures, and free and open tourism; exchanging cultural products and information; and developing cooperation in different areas (Bar-Tal & Bennink, 2004).

However, such policies often seem difficult to achieve in the aftermath of protracted ethnic conflicts. The difficulties are not only related to the lack of agreement or cooperation among policymakers, but also to the lack of public support on both sides for embarking on a route of cooperation and reconciliation. Achieving reconciliation requires more than agreement or friendly relations between leaders; it requires the support of the entire society, or at least the vast majority of it, so that stable and lasting peace can be reached (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004; Bar-Tal, 2000).

Reconciliation and compromise policies often meet with opposition that must be overcome by leaders and policymakers in order to successfully advance and implement them (Bar-Tal & Bennink, 2004). Public opinion, being a social force that can facilitate or impede the implementation of the desired political
changes, is therefore central to transformative processes of reconciliation (Shamir & Shikaki, 2002).

Given the significance of public opinion in the implementation of compromise, cooperation, and reconciliation policies in post-conflict situations, it is important to understand the factors that influence the public’s attitudes toward compromise and reconciliation. Thus, in this article, we explore psychological factors in the context of the relations between Israelis and Palestinians, and concerning the specific issue of Jerusalem.

Psychological Factors and Transition to Post-Conflict Cooperation and Reconciliation

Perception of Threats in Conflict and Reconciliation

According to realistic theories of group conflict, conflicts of interest cause intergroup hostility and the perception of threat (Posen, 1993; Waltz, 1979). Thus, not surprisingly, societies involved in intractable conflicts are dominated by threat orientation. While threat orientation may be functional for coping with the stressful, highly uncertain and demanding situation of warfare, when it is maintained in post-conflict situations, it serves as a barrier to the progress of the peace process, to reconciliation, and to cooperation with the other side (Bar-Tal, 2000).

As in similar intractable conflicts, in the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well such threat orientations vis-à-vis the other group have been found to be a dominant force in maintaining and escalating the conflict. Jewish-Israeli perceptions of the collective Palestinian threat (perceptions such as “the Palestinians want to destroy the state of Israel” or “Palestinians hate Jews”) have been found to be a major factor associated with less conciliatory and less compromising positions in the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2001; Gordon & Arian, 2001; Maoz & McCauley, 2005).

Thus, we assume that perceptions of an acute Palestinian threat constitute a major barrier to transition to the envisaged reconciliation and cooperation in Jerusalem (Hasson et al., 2005). Such perceptions of Palestinians as highly threatening can be expected to considerably lower support for compromise ven-
ues in Jerusalem, which are a necessary prerequisite for the transition to post-conflict reconciliation.

**Feelings toward the Other Side as Determining Support for Reconciliation**

Studies and writings in the past decade greatly emphasize the importance of emotions in conflict resolution and reconciliation (Bar-On, 1997, 1999; Bar-Tal, 2001; Staub, 1996, 2000). This literature describes how negative and widely shared feelings towards the other side such as anger, fear, and hatred, which are usually dominant in societies involved in conflict, can also remain dominant in post-conflict situations and thus become a barrier to reconciliation and cooperation (Bar-On, 1997; Bar-Tal, 2001; Staub, 1990, 2000). On the other hand, the importance of developing positive feelings in post-conflict situations, such as hope (Bar-Tal, 2001; Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal, 2002), caring, sensitivity, and sympathy vis-à-vis the members of the other group (Bar-Tal, 2004; Kelman, 1998, 1999; Steinberg & Bar-On, 2002; Staub, 1996, 2000), is emphasized. Positive emotional orientations towards the other side are described as necessary for achieving and maintaining reconciliation and cooperation between former enemies.

Previous studies conducted in the specific context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have found that less negative feelings towards Palestinians – less anger, fear, and hate – are related to greater Jewish-Israeli readiness for compromise, cooperation, and reconciliation in the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2001; Maoz & McCauley, 2005).

On the other hand, such studies have also found that sympathy towards Palestinians is also a significant factor that influences Jewish-Israeli support for compromise, cooperation, and reconciliation. Specifically, it was found that Israeli Jews with greater sympathy for Palestinians were more supportive of reconciliation and compromise in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Maoz & McCauley, 2005).

Thus we assume here that stronger negative feelings of hatred, anger, and fear towards Palestinians, as well as weaker positive feelings of sympathy towards them, constitute a major barrier to transition to the envisaged reconciliation and
cooperation in Jerusalem (Hasson et al., 2005). Such emotional configurations of strong hatred and little sympathy towards Palestinians can significantly lower the support for compromise venues in Jerusalem, which are a necessary prerequisite for transition to post-conflict cooperation and reconciliation.

**Ideological Factors in Reconciliation: Hawk-Dove Identification and Greater Religiosity**

Lower support for compromise and reconciliation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has also been found to be strongly determined by two ideological factors: hawkish political identification (Bar-Tal, Raviv, & Freund, 1994; Maoz, 1999; Maoz, Ward, Katz & Ross, 2002; Shamir & Shamir, 2000) and greater religiosity (Yuchtman-Yaar et al., 1997). In line with these previous findings it is reasonable to assume that more hawkish positions and greater religiosity are also related to lower support for the envisaged compromise, cooperation, and reconciliation in Jerusalem.

**Part 2: The Psychology of Transition to Post-Conflict Cooperation and Reconciliation in Jerusalem as a Divided City: A Study of Jewish-Israeli Public Opinion**

Given the significance of public opinion in the implementation of compromise, cooperation, and reconciliation policies in post-conflict situations, it is important to understand the different factors that influence public attitudes on such issues. Thus, the aim of this study is to explore the psychological and ideological factors described above, and examine the extent to which these factors influence the readiness of the Jewish-Israeli public for a transition to post-conflict reconciliation in Jerusalem.

A basic prerequisite for the transition from the present state of conflict to a state of post-conflict cooperation in Jerusalem, as described in the best-case scenarios and in the Jerusalem Vision (Hasson et al., 2005), is agreement between the sides on a compromise solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict envisaging two capitals in Jerusalem. Agreement on such a compromise requires public support on both sides.

Thus this study examines Jewish-Israeli perception of the collective Palestinian threat, and feelings of hatred, fear, and sympathy towards Palestinians, as well
as ideological and demographic factors, as predictors of attitudes towards the “two capitals in Jerusalem” compromise and reconciliation venue.

**Overview of the Study**

The aims of this study are (1) to examine the extent to which the Jewish-Israeli public supports the two capitals compromise solution in Jerusalem, as compared to the support for other two-state and quasi two-state solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; (2) to identify psychological factors and other (ideological and demographic) factors that constitute barriers to the transition to cooperation and reconciliation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, insofar as they lower support for “two capitals in Jerusalem”; (3) to examine the extent to which different subgroups in the Jewish-Israeli population differ in their support for the “two capitals” compromise.

**Methods**

Telephone interviews (N=504) were conducted by the Machshov Research Institute with a representative sample of adult Jewish Israelis in April 2005. The survey included one set of questions measuring the respondents’ attitudes toward various compromise solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including the two capitals in Jerusalem solution. Another set of questions assessed the psychological predictors: the respondents’ threat perceptions and their feelings towards Palestinians. We also included measurements of religiosity and hawkishness, and of demographic variables. The study is also based on relevant survey data collected in 2002 and 2003.

**Questions and Measurements**

Presented below are the different questions and measurements used in this study concerning (A) Compromise Solution Options; (B) Predictors of Public Attitudes.

**(A) Compromise Solution Options**

Our study focused, as described above, on the “two capitals in Jerusalem” compromise and reconciliation venue. The formulation of this option, as presented in our study, is as follows:
1. **The “Two Capitals in Jerusalem” Compromise and Reconciliation Venue.** In the framework of a peace agreement, Israel will withdraw from the territories to the 1967 lines, with territorial adjustments taking into account Israeli security needs. A Palestinian state will be established, and in Jerusalem there will be two capitals – an Israeli capital in the western part and a Palestinian capital in the eastern part. The Palestinians will commit themselves to preventing terrorist acts against Israel.

General public support for “two capitals in Jerusalem” was compared to support for the following compromise solutions, which have been an essential part of political discourse concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict:

2. **Jerusalem under Israeli Sovereignty.** In the framework of a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, Israel will withdraw from the territories to the 1967 lines, with territorial adjustments taking into account Israel’s security needs into account. Jerusalem will remain under Israeli sovereignty, a Palestinian state will be established, and the Palestinians will commit themselves to preventing terrorist acts against Israel.

3. **Road Map Leading to Palestinian State.** Within the framework of a peace agreement, in the first phase a provisional Palestinian state will be established, consisting of the Gaza Strip and around 40% of the West Bank. In the second phase an independent, democratic Palestinian state will be established with Israeli-Palestinian agreement on borders, Jerusalem, and Jewish settlements. The Palestinians will commit themselves to preventing terrorist acts against Israel.

4. **Unilateral Withdrawal.** Israel will unilaterally withdraw from territories in the West Bank and Gaza to secure its lines of defense. Three major clusters of settlements will remain inside Israel: the Etzion bloc, the area of Jerusalem, and the area of Ariel. The Jordan Valley will also be under Israeli security control. A security fence will be constructed that will prevent unmonitored passage from the territories to Israel. Isolated settlements will be evacuated or transferred to clusters of settlements.
(B) Predictors of Public Attitudes (Scales and Variables)

The predictors used in the study included the following:

Psychological Scales

1. Hatred towards Palestinians (Hate, anger, disgust)  
   (Mean = 3.4, SD = 1.4, Reliability (Alpha Cronbach) = .7).

2. Sympathy towards Palestinians (liking, understanding).  
   (Mean = 2.0, SD = 1.6, Reliability (Alpha Cronbach) = .8).

3. Personal fear of Palestinians and of Palestinian terrorism (“I’m afraid of Palestinians,” “I’m afraid that I or my family will be injured in a Palestinian terrorist attack”).  
   (Mean = 3.8, SD = 1.3, Reliability (Alpha Cronbach) = .6).

4. Perceptions of collective threat from Palestinians (“Palestinians would destroy the State of Israel if they could,” “Palestinians hate Israelis,” “I am concerned about waves of Palestinian terrorism against Israel,” “One cannot trust Palestinians”).  
   (Mean = 4.4, SD = 1.2, Reliability (Alpha Cronbach) = .7).

Other Prediction Variables

1. Hawk-dove political identification

2. Religiosity

3. Demography (SES, education, gender, age, ethnicity)

Public Opinion Study Findings

The findings of the public opinion study are presented under the following three headings:

1. Support of the Jewish-Israeli public for the “two capitals” compromise and reconciliation venue, at three points in time over the past
few years, as compared to support for other compromise solutions in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

2. Psychological and other factors predicting support for “two capitals in Jerusalem”.

3. Support for “two capitals in Jerusalem” in different subgroups of the Jewish-Israeli population.

(1) Jewish-Israeli Public Support for the “Two Capitals” Compromise and Reconciliation Venue as Compared to Support for Other Compromise Solutions in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Table 1 below shows our results concerning Jewish-Israeli support for the “two capitals” compromise solution, as compared to support for other compromise solutions in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over the past few years.

Table 1
Support for “two capitals in Jerusalem” over the years as compared to support of other compromise solutions: Means, (SD), and percentage of supporters. (rating 4, 5, and 6 on a 1 to 6 scale)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Two capitals in Jerusalem</td>
<td>2.5 (1.7)</td>
<td>2.5 (1.7)</td>
<td>2.4 (1.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem under Israeli</td>
<td>3.3 (1.7)</td>
<td>3.2 (1.7)</td>
<td>3.5 (1.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovereignty</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road map</td>
<td>3.4 (1.7)</td>
<td>3.3 (1.7)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unilateral withdrawal</td>
<td>3.4 (1.6)</td>
<td>3.7 (1.6)</td>
<td>3.6 (1.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The data in Table 1 demonstrate the following major points concerning public support for compromise solutions in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over the years:

- Support for the different solutions is quite consistent over the years. Support for the “two capitals” solution is consistently and significantly lower than for the three other solutions.

- Most interestingly, the support for the “two capitals” solution is consistently lower than the support for the very similar “Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty” solution.

- Our findings point to the special sensitivity of the Israeli public to the “two capitals” compromise in Jerusalem. Thus, strategies of transition to the envisaged reconciliation and cooperation in Jerusalem should deal with sources of objection to such a compromise.

(2) Psychological and Other Factors Determining Support for the “Two Capitals in Jerusalem” Compromise and Reconciliation Venue

To examine the factors determining support for “two capitals in Jerusalem”, we performed a stepwise regression analysis in three consecutive stages. The first stage was to examine psychological factors predicting support. The second stage examined ideological factors adding to the prediction of support; and the third stage examined the further contribution of demographic and other factors to the prediction of support. The results are shown in Table 2 below.
Table 2
Psychological, ideological, demographic, and other factors determining support for the “two capitals in Jerusalem” compromise and reconciliation venue: general public

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total explained variance (R²)</th>
<th>Addition (R² Change)</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 1: Psychology</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat perception</td>
<td>R² = 17%</td>
<td></td>
<td>P &lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sympathy</td>
<td>R² = 18.3%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>P &lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 2: Ideological</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawk-dove</td>
<td>R² = 23.8%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>P &lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>R² = 26.8%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>P &lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 3: Demographic and other</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td>R² = 28.6%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>P &lt; .001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data in Table 2 demonstrate the following major points regarding the factors determining support for the “two capitals in Jerusalem” compromise and reconciliation option:

- The following factors were found to be significant in predicting increased support for the “two capitals in Jerusalem” compromise and reconciliation option: perception of low collective threat from Palestinians (i.e., low rating for “Palestinians would destroy Israel if...
they could” and “Palestinians hate Jews”); high sympathy towards Palestinians (i.e., high ratings for feelings of understanding and liking towards Palestinians); dovish political attitudes; low religiosity; high SES.

- In combination, the factors of threat perception, sympathy, dovinness, religiosity, and SES have a great relative influence (29%) in determining support for “two capitals” as part of the envisioned reconciliation and cooperation in Jerusalem.

- Factors not contributing to the prediction of support for “two capitals in Jerusalem” were personal fear of Palestinians and of Palestinian terrorism, hatred of Palestinians, and demographics (SES, education, gender, age, and ethnicity).

(3) Support for “Two Capitals in Jerusalem” in Different Subgroups of the Jewish-Israeli Population

This section will identify subgroups that can block a process of transition to reconciliation and cooperation in Jerusalem, as they show especially high resistance to the envisioned “two capitals” compromise. We also identify other subgroups here that can help advance such a transition with their high support for compromise. The following are examined:

(a) Jerusalem compromise support among hawks and doves

(b) Jerusalem compromise support among groups with different levels of religiosity

(c) Jerusalem compromise support among different socioeconomic groups.

(a) Jerusalem Compromise Support Among Hawks and Doves

Table 3 and Figure 1 below present our findings with regard to the support of different political groups in Israeli society (hawks, center, doves) for “two capitals in Jerusalem”. For the sake of comparison, we also present findings regard-
ing the other Jerusalem solution included in this study, which leaves the city under full Israeli sovereignty.

Table 3
Jerusalem compromise support among hawks and doves: Means, (SD) and percentage of support (Rated 4, 5, 6 on a 1 to 6 scale)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hawks</th>
<th>Center</th>
<th>Doves</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Two capitals in Jerusalem</strong></td>
<td>Mean = 1.8</td>
<td>Mean = 2.6</td>
<td>Mean = 3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.2)</td>
<td>(1.6)</td>
<td>(1.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
<td>62.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty</strong></td>
<td>Mean = 2.8</td>
<td>Mean = 3.5</td>
<td>Mean = 3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.7)</td>
<td>(1.7)</td>
<td>(1.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>37.3%</td>
<td>52.5%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1

Jerusalem Solutions Support of Hawks and Doves

![Graph showing support for different Jerusalem solutions among hawks and doves.](attachment:graph.png)
The data above indicates that only a minority of Jewish-Israeli hawks support “two capitals in Jerusalem”, while the majority of doves support this compromise. It is however interesting to note, that although the percentage is not high (14.6%), there is some support among the more hawkish population for “two capitals in Jerusalem.”

(b) Jerusalem Compromise Support among Groups with Different Levels of Religiosity

Table 4 and Figure 2 below present our findings with regard to the support among groups with different levels of religiosity for “two capitals in Jerusalem”. For the sake of comparison, we also present findings regarding the other Jerusalem solution included in our study that leaves the city under full Israeli sovereignty.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ultra-Orthodox</th>
<th>Religious</th>
<th>Respects tradition</th>
<th>Secular</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Two capitals in Jerusalem</strong></td>
<td>Mean = 1.2</td>
<td>Mean = 1.6</td>
<td>Mean = 2.2</td>
<td>Mean = 3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.7)</td>
<td>(1.1)</td>
<td>(1.3)</td>
<td>(1.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty</strong></td>
<td>Mean = 2.5</td>
<td>Mean = 2.7</td>
<td>Mean = 2.7</td>
<td>Mean = 3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.8)</td>
<td>(1.6)</td>
<td>(1.6)</td>
<td>(1.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32.6%</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
<td>58.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The findings presented above indicate that the Israeli ultra-orthodox Jewish population group shows very low support (but still, surprisingly, some support) for the “two capitals” option. As could be expected, the secular population group shows a much higher and considerable support for this compromise. Thus, interestingly, nearly half of secular Israeli Jews support the idea of two capitals – an Israeli one and a Palestinian one - in Jerusalem.

(c) Jerusalem Compromise Support Among Different Socioeconomic Groups

Table 5 and Figure 3 below present our findings with regard to the support among different socioeconomic groups for “two capitals in Jerusalem”. For the sake of comparison, we also present findings regarding the other Jerusalem solution included in our study that leaves the city under full Israeli sovereignty.
Table 5
Jerusalem compromise support among different socio-economic groups: Means, (SD) and percentage of support (Rated 4, 5, 6 on a 1 to 6 scale)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Upper quarter</th>
<th>Second quarter</th>
<th>Third quarter</th>
<th>Lower quarter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Two capitals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Jerusalem</td>
<td>Mean = 3.1</td>
<td>Mean = 2.7</td>
<td>Mean = 2.3</td>
<td>Mean = 2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.8)</td>
<td>(1.7)</td>
<td>(1.6)</td>
<td>(1.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>51.5%</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Jerusalem**   |               |                |               |              |
| under Israeli   | Mean = 3.7    | Mean = 3.4     | Mean =3.0     | Mean = 3.5   |
| sovereignty     | (1.8)         | (1.678)        | (1.7)         | (1.9)        |
|                | 60.6%         | 50.5%          | 39.5%         | 54.5%        |

Figure 3

The findings above clearly indicate that we can find relatively high support for “two capitals in Jerusalem” (more than 50%) in the higher Jewish-Israeli socio-economic status group (upper quarter). This support decreases for the lower
SES groups, but still remains considerable even for the third and fourth quarter (about 25% support in each of these groups).

Part 3: Strategic Recommendations

The findings of our study indicate that the “two capitals in Jerusalem” compromise and reconciliation venue has received consistently low support from the Jewish-Israeli public over the years.

Our findings point to the special sensitivity of the Israeli public to compromise in Jerusalem that might lead to cooperation and reconciliation.

Thus, strategies of transition to the envisioned reconciliation and cooperation in Jerusalem should deal with the sources of objection to such compromise.

This study identified the factors of threat perception, sympathy, dovishness, and religiosity as having a great relative influence in determining support for “two capitals in Jerusalem”.

Thus, strategies of transition to the “Jerusalem Vision” should be shaped around these factors and give primary consideration. Such strategies should focus on changing the psychological perceptions and attitudes that have been found here as determining support for the envisioned compromise, reconciliation, and cooperation in Jerusalem.

Different devices, such as greater exposure to accurate information on the conflict and on the relative strength of each side, should be used in order to try to modify exaggerated perceptions of the collective threat posed to Israel by the Palestinians.

Such strategies should also use various devices (such as organized dialogues) to increase sympathy towards Palestinians.

In addition, transition mechanisms should specifically identify and address the centers of higher resistance indicated here: the sectors in the population that tend to show considerably lower support for the envisioned compromise and reconciliation in Jerusalem, such as the hawkish, lower socioeconomic, and religious sectors. Transition mechanisms for the envisioned cooperation and rec-
conciliation in Jerusalem should specifically address these subgroups and include devices to draw them into a process of compromise and reconciliation in Jerusalem.

At the same time, the subgroups that show considerably high support for compromise in Jerusalem, such as the dovish, secular, and higher socioeconomic sectors, should be treated as resources that can help advance a process of transition to the envisioned cooperation and reconciliation in Jerusalem.
References


Jarymowicz, M. & D. Bar-Tal (2002). The Dominance of Fear over Hope in the Life of Individuals and Collectives. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University.


